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Notes On Revised Edition
This is the second revised and updated edition of The Maritime
Strategic Debates: A Guide to the Renaissance of U.S. Naval Strategic
Thinking in the 1980s . The original version, prepared by Capt. Peter M.
Swarz, U.S. Navy, first appeared in part in the U.S. Naval Institute's
special "White Paper" supplement to the January 1986 issue of the
Proceedings. The first revised edition was published in the spring of 1988 by
the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School as "Technical Report NPS-56-88-009,"
"
again authored by Capt. Swarz. This revision continues to build on Capt.
Swartz' pioneering work. Key changes from the first two editions include
the following:
• annotated entries alphabetized by author's last name;
• approximately 200 additional entries, including, in particular, an
extensive sample of overseas views and commentary.
Since the publication of the bibliography's first edition, the volume
and range of written commentary on maritime strategical issues has
grown by leaps and bounds. Accordingly, the 200 new entries in this
document barely scratch the surface of the recent literature on the subject.
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General Introduction
This is a bibliography with a point of view. It takes as a departure
point the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, as
enunciated by the civilian and military leaders of the U.S. Government,
especially the Department of the Navy. It includes criticism of and
commentaries on that strategy, as well as items relating the Maritime
Strategy to overall national and allied military strategy, and to historical
precedents. In addition, it covers both how the Strategy was developed and
who developed it, and the important role of wargaming.
The Maritime Strategy has generated enormous debate. All sides and
aspects of the debate are presented here. The focus, however, is on that
Strategy. Absent are discussions of naval affairs which do not have as their
points of departure—explicitly or implicitly—the contemporary Maritime
Strategy debate.
In order to trace the ebb and flow of ideas and events over time, items
are listed chronologically, by occurrence or publication date, rather than
merely alphabetically. Authoritative official statements of the Maritime
Strategy are indicated by an asterisk (*). Explicit direct commentaries on
the Maritime Strategy are indicated by a double asterisk (**). The other
items listed deal implicitly with various antecedents.
Publications on Sister Service and Allied contributions to the
Maritime Strategy are listed separately, to aid the reader/researcher.
(Admittedly, this and other artificial topological devices run against a
central theme of the Maritime Strategy—its global, "seamless web"
character. Also, only cursory attention is paid to pre-1981 Navy strategic
thinking on global war, a structural shortcoming that cannot legitimately
be cited as evidence that such thinking was lacking.

I. MARITIME STRATEGY DEBATES: 1979-1985
American military strategy and its maritime component have been
debated since the foundation of the republic. Following World War II,
maritime strategy concerns centered around peacetime presence,
antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and the Navy's role in nuclear strike
warfare against the Soviet Union. During the late 1950s and 1960s the focus
shifted to limited war and deterrence through nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarine (SSBN) operations. In the early 1970s, the debate
centered on then Chief of Naval Operations Elmo R. Zumwalt's formulation
of the "Four Missions of the Navy": strategic deterrence, sea control, power
projection, and peacetime presence. A major body of literature began to be
created then on presence. In the mid-1970s, sea control seemed to dominate
discussions.
In 1978, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward became Chief of Naval
Operations. His views on strategy had been heavily influenced by his
experience as Seventh Fleet Commander and Pacific Fleet Commander-in-
Chief in the post-Vietnam environment. Admiral Hayward's focus was on
flexible offensive forward power projection, conducted globally and in
conjunction with allies and sister services, especially against the Soviet
Union and its attacking forces. Much of this was a return to concepts
familiar to U.S. naval officers of the first post-World War II decade. That
era's focus on nuclear strikes, however, now broadened to encompass a
much wider range of options, primarily conventional.
Admiral Hayward outlined his views publicly in his initial 1979
testimony before Congress, and subsequently in the pages of the
Proceedings. The naval strategic renaissance and the resultant debate he
and others sparked continues to this day, fueled by the statements and
policies of the Reagan Administration, especially its first Secretary of the
Navy, John F. Lehman, Jr., who served from February 1981 to April 1987.
The initial public Maritime Strategy discussion of the early 1980s had
largely taken the form of a debate on the pages of American public and
foreign affairs and national security periodicals. This debate has focused on
two themes: the general forward strategic principles (and certain highly
publicized Norwegian Sea examples) enunciated repeatedly by Secretary of
the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr. and a perceived "Maritime Strategy versus
Coalition Warfare" dichotomy incessantly alleged by former Under
Secretary of Defense Robert Komer and others.
At the same time, however, the staffs of the Chief of Naval Operations
and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in conjunction with officers of
their sister services and allied, had been asked to develop for internal use a
detailed description of the Maritime Strategy component of U.S. national
military strategy. This Maritime Strategy rigorously integrated into one
clear, consistent document a number of long held views of Navy and
Marine Corps senior officers, certain newly refined concepts developed in
the fleet and at the Naval War College, agreed national intelligence
estimates, the strategic principles articulated by Secretary Lehman and
other Reagan Administration officials, and a thoughtful discussion of the
variety and range of uncertainties inherent in the strategy.
Concepts developed by the Navy's warfare communities and fleets, as
well as by Army, Air Force, joint and allied commanders, were examined
and incorporated as appropriate. Where inconsistencies appeared, hard
choices were made. Uncertainties and limitations were identified.
Properly, the job was spearheaded by the Strategic Concepts Group on the
staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-603).
The U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Maritime Strategy was codified initially
in 1982 to focus Navy program development efforts more tightly. Its basic
premises already had been underlying Navy planning, gaming, and
exercises. Subsequently, congressional testimony in 1983 released an initial
edition of the Maritime Strategy to the public. A classified revision to the
strategy statement was approved by the Navy's Program Review Committee
(chaired by then Vice Admiral Carlisle Trost) in October 1983 and signed
and distributed Navy-wide by Admiral James D. Watkins, then Chief of
Naval Operations, in 1984.
Various unclassified elements of the strategy began to find their way
into naval affairs journals, especially the Proceedings . Writings on naval
strategy that did not take the Maritime Strategy as a starting point began to
fade. By 1985, enough authoritative congressional testimony, speeches, op-
ed pieces, journal articles, and letters-to-the-editor, penned by senior naval
officers and well-placed civilian commentators, had appeared for the
essential elements of the Maritime Strategy to be accessible to the public.
Public commentary gradually shifted from exegeses on the press
conferences, speeches, and articles of Secretary Lehman and Ambassador
Komer to discussions on aspects of the actual Maritime Strategy developed
largely by military officers from national and alliance guidance and
approved by civilian leadership.
Promulgation of the Maritime Strategy fostered increasing public
and government discourse. Within the Navy, the interplay among the
Maritime Strategy, force-level planning, fleet plans and operations, and
professional education and training became a governing dynamic. In the
open literature, the number of writings on the strategy rose from a handful
of newspaper and journal articles in 1981 to an avalanche of government
documents, books, and articles in 1986, including over 145,000 copies
distributed of the Proceedings ' watershed "The Maritime Strategy"
January 1986 supplement alone. This quantitative leap was accompanied by
qualitative changes in both the background of the commentators and the
sophistication of their arguments.
Contrary to much uninformed external criticism of the early 1980s,
the Maritime Strategy was presented by the Navy as only one, albeit a vital
component of the national military strategy. It was not presented as a
recommended dominant theme of that national strategy. Also contrary to
earlier uninformed criticism, the strategy embodied the views of unified
and fleet commanders as well as Washington military and civilian
planners and Newport thinkers. The Navy Department and the fleet were
now speaking with one sophisticated voice to, and increasingly for, the
nation and its allies.
Ackley, R.T., "No Bastions for the Bear: Round 2," Proceedings .
April 1985, pp 42-47. Also "Comment and Discussion," May 1985, pp
14-17, July 1985, p 112. More on the anti-SSBN mission.
Arkin, William M. and Chappell, David, "Forward Offensive
Strategy: Raising the Stakes in the Pacific," World Policy Journal .
Summer 1985, pp 481-500. Forward operations in the Northeast
Pacific seen as "provocative and destabilizing." Similar in tone and
political coloration to Barry Posen 1 982 critique of Norwegian Sea
operations.
Arkin, William M., "Nuclear Weapons at Sea," Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists . October 1983, pp 6-7. Sees U.S. Navy theater
nuclear weapons under development as destablitizing, despite Soviet
theater nuclear naval programs.
Ball, Desmond, "Nuclear War At Sea," International Security .
Winter 1985-86, pp 3-31. Argues against anti-SSBN operations and for
more U.S. Navy focus on the escalatory dangers of theater nuclear
war at sea. Not particularly accurate.
Betts, Richard K., Cruise Missiles: Technology. Strategy. Politics .
Washington: Brookings, 1981, pp 537-540. See discussion of carrier
penetration of Soviet waters as "peacetime deterrent rhetoric" about
risky "missions that could turn into a naval Charge of the Light
Brigade."
Bond, Larry, and Ries, Tomas, "Controversy: A New Strategy for the
North-East Atlantic?" International Defense Review . 12/1984, pp 1803-
4. USN and NATO naval strategy.
Bowling, Capt. R.A., USN (Ret.), "Keeping Open the Sea-Lanes,
"
Proceedings . December 1985, pp 92-98. Argues for a return to SLOC
protection focus for the U.S. Navy.
Breemer, Jan S., "The Soviet Navy's SSBN Bastions: Evidence
Inference, and Alternative Scenarios," RUSI Journal . March 1985,
pp 18-26. Includes useful review of literature.
** Brooks, Capt. Linton F., "Escalation and Naval Strategy,"
Proceedings . August 1984, pp 33-37. Also "Comment and
Discussion," October 1984, pp 28-29; November 1984, pp 18, 24;
December 1984, p 174. On Maritime Strategy and nuclear weapons by
an important articulate contributor to development of the Strategy.
Focus of public debate begins to shift to the Strategy as it actually is,
rather than the Strategy as it is alleged to be.
Brown, Harold, Thinking About National Security: Defense and
Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World . Boulder CO: Westview Press
1983. By the 1977-1981 Secretary of Defense. Mildly critical of forward
carrier operations. More strongly critical of the 600-ship Navy build-
up. See especially pp 100-101, 121-123, 171-187.
Caldwell, Hamlin, "Arctic Submarine Warfare," Submarine Review .
July 19892, pp 4-13. Develops further the arguments in his 1981
article.
Caldwell, Hamlin, "The Empty Silo—Strategic ASW, Naval War
College Review . September-October 1981, pp. 4-14. Call for anti-SSBN
operations in Soviet home water bastions.
Carnegie Panel on U.S. Security and the Future of Arms Control,
Challenges for U.S. National Security: Assessing the Balance:
Defense Spending and Conventional Forces: A Preliminary Report.
Part II
.
Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1981. Chapter 3, pp 99-148, assesses the naval balance and identifies
key issues. No policy recommendations. Comprehensive and even
handed. Unlike the Maritime Strategy, purely budget-oriented.
Cohen, Eliot A., "The Long-Term Crisis of the Alliance," Foreign
Affairs . Winter 1982/3, pp 325-343. A Naval War College faculty
member argues for strengthening the U.S. Navy, creation of a "Fifth
Fleet," global U.S. military focus and increased European military
responsibilities in NATO. Seeks to bridge the "Atlanticist vs navalist"
debate.
Collins, Col. John M., USA (Ret.), U.S.-Soviet Military Balance 1980-
1985 . Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985. Compares strategy
and policy as well as force levels. See especially Chapter 11. Also
Chapters 9, 12 and 16.
Corddry, Charles W., "Navy Grows Toward 600-Ship Fleet, But
Sustaining It May be a Problem," Baltimore Sun . May 22, 1985, p 1.
Cites Congressional Budget Office (CBO) skepticism that the 600-ship
fleet goal may not be sustainable with the anticipated decline of
defense budget growth.
Corry, James, "Strategy of the Navy for the War of the Future," New
York Times . May 17, 1984, p C-25. Preview of "The Return of the
Great White Fleet," broadcast on television on May 17, 1984. Finds
that the program's portrayal of the large vs. small carrier debate was
"stacked against" John Lehman's 15-carrier battlegroup plan.
Dunn, Keith A., and Staudenmaier, Col. William 0., USA, Strategic
Implications of the Continental-Maritime Debate (Washington Paper
#107) . Washington: CSIS, 1984. Expands arguments made in their
Foreign Policy article.
Dunn, Keith A., and Staudenmaier, Col. William O., USA, "Strategy
for Survival," Foreign Policy . Fall 1983, pp 22-41. Also Komer and
Dunn and Staudenmaier letters, Winter 1983-84, pp 176-178. The
"Carlisle School" again. Seeks to synthesize all points in the
maritime-continental debate.
Dunn, Keith A., and Staudenmaier, Col. William O., USA, "The
Retaliatory Offensive and Operational Realities in NATO," Survival.
May-June 1985, pp 108-118. Shows Maritime Strategy similarities to
Samuel Huntington proposals to adopt retaliatory offensive strategy
on the ground and in the air in Europe. Argues against both.
Epstein, Joshua M., "Horizontal Escalation: Sour Notes of a
Recurrent Theme," International Security . Winter 1983/84, pp 19-31,
especially pp 23-25. Also reprinted in Art, Raymond and Waltz,
Kenneth (eds.), The Use of Force (second edition), 1983, and updated
as Chapter 3 of Epstein's Strategy and Force Planning: The Case of
the Persian Gulf. Washington: Brookings 1987. Critique of
'Horizontal Escalation,' not only as a counter to a Soviet invasion of
Iran, but also apparently as a function of maritime forces in a global
war with the Soviets. Sees Soviet-Chinese wartime relationship as
unaffected by naval considerations, and regards Soviet ground force
numbers as virtually limitless. No discussion of possible Soviet air
force redeployment, however.
* Fogarty, Como. William, "Navy Maritime Strategy Moving on
Offensive," Navv Times . August 20, 1984, pp 25-26. Fogarty outlines
maritime Strategy.
* Foley, Adm. Sylvester R., Jr., "Strategic Factors in the Pacific,"
Proceedings . August 1985, pp 34-38. Retiring PACFLT Commander-
in-Chief discusses his task in context of overall Maritime Strategy.
Shows one component commander's view of the Strategy.
** Friedman, Norman, "A Survey of Western ASW in 1985,"
International Defense Review . 10/1985, pp 1587-97. Maritime Strategy
and the North Atlantic ASW campaign: Open ocean vs close-in vs
convoy campaigns.
Friedman, Norman, "U.S. Maritime Strategy," International
Defense Review . 7/1985, pp 1071-1075. A prominent civilian naval
affairs commentator analyzes rationale for USN Maritime Strategy.
** George, James L. (ed.), The U.S. Navv: The View From the Mid-
1980s . Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985. Papers delivered at a
Center for Naval Analyses conference, Fall 1984. See chapters by Dov
Zakheim on "Land Based Aviation and Maritime Warfare," Robert
Wood and John T. Hanley, Jr., on "The Maritime Role in the North
Atlantic," and "Commentaries," by retired Admirals Robert Long
and Harry Train. Admiral Long's Pacific Command"Concept of
Operations: and his Pacific Command Campaign Plan were
important building blocks for the Maritime Strategy.
Getler, Michael, "Too Late to Stop Fleet Buildup, says Navy
Secretary," Washington Post . December 2, 1982, p 16. Reports on a
Brookings Institution seminar on military budgets, including
SECNAV Lehman's rejection of calls for reduced Navy spending as
"too late to stop it."
Getler, Michael, "Lehman Sees Norwegian Sea as a Key to Soviet
Naval Strategy," Washington Post . December 29, 1982, p 4. Reports
Lehman's call for a navy and strategy to fight a global war at sea,
involving simultaneous operations in multiple theaters. U.S.
pressure against the Kola Peninsula (which Lehman denied meant
taking the carriers close to the Soviet mainland) will afford "a
tremendous bit of leverage because (the Sqviets can't afford to lose
that. ..They'd lost their whole strategic submarine fleet if they lose
Kola."
Geyelin, Philip, "Mr. Lehman's Dream Navy," Washington Post .
October 2, 1981, p 29. Question's the Navy's need and ability to fight a
"global Trafalgar conveniently confined to blue water and
conventional weapons."
Glenn, Senator John, Carter, Barry E., Komer, Robert W.,
Rethinking Defense and Conventional Forces . Washington: Center
for National Policy, 1983. Two ex-Army officers, Carter, pp 33-35, and
Komer, pp 46-48, attack the Maritime Strategy and the 600-ship Navy.
Gordon, Michael R., "Lehman's Navy Riding High, But Critics
Question Its Strategy and Rapid Growth," National Journal .
September 21, 1985, pp 21 20+. Wide-ranging review ofmany aspects
of the debate.
Hamm, Manfred, "Ten Steps to Counter Moscow's Threat to
Northern Europe," Backgrounder (The Heritage Foundation), No.
1356, May 30, 1984. Calls for rather modest U.S. and allied maritime
counters to a greatly increased Soviet threat.
** Harris, Cdr. R. Robinson, and Benkert, Lcdr. Joseph, "Is That All
There Is?" Proceedings . October 1985, pp 32-27. Surface combatants
and the Maritime Strategy.
Hart, Senator Gary, "Can Congress Come to Order?" Franck,
Thomas, (ed.), The Tethered Presidency . New York: New York
University Press, 1981, pp 242-3. A call for a national maritime-only
strategy and "obvious and indisputable naval superiority." The U.S.
Navy certainly shares the second goal, but not the first.
Hayward, Adm. Thomas B., "The Future of U.S. Sea Power,"
Proceedings/Naval Review . May 1979, pp. 66-71; Also Zumwalt, Adm.
Elmo R., Jr., "Total Force," pp. 103-106; and "Comment and
Discussion," July 1979, pp. 23-24; August 1979, pp. 87-89; September
1979, pp. 89-91 ; October 1979, p. 21; December 1979, p. 88; January
1980, pp. 82-86. Public debate on the new era of U. S. Navy strategy
begins. Hayward, Zumwalt, Bill Lind, Norman Friedman, et al. See
also Hayward "Posture Statement" testimony before Congress, 1979-
1982.
Hayward, Thomas B., Adm. USN, Untitled remarks before the
annual convention of the Association of Naval Aviation, Wings
of Gold . Summer 1982, pp 57-60. The former CNO and one of the
"founding fathers" of the maritime strategy of the 1980s takes on the
"convoy syndrome" that he claims was being foisted upon the U.S.
Navy in the 1970s. The key principles of the Navy's strategy today
(1982), he says, are superiority, rejection of the "short war" theory,
forward operations, and "to take the fight to the enemy at the time we
want to, where we want to, at our option and not his."
Healy, Melissa, "Lehman: We'll Sink Their Subs," Defense Week .
May 13, 1985, p 18. Reports the SECNAV's oft-publicized comment,
made on April 19, 1985, that U.S. submarines will attack the Soviet
SSBN fleet "in the first five minutes of the war."
Holloway, Adm. James L., Ill, USN (Ret.), "The U.S. Navy—
A
Functional Appraisal," Oceanus . Summer 1985, pp 3-11.
Reformulation of pre-Maritime Strategy USN positions by Adm.
Hayward's predecessor as CNO. Similar to the Navy's 1978 Strategic
Concept of th U.S. Navv (NWP-1 ). Focus on sea control and on Soviet
Navy as anti-SLOC force.
Huntington, Samuel P., "The Defense Policy, 1981-1982," in
Greenstein, Fred I. (Ed.), The Reagan Presidency. An Early
Assessment. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1983,
pp. 82-116. Initial Reagan overall defense policies and strategy, the
contest of the Maritime Strategy.
Ikle, Fred Charles, "The Reagan Defense Program," A Focus on the
Strategic Imperatives," Strategic Review. Spring 1982, pp 11-18. By
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Especially good on
administration requirements for naval forces to provide options to
fight on a variety of fronts.
International Combat Arms . May 1985, Interview with SECNAV
John F. Lehman, Jr., pp 12-13. The SECNAV explains why the
Navy's 600-ship goal must be based on the "worst case" scenario of a
general conventional war with the Soviet Union. Automatically
embedded within this scenario, claims Lehman, is "every
conceivable peacetime crisis (as) a subset."
Jampoler, Capt. Andrew, "A Central Role for Naval Forces? ... to
Support the Land Battle," Naval War College Review . November-
December 1984, pp 4-12. Also "In My View," March-April 1985, pp 96-
97; July-August 1985 p 83. Mainstream U.S. Navy thinking.
Jenkins, Ronald Wayne, "Coalition Defense vs. Maritime Strategy: A
Critical Examination Illustrating a New Approach to Geopolitical
Analysis," unpublished PhD. dissertation, Pennsylvania State
University, 1985. A political geographer's take. Buys into
categorization of "Schools" popularized by Komer, Dunn and
Staudenmaier. Recognized irrelevance of much of the pre—1984
literature to "real-world" USN planning and programming
problems. Includes a study of the views of Naval War College officers
on geography and Maritime Strategy.
Kaufman, William W., Thel985 Defense Budget. Washington:
Brookings, 1984, especially pp 29-34. A snide critique of U.S. Navy
strategy and force level requests. Naval power projection forces seen
as only needed in Third World areas during a global war with the
Soviets. Unlike the Maritime Strategy, a purely budget-oriented
document. See also Kaufmann chapters in earlier 1982 and 1983
Brookings annuals edited by Joseph Pechman, Setting National
Priorities: 1983 and 1984 . and his 1981 Defense in the 1980s .
Kaufmann, William W., The 1986 Defense Budget. Washington,
Brookings, 1985, especially pp 32-35. Another sarcastic Kaufmann
budget-oriented critique, including an unduly sanguine view of allied
naval capabilities.
Kennedy, Col. William V., USAR (Ret.), "Tailor military Strategy to
the Economy," Philadelphia Inquirer . May 26, 1982, p 25. Sees the
Reagan Administration as building a new maritime strategy on top
of an old continental strategy. Considers the Soviet Far East as the
key Soviet vulnerability for naval forces to exploit.
Kennedy, Floyd D., Jr., "From SLOC Protection to a National
Maritime Strategy: The U.S. Navy under Carter and Reagan, 1977-
1984," in Hagan, Kenneth J., (ed.), In Peace and War . (Second
Edition), Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1984. (Mostly on operations
and shipbuilding. Sees Secretary Lehman's contribution as a
reorientation of national strategy rather than simply an
enhancement of its maritime elements).
Klare, Michael T., "Securing the Fire Break," World Policy Journal
.
Spring 1985, pp 229-247. Sees forward offensive operations for ships
with both nuclear and conventional capabilities as eroding the
8
firebreak between nuclear and non-nuclear combat and raising the
likelihood of nuclear war.
Koburger, Capt. C. W. , USCGR, "Pitts' Choice: An Alternative
NATO Strategy for the USA," Navv International . December 1981, pp
730-731. Like that of Sen. Hart, one of the very few real examples of a
call for a "pure" national maritime strategy, a position often falsely
attributed to proponents of the U.S. Navy Maritime Strategy.
Komer, Robert, Maritime Strategy of Coalition Defense . Cambridge,
MA: Abt Books, 1984. Also review by Dr. Dov Zakheim, Political
Science Quarterly . Winter 1984-85, pp 721-722. Ambassador Komer's
last salvo before November 1984 elections, with administration retort.
Komer, Robert, "Maritime Strategy vs. coalition Defense," Foreign
Affairs. Summer 1982, pp 1, 124-1, 144. Also Turner, Adm.
Stansfield, and Thibault, Capt. George, "Preparing for the
Unexpected: The Need for a New Military Strategy," Fall 1982, pp 125-
135; "Comments and Correspondence: Maritime Strategies," Winter
1982/3, pp 453-457. The debate jumps to a wider arena: Komer vs.
Turner vs. Lehman. Ambassador Komer had been a leading Carter
Administration Defense Department official from 1977 to 1981.
Lehman, John F., Jr., "Nine Principles for the Future of American
Maritime Power," Proceedings . February 1984, pp 47-51. Refinement
of Secretary Lehman's thought after three years in office.
Lehman, John F., Jr., "Rebirth of a U.S. Naval Strategy," Strategic
Review . Summer 1981, pp. 9-15. For more than two years, the basic
Navy public statement on Maritime Strategy. See also Lehman
"Posture Statement" testimony before Congress, 1981-1987, especially
regarding linkages among operations, strategy, and programs.
Lehman, John F., Jr., "Talking Surface with SECNAV," Surface
Warfare . September-October 1985, pp 2-10. SECNAV ties the
strategy, surface warfare and procurement issues together.
Lehman, John, Remarks before the Jewish War Veterans of the
USA, Washington, D.C., August 31, 1984. Reaffirms the need for
a forward strategy to "throw the Soviets on the defensive."
Lehman, John, "Support for Defense is Still Strong," Washington
Post . December 16, 1982, p. 23. "The Navy is working to do its part
in a team effort of forward-based air, land, and naval power. Navy
strategy is part and parcel of the national strategy of deterrence, not a
substitute for it".
Martin, Ben L., "Has There Been a Reagan Revolution in Defense
Policy?" World Affairs . Winter 1985-86, pp 173-182, especially 175-6.
Sees Maritime Strategy as the basis for horizontal escalation
doctrine, and both important only as U.S. Navy budget rationales.
"The idea of horizontal escalation itself is too inherently implausible
to find an enduring place in American strategic doctrine."
Martin, Laurence, NATO and the Defense of the West . New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985, especially pp 30-35 "Flanks," 51-56
"Warning, Mobilization and Reinforcement"; and 57-67 "The
Maritime Battle." Features graphics rivaling those in the official US
Navy Maritime Strategy testimony in their explanatory power and
often their complexity.
Maze, Rick, "CNO, SecNav in Agreement on Strategy, Lehman
Says," Navv Times . June 20, 1983, p 9. Disputes media reports that
the CNO and SECNAV are at odds over the early forward deployment
of carrier battlegroups into the Barents Sea.
McDonald, Adm. Wesley, "Mine Warfare: A Pillar of Maritime
Strategy," Proceedings. October 1985, pp 46-53. By the NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic and Commander-in-Chief
of the U.S. Atlantic Command and the U.S. Atlantic Fleet.
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Lodgaard, Sverre and Thee, Marek, (eds.), Nuclear Disengagement
in Europe . London: Taylor and Francis, 1983, pp 117.137.
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Strategy and Reagan administration policy.
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Kola, Vladivostok, and Petropavlovsk, by the 1970-1974 Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 1967-1970 Chief of Naval Operations.
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** Murray, Robert J., "A War-Fighting Perspective," Proceedings.
October 1983, pp 66-81. By a former Under Secretary of the Navy and
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Stockman, David, The Triumph of Politics: How the Reagan
Revolution Failed. New York: Harper and Row, 1986, pp 280-281.
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Summer 1985, pp 12-27, especially pp 20-21. Prominent conservatives
line up, pro or con, on the 600-ship Navy and the Maritime Strategy
as they understand it.
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Forces . No III/1985, pp 15-25. Update of Turner's thought,
emphasizing amphibious interventions and North Atlantic SLOC
protection.
U. S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Ninety-Seventh
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COMO Dudley Carlson publicly unveils a version of the U.S. Navy's
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report is in Bennett, Rep. Charles E., "The 600-Ship Fleet: Is it
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September 1985 . Washington: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
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research.
Ullman, Cdr. Harlan K., USN (Ret.), "The Pacific and U.S. Naval
Policy," Naval Forces . VI/1985, pp 36-48. Sees U.S. Navy Pacific
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as the role of Adm. Thomas Hayward as Pacific Fleet Commander,
originator of the "Sea Strike" study, and Chief of Naval Operations.
Ullman, Cdr. Harlan, USN (Ret.), Crisis or Opportunity? U.S.
Maritime Industries and National Security . Washington:
Georgetown CSIS, 1984. Pp 4-7 give a good quick summary of the
basic opposing viewpoints on U.S. naval strategy, eschewing the
extraneous elements usually dragged in by unknowledgeable would-
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** Ullman, Harlan K., and Etzold, Thomas H. Future Imperative:
National Security and the US Navv in the Late 1980s . Washington:
CSIS, 1985. See especially Ullman's critique of Maritime Strategy, pp
20-21, and 67. Contrast with Ullman riposte to Turner, Proceedings .
January 198, p 77.
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Soviet Maritime Challenge," in Taylor, William J., Jr., et al. (eds.),
Strategic Responses to Conflict in the 1980s . Lexington MA: D.C.
Health, 1984, pp 427-432. 1982 views of a former Naval War College
faculty member. Especially good on late 1970s internal U.S. Navy
strategy debates, and as critique of trying U.S. naval strategy too
closely to the Soviet naval threat. Qf approach taken by McGruther,
cited in Section XI below. This volume also contains some of
Ambassador Komer's early and retrospectively most lucid
arguments, at pp 196-199.
* Watkins, Adm. James D., "Current Strategy of U.S. Navy, " Los
Angeles Times . June 21, 1984, p 22 USN rebuttal to Komer, Robert,
"Carrier Heavy Navy is Waste-Heavy," Los Angeles Times . May 16,
1984, especially to alleged maritime vs. continental and Navy vs.
Europe dichotomies. See also Watkins "Posture Statement" testimony
before Congress, 1983-1986.
* Watkins, Adm. James D., "Maritime Strategy: Global and Forward,"
Baltimore Sun . April 16, 1985, p 15. USN rejoinder to a variety of
critics, especially Record, Jeffrey, "Sanctuary Warfare," Baltimore
Sun . March 16,1 985, p 7.
** Watkins, Adm. James D., "Reforming the Navy From Within,"
Defense 85 . November 1985, pp 18-20. The CNO on the role of the
Maritime Strategy within the Navy, and its basic characteristics.
"We lean heavily on our unified commanders-in-chief and Navy fleet
commanders to help strengthen, modernize, and then put into
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resulting competition of ideas have made for a robust dynamic
strategy that recognizes and reflects the complexity of strategic
issues as viewed by all key U.S. military leaders worldwide, not as
viewed by a parochial naval bureaucracy in Washington."
** Watkins, Adm. James D., "The Greatest Potential Problem: Our
National Willpower," Sea Power. October 1985, p 71. CNO describes
utility and development process of the Maritime Strategy.
* Watkins, James D., Adm., USN. "Alliance Maritime Power and
Deterrence of War." Remarks at the International Seapower
Symposium, Newport, RI, October 21, 1985. A plea and agenda
directed at an audience made up largely of allied naval
representatives for "bringing our common perspectives to bear
on a common problem" i.e. the integration of U.S. an dallied
maritime deterrence and war-fighting capabilities and plans into a
"global coalition deterrence strategy." The CNO's proposed "building
blocs" toward this goal are: (1) bilateral navy-to-navy talks, (2)
mutually-supporting bilateral maritime strategy agreements, (3)
joint regional maritime strategies, (4) war-gaming, and (5) a global
coalition strategy aimed at maritime deterrence.
* Watkins, James, D., Adm. USN, "We Are The Real Reformers."
Remarks at the Current Strategy Forum, Newport, RI, June 19, 1985.
Declares the Maritime Strategy the centerpiece of contemporary Navy
strategic thought, tactical developments, force planning, and
systems procurement. The Maritime Strategy is, reports Watkins,
the Navy's "strategic vision," initiated and sustained "from within,"
and "without much hoopla and without the help of self-appointed
military reformers..."
** West, F.J. "Bing" Jr., "Maritime Strategy and NATO Deterrence,"
Naval War College Review. September-October 1985, pp 5-19. By a
former Reagan Administration Assistant Secretary of Defense,
naval strategic thinker, and principal author of "SEAPLAN 2000," a
1978 progenitor of the Maritime Strategy. Excellent discussion of
conventional protracted war and deterrence concepts underlying the
strategy.
* Wings of Gold . Winter 1981, "CNO Discusses Current Issues."
Outgoing CNO, Adm. Thomas B. Hayward discusses the need for
a 600-ship and 15-carrier navy that will "make them worry about our
being the threat in a very significant way." He predicts that the new
Reagan administration's "new direction" will make his successor
"much more able to create havoc in the Kremlin (make Gorshkov
worry more) which is just what we want to do."
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Wood, Robert S. and Hanley, John P., Jr., "The Maritime Role in
the North Atlantic," Naval War College Review . November-
December 1985, pp 5-18. The Naval War College faculty begins to
weigh in heavily in the public debate.
Zakheim, Dov S., "The Role of Amphibious Operations in National
Military Strategy," Marine Corps Gazette . -March 1984, pp 35-39.
(Deputy Under Secretary of Defense explains Marine missions and
programs in context of overall administration strategy.)
Zakheim, Dov., "The Unforeseen Contingency: Reflections on
Strategy," Washington Quarterly . Autumn 1982, pp. 158-166. (Reagan
administration maritime strategy in overall military context, by a
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense.
Zimm, LCdr. Alan D., "The First Salvo." Proceedings. February
1985, pp 55-60. Also"Comment and Discussion," April 1985, p 16;
June 1985, p 132; July 1985, p 106. See especially for timing fo forward
carrier battle group moves and for strategy issues.
Zumwalt, Adm. Elmo R., Jr., USN (Ret.) "Naval Battles We Could
Lose," International Security Review , summer 1981 pp 139-155. (By
the 1970-1974 U. S. Navy CNO. Argues for more stress on the U.S.
Navy as "geopolitical cavalry" for low-to-middle-level conflict, and for
a "distributed force" building program as optimum for the full
spectrum of naval warfare requirements, including nuclear war at
sea).
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II. THE MARITIME STRATEGY DEBATE: 1986: THE WATERSHED
YEAR
In late 1985, Secretary Lehman, Admiral Watkins, and General
Kelley, having ensured that the Maritime Strategy met their requirements
and represented both their thinking and that of their superiors, submitted
manuscripts containing the strategy's basic tenets (less its uncertainties
and limitations) to the Naval Institute, following the publication of "The
Maritime Strategy," a special supplement to the January 1986 Proceedings ,
public discussion of the strategy took on a new, sophisticated tone, more
relevant to the actual requirements of U.S. national security decision
making. Subsequent statements by President Ronald Reagan, Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger and others confirmed for the public that the
strategy was consistent with higher civilian and military defense guidance.
In the United States and abroad, discussions ranging from global
warfare with the Soviets to naval history, fleet balance, and peacetime and
crisis operations became suffused with the vocabulary and concepts of the
Maritime Strategy. Much of the writing was now done by senior military
officers. Most notably, a spate of broad-gauged articles by naval aviation,
surface, and submarine warfare specialists appeared, transcending
narrow "unionism." Knowledgeable civilian strategic thinkers and
historians also offered their cogent commentary on the Strategy.
Proceedings now served as the primary forum, along with the Naval
War College Review, Sea Power, and Naval Forces. The arena, however,
also broadened to include more newspapers and popular magazines. The
public affairs and national security journals rediscovered the Maritime
Strategy, but now in a manner that brought together not only academics,
pundits, and military retirees, but also serving naval professionals. By
1987, the uniformed naval officer corps once again, as in the days of Alfred
Thayer Mahan or of the pre-World War II War Plan Orange, had captured
the high ground and catalyzed thinking about the Navy's role in national
an alliance strategy.
"Aircraft Carriers Use Technology, speed to Stage Vanishing Acts
on High Seas," Baltimore Sun . August 17, 1986, p 16. Discusses U.S.
Navy countermeasures to Soviet intelligence and targeting at sea, a
key element in carrying out the Maritime Strategy.
Archer, Clive and Scrivener, David (eds), Northern Waters: Security
and Resource Issues . Totowa NJ: Barnes and Noble, 1986. A series of
survey papers focusing on the Norwegian Sea. See especially Geoffrey
Till on Strategy, David Hobbs on Military Technology, and Steven
Miller on Reagan Administration Strategy. The Miller piece is
essentially an update of his 1983 paper, cited in Section I above.
** Ausland, John C, Nordic Security and the Great Powers . Boulder,
CO: Westview, 1986. Comprehensive and detailed treatment of the
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Maritime Strategy in peace and war within the overall context of
Nordic military security. See especially Chapter 20, "The Battle for
the Norwegian Sea," the author's "climax."
** Ausland, John, "The Silence on Naval Nuclear Arms Should Be
Broken," International Herald Tribune . March 12, 1986, p 25. A
critical look, at naval theater nuclear weapons and war fare and the
Maritime Strategy.
Bagley, Adm. Worth H., USN (Ret.), "U.S. Military Power in the
Pacific: Problems and Prospects," in International Security Council,
National Security in Northeast Asia . New York: CAUSA Publication,
April 13-15, 1986. Reverses the usual argument by treating NATO as
a "second front threat" diverting the Soviets from the Far East.
**
"Bridge Over Troubled Waters," Defense and Foreign Affairs . May
1986, pp 38-9. On the U.S. Navy's efforts to link technology and
weapons acquisition to the Maritime Strategy.
** Brooks, Capt. Linton, "Naval Power and National Security: The Case
for the Maritime Strategy," International Security . Fall 1986, pp 58-
87. One of the Strategy's contributors definitively expands on its basic
elements and on its rationale. Especially useful in discussing the
rationale for anti-SSBN operations and the Strategy's inherent
uncertainties, integral aspects of the Maritime Strategy often
slighted in public official U.S. Navy discussions.
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Game Plan: The Geostrategic Framework for
the Conduct of the U.S.—Soviet Contest . Boston: Atlantic Monthly
Press, 1986. Views role of the Navy as one of "Sea Control" and
projecting American power into "distant local conflicts," rather than
carrier strikes on "Soviet home ports" or "strategic nuclear
warfare." See pp 183-4, 191-2.
Bunting, Glenn F., "Navy Warms up to Idea of Presence in Cold
Bering Sea," Los Angeles Times . August 31, 1986, p 3. Maritime
Strategy as reflected in increased U.S. Navy peacetime North Pacific
presence.
Canby, Steven L., "South Korea's Defense Requires U.S. Air Power,
Not Troops," Wall Street Journal . July 17, 1986, p 24. Sees limited
utility of Pacific Fleet carriers in a war with the Soviets. Advocates
naval force level cuts.
Chicago Tribune . February 1, 1986, "The 600-Ship Mistake," p 3.
Worn out argument that the Navy is building the "wrong" fleet for
the "wrong" problem, and should concentrate instead on building




Clancy, Tom, Red Storm Rising . New York: Putnam, 1986. Fiction.
Wartime Maritime Strategy implemented under drastically changed
assumptions, some plausible and some fanciful, to suit the
storyteller's needs. Soviet fear of global forward pressure leads to pre-
emptive seizure of Iceland, SSN surge to the Atlantic, but operations
are somehow limited to Central and Northern Europe only. Inherent
flexibility and lethality enables NATO navies to adapt rapidly and
successfully, but with heavy losses. In this vein, see reviews by Capt.
David G. Clark in Naval War College Review . Winter 1987, pp 139-
141, and Adm Thomas B. Hayward, USN (Ret.) in Proceedings .
March 1987, p 164. £f Hackett and McGeorch et al, The Third World
War; The Untold Storv . cited in Section V below; and Hayes et al,
American Lake , below, Chapter 19, which addresses the Pacific in a
hypothetical global war, although probably not in a manner in which
Capt. Clark or Adm. Hayward would agree.
Cohen, Eliott A., "Do We Still Need Europe?" Commentary . January
1986, pp 28-35. A Naval War College faculty member views NATO
flanks and the Far East as of increasing importance. Sees little utility
in discussions of stark strategic alternatives, e.g. "Europe vs. the
Pacific, going it alone vs. having allies, keeping resolutely to the sea
vs. preparing to engage the Red Army on the continent.
Connell, John, The New Maginot Line . New York: Arbor House,
1986, pp 71-81. Another journalist, this time British, for whom the
strategy debate is largely between Secretary Lehman and
Ambassador Komer, and solely driven by budgetary considerations.
Arguments totally derivative from other journalists. It would have
been news four years earlier.
* Cropsey, Seth, "Forward Defense or Maginot Line? The Maritime
Strategy and its Alternatives," Policy Review . Fall 1986, pp 40- 46.
An excellent restatement of the Navy's arguments by the Deputy
Under Secretary of the Navy for Policy. Particularly useful on the
historical background of the Maritime Strategy.
Daniel, Donald C, Anti-Submarine Warfare and Superpower
Strategic Stability . Champagne IL: University of Illinois Press, 1986.
An excellent survey by a Naval War College faculty member.
Concludes that "It seem(s) implausible the U.S. could so reduce the
number of Soviet SSBNs that the U.S.S.R. might be pushed into using
the remainder." See especially pp 151-157.
** Defense Choices: Greater Security with Fewer Dollars . Washington:
Committee for National Security, 1986. The Committee's annual
attack on the Maritime Strategy and the 600-Ship Navy. "There is no
need to ask the U.S. Fleet to take on high risk missions close to Soviet
shores." Advocates a "return to a more sensible naval strategy."
22
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This study achieved a certain notoriety due to its endorsement by Dr.
Larry Korb, a former Reagan Administration defense official and
earlier advocate of a 600-ship Navy.
* Demars, V.Adm. Bruce, "The U.S. Submarine Force," Naval
Forces. IV/1986, pp 18-30 and "Speech at the Submarine
Symposium, Lima, Peru," Submarine Review . January 1987, pp
5-12. By the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Submarine
Warfare. See especially pp 20-21 of the former and 8-11 of the latter on
the role of U.S. and allied submarines in the Maritime Strategy: "We
dare not go it alone."
** Doerr, Capt. P.J., "CWC Revisited," Proceedings. April 1986, pp 39-
43. Organizing the Battle Force to implement the Maritime Strategy.
Contrast with Capt. Powers' October 1985 Proceedings views.
**
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Elliott, Frank, "Exon Says Maritime Plan Could Trigger War,"
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SSBN aspects of the maritime Strategy. "There are good elements in
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** Epstein, Joshua M., The 1987 Defense Budget. Washington:
Brookings, 1986. Brookings' annual attach on the Maritime
Strategy. Pp 13, 41-45 and 55-58 reject the Maritime Strategy as
"inefficient and potentially escalatory: and recommend U.S. Navy
force posture cuts accordingly. Sees defense of Norway as not
requiring significant U.S. naval forces. Arguments derived from
Kaufmann, Komer, Posen, and the Congressional Budget Office.
Unlike the Maritime Strategy, a purely budget-driven document.
** Fouquet, David, "NATO Soldiers March Into Autumn, Testing
Tactics, Equipment, Systems," Defense News . September 15, 1986, p
14. The Allies test the Maritime Strategy on the Northern Front.
** Friedman, Norman, "U.S. Strategy and ASW," Jane's Defense
Weekly . November 19, 1986, pp 1269-1277. An update of Dr.
Friedman's thought on the Maritime Strategy, ASW, and the SSN-21.
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** Gordon, Michael R., "Officials say Navy Might Attack Soviet A-Arms
in Nonnuclear War," New York Times . January 7, 1986, p 1. See also
(New York) Daily News . January 8, 1986, p C-10; The Oregonian .
January 9, 1986, p CIO; Los Angeles Times . January 10, 1986, p 4;
Boston Globe . January 11, 1986; New York Times . January 12, 1986, p
E-l; and The Times (London), February 26, 1986. Initial press
comment on publication of "The Maritime Strategy" by the Naval
Institute. Ignores all strategy issues except the anti-SSBN operations
debate.
* Gray, Colin S., "Keeping the Soviets Landlocked: Geostrategy for a
Maritime America," The National Interest . Summer 1986, pp 24-36.
Masterful discussion of the relationships between geopolitics and the
Maritime Strategy.
** Gray, Colin S., Maritime Strategy. Geopolitics, and the Defense of the
West . New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1986. An
extension of his classic 1977 work on geopolitics, focusing on
implications for U.S. national military strategy. The footnotes
include some excellent rebuttals to the arguments of Ambassador
Komer. A new classic.
** Gray, Colin, "Maritime Strategy," Proceedings . February 1986, pp 34-
42. Supportive commentary by a top-ranked civilian geopolitician and
strategist. Especially helpful in untangling arguments regarding
"horizontal escalation."
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Technology. December 22, 1986, pp 28-29. On V.Adm. Diego
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** Halloran, Richard, "A Silent Battle Surfaces," New York Times
Magazine . December 7, 1986, pp 60, 94-97. On the anti-submarine
warfare component of the Maritime Strategy.
Hampton, L.Cdr. J. P., "Integrated Air Defense for NATO,"
Proceedings. September 1986, pp 114-116. On integrating U.S. Navy
carrier battle groups with U.S. and allied air force aircraft to counter
the Soviet air threat on the NATO Southern Front: an essential
component of the maritime Strategy too often overshadowed in the
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** Hart, Senator Gary, with Lind, William S., America Can Win: The
Case for Military Reform . Bethesda MD: Adler & Adler, 1986, pp 77-
81 . Criticizes the Maritime Strategy for its linkages to the land war in
Europe, its early forward focus, and its relationship to current force
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** Hayes, Peter, Zarsky, Lyuba, and Bello, Walden, American Lake:
Nuclear Peril in the Pacific . New York: Penguin, 1986. Thorough
and extensive analysis of the Maritime Strategy and much else, but
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16, and Chapter 19, a fictional scenario. They understand that "What
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Power . May 1986, pp 17-24, especially p 22. By the Deputy Chief of
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especially Chapter 1 on the relationship between war at sea and war
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called "Lehman Doctrine."
* Jervell, Sverre and Nyblom, Kare (eds.), The Military Buildup in **
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University Press of America, 1986. 1985 Harvard conference. Eliot
Cohen, Robert Weinland, Barry Posen, V.Adm. Henry Mustin and
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Kaufmann, William W., A Reasonable Defense . Washington:
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his own highly personal interpretation of the Maritime Strategy,
ceding the Mediterranean totally to indigenous allied naval forces but
sailing a major fleet into the Indian Ocean. Unlike the Maritime
Strategy, solely aimed at influencing legislative budgetary decisions.
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Power . April 1986, pp 82-97. See especially pp 83-86 for an overview of
the Maritime Strategy from the Commandant of the Marine Corps
perspective.
Kennedy, Col. William V., USAR (Ret.), "New NE Asian
Geography?", Naval War College Review . March-April 1986, pp 91-92.
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Landersman, Capt. S.D., USN (Ret.), "Naval Protection of Shipping:
A Lost Art?" Naval War College Review . March-April 1986, pp 23-34.
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Commodore," Proceedings. June 1986, pp 56-63.
** Lapham, Lewis H., "Notebook: Pictures at an Exhibition," Harper's .
March 1986, pp 8-9. A bizarre, overwritten exposition on the
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* Lehman, Hon. John F., Jr., Maritime Strategy in the Defense of
NATO . Washington: CSIS, September 25, 1986. His 1986 views:
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* Lehman, John F., "The U.S. Secretary of the Navy: Towards the
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Liska, George, "From containment to Concert," Foreign Policy .
Spring 1986, pp 3-23, and "Concert Through Decompression,"
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between land and sea powers." Argues, however, for a "land-sea
power concert" by the two. "The salience of sea-over land-based power
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difficult to maintain clear naval superiority."
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* "Maritime Strategy Seminar," Proceedings. August 1986, pp 8-**10.
Former SACLANT/CINCLANT Adm. Wesley McDonald, former
Undersecretary of Defense Robert Komer, former Assistant Secretary
of Defense Bing West, and then-U.S. Second Fleet/NATO Striking
Fleet Atlantic Commander V.Adm. Henry Mustin debate the
Maritime Strategy. For more details, see the excellent Maritime
Strategy Seminar Transcript . Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1986.
** Mather, Ian, "NATO Row Over Boundary Shift," Sunday London
Observer . June 16, 1986. Sees Secretary of Defense Weinberger's call
for an expanded NATO reach beyond Europe as derived from the
Maritime Strategy.
* Matthews, William, "Marines Would Storm by Air, Not Sea if NATO
Attacked," Navv Times . December 1, 1986'. Despite the misleading
headline, an otherwise generally accurate rendering of the views of
the principal USMC global strategist, B. Gen. Michael Sheridan, on
the role of the Marines in North Norway as part of the Maritime
Strategy.
** Mearsheimer, John, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy
and Deterrence in Europe," International Security . Fall 1986, pp 3-57.
Despite its biases, distortions, and misleading discussions of the
development of the Maritime Strategy over time, probably the most
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* "Message to Moscow: Be My Guest," The Navy," Newsweek .
February 3, 1986, pp 16-17. V.Adm. Henry C. Mustin on U.S.
Second Fleet implementation of the Maritime Strategy.
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First reported public discussion of the Maritime Strategy by the new
CNO, Adm. Carlisle Trost, with a critique by Brookings Institute
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* Mustin, V.Adm. Hebry C, "Maritime Strategy from the Deckplates,"
Proceedings . September 1986, pp 33-37. U.S. Navy Second
Fleet/NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic Commander's positive views on
the utility of the Maritime Strategy to an operational commander. See
also "Comment and Discussion," November 1986, p 14.
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Norwegian Sea," Naval War College Review . March-April 1986, pp 2-
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** O'Neil, W.D., Capt., USNR, "Executing the Maritime Strategy," U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings . December 1986, pp 39-42. Argues that
Soviet technological strides in submarine quieting, anti- submarine
warfare, and air defenses will make the execution of an anti-SSBN
bastion offensive increasingly difficult. The "solution" for the U.S.
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development of "stealth" technologies.
O'Rourke, Ronald, "Tomakhawk: The U.S. Navy's New Option,"
Naw International . July 1986, pp 394-398. Good coverage of the
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** Polmar, Norman, "600 Ships-Plus or Minus?," Proceedings.
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28
some would argue with specific components of both the strategy and
the ships that Lehman seeks, it is a coherent and long-term plan...
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services."
** Polmar, Norman, "The Soviet Navy: Nuclear War at Sea,"
Proceedings. July 1986, pp 111-113. See also "Comment and
Discussion," Proceedings
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deter nuclear war at sea."
** Reed, Fred, "Soldiering: Navy's Sensitivity Works Against It,"
Washington Times . March 27, 1986, p 2. Criticizes U.S. Navy
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a rather ironic criticism given the author's own arguments.
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Ryan, Capt T.D., "SUBDEVRON TWELVE: In the Global War
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* "Sailing the Cold Seas," Surface Warfare . May-June 1986, pp 6-8. On
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** Case of War in Europe," New York Citv Tribune . June 23, 1986, p 1.
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Armed Forces . October 1986, pp 446-448. Deputy Commander-in-
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Smith, Lee, "How the Pentagon Can Live On Less," Fortune . July 21,
1986, pp 78-85. See especially p 87. Fortune and ex-Reagan
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on Murmansk, Vladivostok, and Petropavlovsk. For more on
DeLauer's negative views, see "Interview: Richard DeLauer on
Defense," Technology Review . July 1986, pp 58-67.
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Control Implications," Arms Control Today . December 1986, pp
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July. "The implicit threat to Soviet ballistic missile submarines
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direct result of threats or even attacks on Soviet SSBNs in their home
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** Stefanick, Tom, "Attacking the Soviet Sea Based Deterrent: Clever
Feint or Foolhardy Maneuver?", F.A.S. Public Interest Report .
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Naval Institute Professional Seminar Series Transcript, February 12,
1986, pp 19-20. R.Adm. Dennis Brooks, COMCARGRU 7, on the
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April 19, 1986, pp 49-65. Strategy and programs.
** Train, Adm. Harry, USN (Ret.), "Seapower and Projection Forces,"
in American Defense Annual . 1986-1987, Lexington MA: Lexington
Books, 1986, pp 128-129. This former Sixth Fleet and Atlantic Theater
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James L. (ed), The Soviet and Other Communist Navies: The View
from the Mid-1980s . Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986, pp 283-
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Navy?", Armed Forces Journal International . July 1986, pp 74-
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* U. S. House of Representative, Committee on Appropriations,
Ninety-Ninth Congress, Second Session, Hearings on the
Department of Defense Appropriations for 1987: Part 1 . February 26,
1986, pp 500-504 and 547-550. Admiral Watkins and Secretary
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the Maritime Strategy. "The decision to go after an SSBN in time of
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Defense Weekly . December 17, 1986, pp 1474-1475. Interview with V.
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deter war or, should deterrence fail, conduct wartime operations in
the North Pacific in accordance with the Maritime Strategy.
**
"U.S. Maritime Strategy for the 1980s," Security Digest. The Wilson
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Mearsheimer debate the Maritime Strategy.
* U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Ninety-Ninth Congress,
Second Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense
Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987: Part 1 .
February 5, 1986, Washington: USGPO, 1986, pp 82-83. The Secretary
of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testify on the
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SSBN operations. A key Maritime Strategy element enunciated by the
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Weisskopf, Michael, "Pentagon Plan Coldly Received," Washington
Post . February 6, 1986, p A14; Weinberger, Caspar, "U.S. Defense
Strategy," Foreign Affairs . Spring 1986, p 695; and Andrews, Walter,
"Weinberger Warns of 'Hollow Strategy,'", Washington Times. July
30, 1986, p 4.
** Ullman, Cdr. Harlan K., USN (Ret.), "Precept for Tomorrow: A Busy
Agenda Awaits the Next CNO," Sea Power. May 1986, pp 48-51. Sees a
need for the new Chief of Naval Operations to examine the future
maritime environment as well as the reactions of U.S. and foreign
political and military leaders to the Maritime Strategy.
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Peace," Sea Power . April 1986, pp 6-20. See especially pp 9-10, on the
rationale for publishing the Maritime Strategy.
* Watkins, Adm. James D., "Power Projection—Maritime Forces
Making a Strategic Difference," NATO's Sixteen Nations . February-
March 1986, pp 102-106. CNO discusses Maritime Strategy within a
NATO context. N.B. This annual special issue contains articles
signed by most of NATO's naval chiefs.
* Watkins, Adm. James D., "The Maritime Strategy," Kelley, Gen.
**P. X., and O'Donnell, Maj. Hugh, "Amphibious Warfare Strategy,"
and Lehman, John F., Jr., "The 600-Ship Navy," Proceedings .
January 1986 "The Maritime Strategy" Supplement. Also "Comment
and Discussion," February 1986, pp 26-28; March 1986, pp 18-21 by
Col. John Collins USA (Ret.) raises 20 questions; May 1986, p 25;
June 1986, p 83 questions nuclear aspects of the strategy; and pp 84-
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elaborates on the strategy; July 1986, pp 24-27, posits significant
Soviet forward submarine operations; August 1986, p 10, still more
questions from the insatiable Col. Collins; January 1987, pp 25-30,
argues for new role for PHMs in the Maritime Strategy; and April
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R.Adm. Pendley.
* Weinberger, Casper, "The Spirit and Meaning of the USS Theodore
Roosevelt," Defense Issues . Vol 1 No 76, November 24, 986. The
Maritime Strategy as a component of national military strategy by the
Secretary of Defense. 'The greatest value of President Reagan's
maritime strategy is that it focuses on the crucial issue of how we
can best use our maritime forces and those of our allies to achieve the
basic goal of deterrence, and deny the adversary his preferred
warfighting strategy." Summarized in Wilson, George, "USS
Theodore Roosevelt Joins Active Service as 15th Carrier,"
Washington Post . October 26, 1986, p A21; and Mathews, William,
"Carrrier Theodore Roosevelt 'Charges' to Life," Navv Times .
November 10, 1986, pp 33 & 37.
** West, Francis J., Jr., et al., Naval Forces and Western Security .
Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986. Contains two essays: "U.S.
Naval Forces and NATO Planning" by West, pp 1-9; and "NATO's
Maritime Defenses" by Jacquelyn K. Davis, James E. Dougherty,
R.Adm. Robert J. Janks USN (Ret.) and Charles M. Perry, pp 10-53.
West restates his 1985 Proceedings article assertion that there is a
profound divergence between U.S. and West European prespective,
on the purpose and potential contribution of naval forces in NATO
contingency planning, although it is sometimes difficult to
understand which Americans and Europeans he is talking about.
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role of naval forces in NATO strategy.
** Wettern, Desmond, "Maritime Strategy: Change or Decay," Navv
International. May 1986, pp 304-308. Endorsement of the Maritime
Strategy by a prominent British naval affairs writer. Questions,
however, whether SLOC interdiction remains as low a Soviet priority
under Adm. Chernavin as it did under Adm Gorshkov.
Williams., Cdr. E. Cameron, USNR, "The Four 'Iron Laws' of Naval
Protection of Merchant Shipping," Naval War College Review . May-
June 1986, pp 35-42. An argument for convoying. Sees the SLOC
protection debate as between convoying and "sanitized lanes."
Oblivious, however, to the debate between either or both of these
options and forward defense, the more topical issue. See also "In My
View," Naval War College Review . Autumn 1986, pp 108-109, and
Spring 1987, pp 91-92.
** Winkler, Philippa, "A Dangerous Shift in Naval Strategy," Oakland
Tribune . July 7, 1986. Decries the Navy's "forward offensive strategy"
for going "beyond legitimate defense purposes."
** Winnefeld, Lt. James A., Jr., "Topgun: Getting It Right,"
Proceedings. October 1986, pp 141-146. The Navy Fighter Weapons
School seen as a key contributor to the Maritime Strategy's execution,
by the School's training officer, one of the new generation of naval
officers for whom the Maritime Strategy is truly the cornerstone of
his profession.
** Wood, Robert and Hanley, John, "The Maritime Role in the North
Atlantic," Atlantic Community Quarterly . Summer 1986, pp 133-144.
Latest incarnation of this oft reprinted article by two Naval War
College faculty members.
** Wood, Robert S., "Maritime Strategy for War in the North," Journal
of Defense & Diplomacy . September 1986, pp 17-20. Portrays the U.S.
Navy's maritime strategy as a conventional long-war alternative to
NATO's avowed reliance to early recourse to nuclear weapons.
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III. THE DEBATE CONTINUES: 1 987 AND BEYOND
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The first half of 1987 saw the Maritime Strategy firmly in place as an
acknowledged vital element of U.S. and allied military strategy. President
Reagan, Defense Secretary Weinberger, Deputy Defense Secretary Taft, and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Crowe, all publicly cited its
importance and utility. Likewise, James H. Webb, Jr. (John Lehman's
successor as SECNAV), Admiral Carlisle Trost (Admiral Watkins'
successor as CNO), and a number of other top flag officers provided
numerous examples of the extent to which it had become the common
strategic framework of the naval leadership. Perhaps the best illustration of
this phenomenon was, however, the July 1987 issue of the Proceedings.
Therein, the Maritime Strategy formed the baseline for a wide range of
discussions of specific U.S. and allied peacekeeping and warfighting
issues: by active duty U.S. Navy junior officers, senior officers, and
admirals; by naval aviators, surface warfare officers, submariners and a
Marine; and by officers concerned with inter-allied relations, regional
strategic objectives, fleet operations, and weapons system employment and
development.
**
"Analysis: U.S. Carriers," RUSI . March 1987, pp 1+2. Drags out yet
again the false choice between a Continental or Maritime Strategy as
an issue. Claims West Germany "would object strongly if moves were
made to convert the Maritime Strategy into the U.S.'s general war
strategy." It is, in part, and they haven't at all. Q£ Bonn's actual
White Paper 1985 . cited in Section V below.
Arkin, William, A., "Our Risky Naval Strategy Could Get Us All
Killed," Washington Post . July 3, 1988, p C-l. A "sampling" of recent
U.S. Navy exercises that Arkin claims "prove" the deliberately
provocative nature of the Navy's maritime strategy. He concludes
with a call for an investigation of the Navy's "practices and strategies
(that) threaten international peace in a way that land-based military
activity does not."
Arkin, William, "Troubled Waters: The Navy's Aggressive War
Strategy," Technology Review . January 1989, pp 54-63. Contrary to
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war plans" which, he says, are "belligerent, dangerously
ambiguous," the "most likely avenue for escalation all the way to
nuclear war," and too "provocative" and "de-stabilizing" to be left to
an "intransigent naval bureaucracy." Arkin proposes that maritime
strategy be replaced with an all-encompassing arms control strategy
that, if consummated, would, in fact, relegate the U.S. Navy to a
chapter in history.
** Baer, George W., Manila Bav to the Norwegian Sea: Dimensions of
U.S. Naval Strategy Since 1890 (forthcoming in 1988). By a Naval War
College faculty member.
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** Barnett, Capt. Roger W., USN (Ret.), "The Maritime Continental
Debate Isn't Over," Proceedings . June 1987, pp 28-34. Still more on
the two famous alleged "mindsets," by one of the most prominent
crafters of the Maritime Strategy. Also, see "Comment and
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(eds.), Maritime Strategy: A Textbook (forthcoming in 1987).
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Bliss, Elsie, "Fleet Hardening: Responding to the Nuclear Threat,"
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38
** Cushman, John H., Jr., "Navy Warns of Crisis in Anti-Submarine
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the strategy on a day-to-day basis. From that derives a new tactical
awareness."
Freedman, Lawrence, "Arms Control at Sea," paper presented at the
Royal. Naval Staff College Conference, "Decade of the '90s: Response
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characteristics and capabilities of naval forces are far more complex
than those on land, and are, therefore, much less amenable to
"traditional" arms control "solutions" (cooperation, predictability,
parity, and stability). Freedman concludes that naval arms control
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office, on his Maritime Strategy opinions. Contributes, however, to
the erroneous view running throughout America journalism that
the Strategy was solely his creation.
Liebman, Marc, "Soviet Naval Initiatives in the Pacific: 1942
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1988," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings . February 1988, pp 53-61. Two
noted strategic commentators debate the "maritimeness" of the U.S.
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Gray, on the other hand, sounds much more comfortable that the
Navy, after 100 years of "strategically undisciplined tracts," has come
to fully recognize the benefits and limits of naval power. At sea, he
maintains, the offense has historically proven the strongest form of
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Matthews, William, "U.S. Navy's Exercises in Aleutians,
Underscore Pacific Interest Concern," Defense News . February 9,
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on the Maritime Strategy. He makes similar points in the July 1987
Submarine Review .
Piotti, R. Adm. Walter T., Jr., "Interview," Journal of Defense and
Diplomacy . Vol 5 #2, 1987, pp 14-16. The Commander of the U.S.
Military Sealift Command on global wartime planning for sealift.
** Pocalyko, L.Cdr. Michael, "Neutral Swedin Toughens NATO's
Northern Tier," Proceedings . March 1987, pp 128-130. By a 1985-86
member of the Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603). On the
interrelationships among Swedish, Soviet, and NATO strategies and
the Maritime Strategy.
** Prisley, Jack, "Submarine Aggressor Squadron—Its Time has
Come," Submarine Review . July 1987, pp 63-86. A call for a "Top
Fish" program, to enable submariners to better practice what they
must do to implement the Maritime Strategy.
** "Push Anti-Mine Work, Navy Urged," Defense Week . March 2, 1987,
p 5. R. Adm. J.S. Tichelman, RNLN, argues that emphasis on
minesweeping "should go hand in hand with the forward strategy"
at a U.S. Naval Institute Seminar on Mine Warfare.
Reagan, President Ronald, National Security Strategy of the United
States . Washington: the White House, January 1987. The framework
within which the Maritime Strategy operates. Clear focus on global,
forward, coalition approach, especially vs. the Soviets. See especially
p 19: "U.S. military forces must possess the capability, should
deterrence fail, to expand the scope and intensity of combat
operations, as necessary," and pp 27-30: "Maritime superiority is
vital. (It) enables us to capitalize on Soviet geographic vulnerabilities
and to pose a global threat to the Soviet's interests. It plays a key role
in plans for the defense of NATO allies on the European flanks. It
also permits the United States to tie down Soviet naval forces in a
defensive posture protecting Soviet ballistic missile submarines and
the seaward approaches to the Soviet homeland..."
Rostow, Eugene V., "For the Record," Washington Post . June 30,
1987, p A18. Extract from a Naval War College lecture by a former
high Reagan Administration Arms Control official: "I can imagine
no better antidote for the frustration and irritability which now
characterize allied relationships than allied cooperation in mounting
successful applications of counter-force at outposts of the Soviet
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empire and shifting geographical points around its periphery. The
Soviet empire is extremely vulnerable to such a peninsular strategy."
RUSI Newsbrief. April, 1988, "NATO's Challenge on the Northern
Flank," pp 29-31 . An error-filled "analysis" of the northern thrust of
the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy. Proposes that the maritime
strategy must prove successful in a "30-day" European war, that the
Soviets "would probably launch their SLBMs rather than have them
destroyed by NATO," and that the Walker-Whitworth and Kongsberg-
Toshiba affairs have "called into question the credibility of the
strategic missile submarine," and have "invalidate(d) the use of
Western hunter-killer submarines to close in on Soviet home
waters."
Sakitt, Mark, Submarine Warfare in the Arctic: Option or Illusion?
Stanford, CA: Stanford University International Strategic Institute,
1988, 93 pp. This monograph considers the tactical and
environmental (read accoustic) problems the U.S. Navy can expect to
encounter when carrying out a strategic ASW campaign in Arctic
waters. Using the results of a series of simple search, attrition and
accoustic propagation models, the author concludes that "reasonable
expected outcomes for the U.S. Navy do not appear very promising,"
and that the "Arctic naval game sems to be one in which the
defenders, the Soviets can dominate." Tactical and environmental
difficulties aside, the book cautions against the risk of unwanted
escalation, and recommends that possible naval arms controls might
consider a trade-off between U.S. agreement on Soviet SSBN
sanctuaries, and Soviet acceptance of a numerical SSN cap.
Sea-War Plan All Wet?" Columbus Dispatch . April 7, 1987, p 10A. A
call for a "vigorous review" by the Pentagon of "Lehman's plan,"
including "aircraft carrier battle groups. ..sent to the. ..Barents, (a
plan) never...formally approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense
Secretary Caspar Weinberger, or NATO." As has often been the case
with public journalistic commentary on the Maritime Strategy, no
mention was made of the extent to which the Strategy reflects
longstanding JCS, SECDEF, or NATO policy and strategy, or of its
roots in the naval officer corps.
Smit, E.D., Jr., Capt. USN, "The Main Utility of the Navy," Naval
War College Review . Autumn 1988, pp 105-107. Recommends that the
strategic purposes of the U.S. Navy in a European conflict be re-
directed away from attacking the Soviet SSBN fleet, to sinking the
Soviet (general purpose) Navy. The author acknowledges that a
successful outcome will contribute little to the events on land, but
avers that it is a worthwhile objective on its own merits and with a
pay-off that will become evident "after the war is over."
•
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* Smith, Lt. Gen. Keith A., "The Posture of Marine Aviation in FY88 -
FY89," Marine Corps Gazette , May 1987, pp 46+. U. S. Marine Corps
Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation on Marine aviation requirements to
support the national, maritime, and amphibious strategies. A
reprint of earlier Congressional testimony.
** Solomon, Richard H., "The Pacific Basin: Dilemmas and Choices for
American Security," Naval War College Review . Winter 1987, pp 36-
43, especially pp 38-39. The Director of the State Department Policy
Planning staff updates his June 1986 Naval War College Current
Strategy Forum lecture: "We must be prepared to open a second front
in Asia."
** Stefanick, Tom A., Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare and Naval
Strategy . Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987.
** Stefanick, Tom, "The U.S. Navy: Directions for the Future," F.A.S.
Public Interest Report . June 1987, pp 1+. Mostly about the budget, but
some discussion of the Maritime strategy, most elements of which
the author opposes.
**
"The Navy Sails on Rough Seas," Newsweek . June 1, 1987, pp 23-26.
A summary of the arguments, pro and con, as influenced by
reactions to the Iraqi attack on the U.S.S. Stark in the Persian Gulf.
** Thomas, Capt. Walter R., USN (Ret.), "Deterrence, Defense, Two
Different Animals," Navv Times . January 26, 1987, p 23. Critique of
John Mearsheimer's Fall 1986 International Security article.
** Trainor, Lt. Gen. Bernard E., USMC (Ret.), "NATO Nations
Conducting Winter Maneuvers in Northern Norway," New York
Times . March 29, 1987, p 14. Practicing the reinforcement of North
Norway. B.Gen Matthew Caulfield USMC: "Marine reinforcement is
part of our maritime strategy." Gen. Fredrik Bull-Hansen RNA:
With or without American carriers, northern Norway will be
defended.
** Trainor, Lt.Gen. Bernard E., USMC (Ret.), "Lehman's Sea-War
Strategy is Alive, But for How Long?", New York Times. March 23,
1987, p 16. Another article in the "Will-the-Strategy-survive-John-
Lehman?" vein. General Trainor's understanding of the uniformed
navy, joint and allied aspects of the strategy do not appear to be on a
par with his understanding of the Marine Corps aspects.
Tritten, Cdr. James J., "Nonnuclear Warfare," Proceedings .
February 1987, pp 64-70. By the Chairman of the National Security
Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School. On the
symbiotic nature of nonnuclear and nuclear warfare, at sea and
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ashore, under conditions of crisis response, intra-war deterrence,
and warfighting.
"Trost Wants Flexibility in U.S. Thinking, Assessment of Soviets,"
Aerospace Daily. June 22, 1987, p 462; and "Naval Strategy Must
Change Says Admiral Trost," Jane's Defense Weekly . June 27, 1987,
p 1345. The Chief of Naval Operations warns against rigid
assumptions about Soviet naval options.
Trost, Adm. Carlisle, "Looking Beyond the Maritime Strategy,"
Proceedings . January 1987, pp 13-16. Also "Comment and
Discussion," July 1987, pp 19-20. Admiral Watkins' successor as
CNO briefly reaffirms the Maritime Strategy's fundamentals:
deterrence, forward defense, alliance solidarity, the global view,
coexistence with other vital components of our national military
strategy and, most important, flexibility. Highlights anti-submarine
warfare in particular.
Trost, C.A., Adm., USN, "The Goal and the Challenge," Sea Power .
October 1988, pp 13-30. In an interview the CNO acknowledges that
the 600-ship goal will not be reached in 1989, but that forward strategy
will remain central to the Navy's peace and wartime deployment
philosophy. According to Trost, "carriers sailing into the Kola Gulf
and lots of other things. ..are not, nor have ever been, envisioned as
part of our forward-based maritime strategy."
Trost, C.A.H., Adm., USN, "Two Bells Into the Watch," remarks at
the annual Submarine League Conference, Washington, DC, July 9,
1987. A future-looking depiction of submarine roles and missions in
the 21st century, including the use of "underseas cruisers" for
integral fleet support with offensive and defensive anti-air warfare
(AAW) capabilities.
Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "Bringing Down the Bird of
Thought," speech at the Current Strategy Forum, Naval War
College, Newport, RI, June 18, 1987. The CNO cautions maritime
strategy planners on the risks of "set-piece thinking," and on the
need to guard against drawing conclusions about Soviet naval
intentions "through their writings or through their military
capabilities themselves."
Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "Global Role Demands a 15-
Carrier Navy," Los Angeles Times . March 16, 1989, p II-9. Reiterates
that 15 is the minimum number of carrier battlegroups necessary to
support the Nation's global commitments in war and peace "at a
prudent level of risk."
Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "Looking at the Future of the
Navy," remarks at U.S. Naval Institute Conference, San Diego, CA,
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July 27, 1988. The CNO foresees a 21st century naval threat
environment that will differ little from current international
conditions, but that will feature important technological changes in
all three warfare dimensions—surface, subsurface and air. Even so,
reports the CNO, the Nimitz-size aircraft carrier will remain "the
centerpiece of naval warfare."
Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "My Frustration," speech at the
New York Navy League, New York, NY, November 14, 1988. The
CNO voices his exasperation with critics who claim, "You don't have
a strategy."
Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "Requirements Drive Navy Force
Levels," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. May 1989, pp 34-38. The
CNO warns that a "precipitate rush to dismantle naval forces
because of premature optimism over the presumed evolution of the
global balance of power could be a most costly misreading of history."
Trost projects a future international environment that will be
increasingly complex, politically and technologically, and that will,
therefore, heighten the importance of forward deployed and
sustained naval forces, including a minimum of 15 aircraft carriers.
Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "This Era and the Next: American
Security Interest and the U.S. Navy," speech at the Naval War
College, Newport, RI, January 10, 1989. A plea to preserve a forward-
deployed 15-carrier Navy while the West guardedly watches the
progress of the "Gorbachev era."
Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "Would You Run Your Company
This Way?" Remarks before the Navy League, March 30,1988. The
CNO voices his dissatisfaction with recent congressionally-mandated
budget and force cut-backs, and Soviet Gosplan-like
"mismanagement of the Navy's affairs."
Trost, Carlisle H., Adm., USN, "In the Sail Left, Thinking of U.S.
Seapower," remarks at Military Sealift Command (MSC) Change-of-
Command Ceremony, December 19, 1988. The CNO decries the
disappearance of America's maritime industry and warns that the
country "will lose its identify as a maritime nation..."
Truver, Scott C. and Thompson, Jonathan S., "Navy Mine
Countermeasures: Quo Vadis?", Armed Forces Journal
International . April, 1987, pp 7074. An adequate survey of the
problems and prospects. No discussion, however, of the primary U.S.
mine countermeasures concept of operations embedded in the
Maritime Strategy: killing minelayers far forward, in transit, and
offshore, before they sow their mines. Illustrative of the dangers of
discussing any one warfare area in isolation from the total Strategy.
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Truver, Scott, "Phibstrike 95 - Fact or Fiction?" Armed Forces
Journal International . August 1987, pp 102-108. A case study of how
the Maritime Strategy has been used as a framework by the Marine
Corps to develop an amphibious warfare concept of future operations.
* U. S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, One-hundredth
** Congress, First Session, Hearings on National Security Strategy.
January-April 1987, Washington: USGPO (forthcoming in 1987/8).
Testimony by administration civilian and -military officials, and by
government and non-government defense specialists. Includes much
discussion of the Maritime Strategy. See especially testimony by
Adm. Lee Baggett, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic and
Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command.
* U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, One-hundredth
Congress, First Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense
Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 .
Washington, DC: USGPO (forthcoming in 1987/8). Prepared annual
"posture" statements by SECDEF, CJCS, SECNAV, CNO and other
officials. Also hearings repartee, and responses to questions for the
record. Maritime Strategy permeates the entire Navy budget
legislative process. In addition to those just cited, see especially
statements by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Melvyn Paisley,
CINCLANTFLT Adm. Frank Kelso, and Deputy Chiefs of Naval
Operations for Surface and Air Warfare, V. Adms. Joseph Metcalf
and Robert Dunn.
** Van Cleave, William R., "Horizontal Escalation and NATO Strategy:
A Conceptual Overview," in E.D. Gueritz et al (eds.), NATO's
Maritime Strategy: Issues and Developments . Washington:
Pergamon - Brassey's, 1987. A leading conservative defense thinker
argues that "the Navy's version of Horizontal Escalation," the
Maritime Strategy, "fails because it does not come to grips with the
nuclear factor; indeed, it seems to attempt ignoring it."
* Webb, James H., Jr., "The Aircraft Carrier: Centerpiece of Maritime
Strategy," Wings of Gold . Summer 1987, pp S-2 and S-3. The new
Secretary of the Navy on the national military strategy, the Maritime
Strategy, and the role of the carrier. Continuity of the Reagan-
Weinberger-Lehman view of maritime strategy confirmed.
* Weinberger, Caspar., Report of the Secretary of Defense to the
Congress on the FY 1 988/FY 1 989 Budget and Fv 1 988-92 Defense
Programs . Washington: USGPO, 1987, p 165. Reconfirms the
Maritime Strategy as a component of declared U.S. national military
strategy. See also Offley, Ed, and Sanger, S.L. "Backing at Top for
Home Port," Seattle Post-Intelligence . April 28, 1987, p 1. SECDEF, in
Seattle, "agrees with the Navy's controversial wartime strategy."
SECDEF direction and endorsement is no flash in the pan.
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** Weltman, John J., "The Short, Unhappy Life of the Maritime
Strategy," The National Interest . Spring 1989, pp 79-86. The author
reports that the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy under the Reagan
Administration was largely the produce of budgetary plenty and the
intra-service dominance of the carrier and submarine communities.
Both conditions, he claims, have ceased to exist, so that planning and
force procurement will shift to a strategy "emphasizing defensive sea
control in support of the land battle..." This development, Weltman
concludes, "can only strengthen the constraints against any assault
upon the Western alliance."
**
**
West, F.J. (Bing), Jr., "The Maritime Strategy: The Next Step,"
Proceedings. January 1987, pp 40-49. By a former Assistant Secretary
of Defense, Naval War College faculty member, lead author of
Seaplan 2000 and U.S. Marine Corps officer. One of the most
imortant analyses of the Maritime Strategy by an outside observer to
date. Develops further his 1985 and 1986 views, cited in
"Contemporary Naval Strategy" and Section II above, on the
relationships between the Strategy and U.S./NATO doctrine. Cf.
however, actual statements by allied military leaders in Section V
below. See also "Comment and Discussion," March 1987, pp 14-15;
July 1987, pp 19-20, and August 1987, pp 31-32.
Wettern, Desmond, "The Paradox of Decline: Are Convoys the Only
Alternative?" Sea Power . April 1989, pp 147-159. The writer, a long-
time British commentator on maritime affairs, seems to think so.
The decline of the West's accoustic advantage, he says, has made the
protection of the Atlantic SLOCs by way of a "Ramboesque" forward
offensive a doubtful proposition. He concludes that, unless the West
successfully develops active towed sonar arrays, alternative ship
protection strategies such as "Moving barriers" and patrolled lanes,"
will probably prove as great a failure as the "patrolled sea lanes" and
"hunter-killer" concepts of the two world wars. Accordingly, the one
remaining option may well be the re-adoption of the convoy system.
White, David F., "Atlantic Sealife Commander Says Containerization
Hurts Readiness," Journal of Commerce . April 7, 1988, p 12B.
Reports the concern expressed by the new chief of the Military Sealift
Command, Atlantic, Capt. Thomas J. Batzel, USN, that the
progressive containerization of merchant fleets will leave his
command short of enough breakbulk freighters to carry odd and
oversize cargoes such as tanks, trucks and artillery.
Wilson, George C, "600-Ship Navy is Sailing Toward Rough Fiscal
Seas," Washington Post . March 16, 1987, pp Al and A6. Sees forward
anti-SSBN operations as a "Watkins scenario" and forward carrier
battle group operations as a "Lehman scenario," with little backing
in the officer corps. Cites a "number of (nameless) Navy officers" as
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predicting that the latter "Aspect of the forward strategy will start
fading as soon as Lehman leaves the Navy Department." This seems
doubtful, given the primary role of the officer corps in drafting the
Maritime Strategy; time will tell. See also retort by Bennett, Rep
Charles E., "A 600-Ship Fleet is What's Needed," Washington Post .
April 22, 1987, p 19.
** Wilson, George, "Soviets Score Silent Success in Undersea Race with
U.S.," Washington Post . July 17, 1987, p A20. Claims Adm. Crowe,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "has never been enamored of
the forward strategy" and that "other Defense Department officials
said the forward strategy started to sink as soon as Lehman left the
Pentagon." On the former, see Crowe testimony earlier in 1987, cited
above. On the latter, see Mark Twain's cable from London to the
Associated Press 1897.
** Winnefeld, Lt. James A., Jr., "Fresh Claws for the Tomcat,"
Proceedings . July 1987, pp 103-107. On the relationship between the
Maritime Strategy, CVBG operations, and hardware requirements.
"The F-14D is not just another nice fighter; it offers a significant
enhancement of the CVBG's ability to execute the maritime strategy.
The aircraft's true worth is apparent only in this light."
Wood, Robert, "The Conceptual Framework for Strategic
Development at the Naval War College," Naval War College Review .
Spring 1987, pp 4-16. Further development of the views of this Naval
War College strategist/faculty member. His focus is now on
integrated national military strategy and its teaching and gaming.
See also commentary by R.Adm. J. A. Baldwin, President of the
Naval War College, pp 2-3.
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IV. SISTER SERVICE CONTRIBUTIONS TO AND VIEWS ON THE
MARITIME STRATEGY
The Maritime Strategy fully incorporates U.S. Navy, Marine Corps,
Coast Guard, Air Force and Army contributions to the global maritime
campaign. In fact, the case can be made that more thought has been given
to actual joint cornbat operations (as opposed to problems of command
relationships or lift) by the Navy and Marine Corps in codifying the
Maritime Strategy than by either the Air Force or the Army in developing
their own "cornerstone" publications. The open literature on potential
Army contributions to maritime warfare, such as air defense batteries
based in islands and littoral areas, is particularly weak.
Alberts, Col. D. J., USAF, "U.S. Naval Air and Deep Strike," Naval
Forces . No. 1/1986, pp 62-75. The strike warfare elements of the
Maritime Strategy from an Air Force officer's point of view.
Atkeson, MG Edear, USA (Ret.), "Arctic Could be a Hot Spot in
Future Conflicts," Army . January 1986, pp 13-14. Fanciful proposal
for expanded U.S. Army role in helping implement the Maritime
Strategy, "An Army air cavalry force, properly tailored for the
mission, should be able to locate submarine activity under the ice as
well as, if not better than, another submarine."
** Breemer, Jan S. and Hoover, SSG Todd, USAF, "SAC Goes to Sea
with Harpoon," National Defense . February 1987, pp 41-45, a history
and an update. Qf Chipman and Lay article cited in Section XI below.
Builder, Carl H., The Army in the Strategic Planning Process; Who
Shall Bell the Cat? . Bethesda, MD: U.S. Army Concepts Analysis
Agency, October 1986. A study done for the U.S. Army to "try to find
out why the Army doesn't seem to do very well in the strategic
planing process." Analyzes Army, Navy and Air Force strategic
planning, especially the Maritime Strategy. Looks for and, therefore,
"finds" differences rather than similarities. To be revised and
reissued as a Rand Corporation publication in 1987.
** Chipman, Dr. Donald D., "Rethinking Forward Strategy and the
Distant Blockade," Armed Forces Journal International . August
1987, pp 82-88. Argues for joint integrated USN-USAF wartime
operations in NATO's Northern Region, the GUIK gap, and the
Norwegian Sea. Well in keeping with the Maritime Strategy.
Cooper, Bert H., Maritime Roles for Land-Based Aviation Report No.
83-1 51 F, Washington: Library of congress Congressional Research
Service, August 1, 1983. Analyzes recent classified studies, identifies
problems and issues, and discusses recent USN-USAF initiatives.
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Correll, John T., "The Power Projection Shortfall," Air Force
Magazine . August 1988. In October 1987, US sea and airlift
capabilities were reorganized under a new unified command, the
U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). The new organization
promised to improve the efficiency and coordination of the Nation's
trans-Atlantic reinforcement assets, but the article reports, it has
been unable to stop the growing decline in national life resources,
especially shipping.
** Estep, Col. James L., USA, "Army's Role in Joint Global Military
Strategy," Army . August 1987, pp 11+. Decries "lack of a more global,
jointly oriented strategy" by the U.S. Army and applauds the Navy's
development of same.
** Fraser, Ronald, "MDZ Mission Defines Coast Guard Wartime Role,"
Naw Times . October 20, 1986, p 27, on the role of the Maritime
Defense Zones.
** Grace, L.Cdr. James A., "JTC3A and the Maritime Strategy,"
Surface Warfare . July/August 1986, pp 22-24. On the role of the Joint
Tactical C3 Agency in fielding joint and allied programs and
procedures to ensure implementation of the Maritime Strategy.
Griggs, Roy A., Maj., USAF, "Maritime Strategy on NATO's Central
Front," Military Review . April 1988, pp 54-65. Urges that the United
States and its Navy develop capabilities and doctrinal concepts for
using the conventional warhead Tomahawk (TLAM-C) in support of
the NATO/US Army follow-on forces attack (FOFA) AirLand Battle
concepts. Deep-interdiction TLAM-C strikes from disperses surface
and subsurface combatants early in a conflict, says the author, would
be "one way the maritime strategy could effectively support ground
forces on the central front." A key problem still to be solved,
concludes the article, is the creation of quick-reaction, on-scence
shipboard TLAM strike planning centers.
** Harned, Maj. Glenn, USA, "Comment and Discussion: The
Maritime Strategy," Proceedings . February 1986, pp 26-28. Argues
U.S. Army suffers from lack of a Maritime Strategy equivalent and
from Navy reticence in explaining its operational tactical doctrines.
Hooker, Richard D., Capt., USA, "NATO's Northern Flank: A
Critique of the Maritime Strategy," Parameters . June 1989, pp 24-34.
An Army officer criticizes, in his words, the "narrow prescriptions
called for in the Maritime Strategy," urging that the Navy's sister
services "enter and participate in the debate" over the defense of the
Northern Flank in particular, and the "tone and substance of the
strategic vision that must guide all our forces into the next century."
Hooker's specific objections to the maritime strategy's northern flank
gambit center on the risk of nuclear escalation, and the concession,
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to the Soviets, of important geo-strategic and force-ratio advantages.
Also disputed is the maritime strategists' claim that submarine
SLOC interdiction has relatively little priority in Soviet Navy
planning. The author concludes with the recommendation that
options for the defense of northern Europe be "rigorously submitted to
the discipline of an articulated and integrated conception of national
military strategy," notably consideration of ground and air force
equipment pre-positioning in Norway.
** Kennedy, Col. William V., USAR (Ret.), "There Goes the U.S. Navy-
Steaming the Wrong Way," Christian Science Monitor . June 23, 1986,
p 14. Calls for the Navy to refocus on Asia, crediting a U.S. Army
"counterattack with having turned the Maritime Strategy from an
alleged early Pacific orientation to a current European one. Attempts
to drive a wedge between the Navy and Marine Corps, and
alleges "only nominal mention of the Army and the Air Force" in the
Proceedings "Maritime Strategy" Supplement, charges belied by
actually reading the Supplement.
Killebrew, Lt.C. Robert B., USA, Conventional Defense and Total
Deterrence: Assessing NATO's Strategic Options . Wilmington DE:
Scholarly Resources, 1986. Unique among studies of NATO defense
in its attempt at an integrated discussion of U.S. and allied land, sea,
and air force. Argues NATO conventional defense is possible.
Advocates early employment of naval forces as a defensive barrier
"guarding" force. Sees a potential role for carrier air on the Central
Front in a protracted war.
Lewis, Kevin N., Combined Operations in Modern Naval Warfare:
Maritime Strategy and Interservice Cooperation (Rand Paper #6999) .
Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, April 1984. See especially for
arguments on alleged unique "Navy Planning Style," many of which
are belied by the Maritime Strategy.
Ley, Capt. Michael USA, "Navy Badly Needs to BeefUp Land
Operations Fire Support," Army . May 1987, pp 12+. Argues for more
large-caliber naval guns to support Army operations ashore.
* Pendley, R.Adm. William, "The U.S. Navy, Forward Defense, and
the Air-Land Battel," in Pfaltzgraff, Robert, J.r, et al. (eds.),
Emerging Doctrines and Technologies . Lexington, MA: Lexington
Books, forthcoming in 1987. Official views of the Navy's Director of
Strategy, Plans, and Policy (OP-60) as of April 1986. Argues that
Maritime Strategy and Air-Land Battle doctrine are similar and
complementary. Sees both as essential parts, along with nuclear
deterrence, of an "essential traid" of U.S. defense strategy. A short
summary is on pp 15-16 of Emerging Doctrines and Technologies:
Implications for Global and Regional Political-Military Balance: A
Conference Report: April 16-18. 1986 . Cambridge, MA: Institute for
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Foreign Policy Analysis, 1986. CfDunn and Staudenmaier May-June
1985 Survival article; March-April 1986 views of V.Adm. Mustin on
linkage between the Maritime Strategy and "Deep Strike," cited
above; and West German government official views on lack of
linkage, cited in Section V below.
Prina, E. Edgar, "The Tripartite Ocean: The Air Force and Coast
Guard Give the Navy a Helping Hand," Sea Power . October 1986, pp
32-45. Good update on tri-service contributions to implementing the
Maritime Strategy.
U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (JCS Pub.2) .
Washington: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 1986. Reflecting the
National Security Act of 1947, as amended, The Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Title 10 and Title
32 U.S. Code, as amended, and DOD Directive 5100.1 (The "Functions
Paper"), JCS Pub. 2. governs the joint activities of th U.S. armed
forces. See especially Chapter II, Sections 1 and 2-3, charging each
Military Department, including the Navy, to "prepare forces. ..for the
effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war."
This responsibility (and not, as some critic charge, a desire to
somehow usurp the authority of the JCS or the Unified and Specified
Commanders) was the primary impetus and justification for Navy
and Marine Corps development, promulgation and discussion of the
Maritime Strategy. It is the Navy Department's framework for
discharging its responsibilities to "organize, train, equip and provide
Navy and Marine Corps forces for the conduct of prompt and
sustained combat incident to operations at sea."
U.S. Air Force, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air
Force (AFM 1-1) . Washington: Department of the Air Force, March
16, 1984. The "cornerstone" Air Force doctrinal manual and,
therefore, a building block of the Maritime Strategy. Takes a
somewhat narrower view of potential areas of mutual support than
does the Navy. See especially the discussion of objectives of naval
forces on p 1-3, neglecting projection operations, e.g., strike or
amphibious warfare; and pp 2-15, 3-1, and 3-5/3-6, covering possible
Air Force actions to enhance naval operations, virtually all of which
are incorporated in the Maritime Strategy. Note, however, the lack of
mention of any concomitant naval role in enhancing "aerospace"
operations, and the lack of discussion of USAF AAW contributions to
maritime warfare, a key element of the Maritime Strategy.
U.S. Army, Operations (FM 100-5) . Washington: Department of the
Army, August 20, 1982. The Army's "keystone warfighting manual"
and, therefore, a building block of the Maritime Strategy. Almost no
discussion of Army/Navy mutual support, however, e.g., air defense
and island/littoral reinforcement. Included on p 17-7 a useful
discussion of the importance and essentially maritime nature of the
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NATO northern and southern European regions. Superseded in May
1986; distribution now restricted to U.S. government agencies.
Wilkerson, Lt. Col. Thomas, USMC, "Two if by Sea," Proceedings .
November 1983, pp 34-39, on important role of the U.S. Air Force in
Maritime Strategy by the principal Marine Corps contributor to the
Strategy's development.
Yost, Adm. Paul, USCG, "The Bright Slash of Liberty: Today's Coast
Guard: Buffeted But Unbowed," Sea Power . August 1986, pp 8-24. See
especially pp 11-12 and 21-22, on the Maritime Defense Zones, an
important Navy-Coast Guard element of the Maritime Strategy, by
the Commandant of the Coast Guard.
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V. ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS TO AND VIEWS ON THE MARITIME
STRATEGY
The Martitime Strategy as developed by the U.S. Navy of the 1980s is
heavily oriented toward combined (and joint) operations, and this was
reflected in the Proceedings January 19867 Supplement, 'The Maritime
Strategy." The postwar U.S. Navy had never been "unilateralist." Allied
contributions to the global campaign were worked out years ago and then
had been continually updated in the drafting aof allied war plans,
Memoranda of Agreement, and other documents. They have been routinely
discussed at annual Navy-to-Navy staff policy talks and CNO-to-CNO visits,
held betwen the U.S. Navy and each of its most important allied associates,
thus, most of the hard bargaining and tardeoffs had alreacy been done, and
integrating allied efforts with the U.S. Navy component of the Maritime
Strategy was not particularly difficult. Once the Maritime Strategy was
drafted, it was briefed to key allied CNOs and plannign staffs and to NATO
commanders. Allied feedback was considered and utilized in updating
revisions to the Strategy, and the process continues today.
Alford, Jonathan, "The Current Military Position on the Northern
Flank," Marineblad (The Hague), December 1986/January 1987, pp
601-08. speaking at a May 1986 conference on "Britain and the
Security of NATO's Northern Flank," the former deputy director of
the London International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
invokes the syllogism, "Who controls the Norwegian Sea depends on
who controls the North Norwegian airfields. Who controls those
fields depends on who gets there first, and who gets there first
depends on who controls the Norwegian Sea." Alford concludes that
the growth in strategic importance of NATO's northern region has
turned Great Britain in "at least as much as a flank country as (a)
central" alliance member. Accordingly, for Britain the maritime vs.
continental alternative "falsifies and obscures the issue." If British
military capabilities must be cut, they should fall on the Central
Front.
Archer, Clive, Britain's surface Fleet: How Little is Enough?
Centrepiece Paper No. 13, Aberdeen, Scotland: University of
Aberdeen, Centre for Defense Studies, Summer 1988, 28 pp. Reports
that national and allied security requires that Britain reverses the
numerical decline of its surface fleet, and take a more active role in
the defense of the North Atlantic. Early Royal Navy forward
deployment in the Norwegian Sea, says Archer, would serve these
purposes: (1) demonstrate allied solidarity and deter precipitated
Soviet action, (2) "hold the fort" and (3) "sanitize" the South
Norwegian and North Seas in preparation of the arrival of U.S. Navy
reinforcements, and (4) influence possible naval arms control
negotiations. On the latter, the author notes that the European voice
in matters will be "relatively proportionate to their naval strength."
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** Arkin, William M. and Shallhorn, Steve, "Canada Even More Under
U.S. thumb in Sub Plan," Globe and Mail (Toronto), July 17, 1987, p 7.
Decries the Maritime Strategy, the new Canadian defense policy and
the linkage between the two.
Armitage, Richard, "The U.S./Japan Alliance," Defense/86 . July-
August 1986, pp 20-27. Reagan Administration defense policy vis-a-
vis Japan, by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs. The context of the Maritime Strategy in Northeast
Asis and the Northwest Pacific. See also his "Japan's Defense
Program: No Cause for Alarm," Washington Post . February 18, 1987,
pA18.
Auer, Cdr. James, USN (Ret) and Seno, Cdr. Sadao, JMSDF (Ret.),
"Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force," Naval Forces . 11/1987, pp
178-190. Stress on the diffusion of labor between the U.S. Navy and the
Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force in the Northwest Pacific and
on the deterrent value of same.
Ausland, John C, "The Heavy Traffic in Northern Seas,"
International Herald Tribune . September 16, 1986, on some effects of
the Maritime Strategy in Norway.
Barresen, Jacob, Capt. Royal Norwegian Navy, "U.S. Carrier
Operations in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea." Paper
presented at the International Comparative Workshop on Soviet
Seapower, Sortland, June 1988, 24 pp. This paper takes aim at the
conventional wisdom that the forward deployment of carrier
battlegroups into the Norwegian Sea will amount to a charge-of-the-
light brigade. Capt. Barresen concludes instead that a two or three-
carrier battlegroup, provided it is afforded adequate land-based AAW
and ASW support, can establish sea control north of the Greenland-
Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap and possibly "profoundly
change the correlation of forces on NATO's northern flank." Such a
force, he reports, will increase allied air defense and anti-submarine
capabilities in the North by factors of five and five-to-ten, respectively.
Bjarnason, Bjorn, "Iceland and NATO," NATO Review . February
1986, pp 7-12. By one of Iceland's leading journalists. "It is crucial
that in any defense of sea routes between North America and
Western Europe, ...the Soviet fleet is confined as far north towards its
home base at the Kola Peninsula as possible. ..the Greenland-
Iceland-UK gap.. .is not an adequate barrier; instead, NATO
envisages a forward defense in the Norwegian Sea." Includes update
on the defense debate in Iceland.
** Boerresen, Capt. Jacob, RNN, "Norway and the U.S. Maritime
Strategy," Naval Forces . VI/1986, pp 14-15, by the military secretary
to the Norwegian Minister of Defense. "During the 1970s, NATO and
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the USA expressly limited their carrier operations...to the waters in
and south of the GIUK gap, Norway...found this situation rather
uncomfortable. ..The official Norwegian reaction to (forward
deployment of CVBGs) has been positive, (but) Norway is...sensitive
to all developments that it fears may threaten the low level of
tension."
Boerresen, J., Capt. Royal Norwegian Navy, "Norway and the U.S.
Maritime Strategy," Naval Forces . When this article was published,
the author was military secretary to Norway's Minister of Defense
Johan J. Hoist. The views expressed can, therefore, be read as a
reliable statement of Norway's defense preferences. In this case,
Boerresen stresses his country's "reluctant embrace" of the U.S.
Navy's maritime strategy. Occasional forward deployments of
American carrier battlegroups, he says, are desirable, but not as
permanent presence. The writer also has misgivings with an anti-
SSBN strategy, and he worries over the "well-known phenomenon
that American commitments fluctuate over the years." He cautions
his American readers that they should not presume that permission
to station their carriers inside Norway's territorial waters will be
timely and automatic.
Bouchard, Lt. Joseph, and Hess, Lt. Couglas, "The Japanese Navy
and Sea-Lanes Defense," Proceedings . March 1984, pp 88-97. On the
concurrent Japanese Maritime Strategy debate. See also Lehrack, Lt.
Col. Otto, "Search for a New Consensus," same issue, pp 96-99.
Breemer, Jan S., "The Euro-Atlantic Dimension." Paper presented at
the Dalhousie University Conference on'The Undersea Dimension of
Maritime Strategy," Halifax, N.S., Canada, June 23, 1989.
Summarizes the Western European perspective on maritime security
in the North Atlantic as codified in the evolving "European Maritime
Concept 2010" studies, notably the "Sub-Concept's" plan for creating
extra-NATO decision-making mechanisms that would permit the
early and timely forward "crisis-deployment" of an all-European task
force into the Norwegian Sea.
** Breemer, Jan S., "The Maritime Strategy: One Ally's View," Naval
War College Review . Summer 1988, pp 41-46. Discusses the (official
and unofficial) views within the Dutch Navy on the possible
implications of the U.S. Navy's "new strategic thinking" for Dutch
and Western European maritime planning. Highlights NATO-
European planning toward early "Phase I" crisis response
operations in the Norwegian Sea.
British Atlantic Committee, Diminishing the Nuclear Threat:
NATO's Defense and New Technology . London: February 1984. A
group of retired British generals and others rail against the
"practicality" and "very purpose" of the NATO reinforcement
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mission, given their assumptions of a short conventional war phase
in Europe and overwhelming surface ship vulnerability. See also
Mitchell, Lt. I.G., RN., "Atlantic Reinforcement—A Re-Emerging
Debate," Armed Forces . September 1986, pp 399-400.
Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, "Arms
Control and the Defense White Paper," Arms Control Bulletin . June
18, 1987. Condemns Canada's nuclear submarine acquisition plan as
providing involuntary support for the U.S. Navy's "Forward
Maritime Strategy," which the authors imply is provocative and
destabilizing rather than a deterrent.
Caufriez, Chaplain G., "Comment and Discussion: Plan Orange
Revisited," Proceedings . March 1985, pp 73 & 79. From Home Forces
Headquarters, Belgium, a plea for Norwegian Sea vice GIUK Gap
defense, lest "at one go, the northern flank would have crumbled."
Challenge and Commitment: A Defense Policy for Canada . Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1987. June 1987 official
Canadian Ministry of Defense "White Paper," the first since 1971.
Current Canadian contributions to allied Maritime Strategy and
future plans. See especially maps pp 13, 52, 64 and discussion of
proposed changes in Canadian policy, which will increase the
requirements for USN and USMC forces in the Norwegian Sea and
elsewhere, but which should help improve other elements needed to
carry out the Strategy.
Chichester, Michael, "The Western Alliance: Politics, Economics
and Maritime Power," Navv International . January 1987, pp 4-6.
While warning that the U.S. naval largesse on behalf of Western
Europe's maritime security may not outlast the Reagan
Administration, Chichester repeats his call for the creation of a
"European maritime pillar," organized under the umbrella of the
EEC or Western European Union (WEU), and headed up by Great
Britain, "the leading maritime power in Europe."
Chichester, Michael, "NATO's Maritime Power: Its place in a New
Strategy," Navv International . August 1986, pp 504-06. Between the
U.S. Navy's global (over) commitments, the possibility that the Soviet
Union will re-direct its expansionary appetite away from the Central
Front, and European desires for a louder voice in Western coalition
strategy, the time has come, says the author, for a "combined
European maritime defense policy" that will take charge of the
security of the eastern Atlantic.
Chichester, Michael, "Towards a European Maritime Policy," Navv
International . November 1988, pp 538-40. One of the most vocal
spokesmen for the creation of a European "maritime pillar" deplores
the failure by the Western European Union (WEU) to translate the
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recent dispatch of Western European flotillas to the Persian Gulf into
a "European standing naval force" for use "outside the NATO
theatre."
Childs, Nick, "The Royal Navy: Which Way Forward?" Navv
International . April 1989, pp 169-71. Proposes that perhaps only
significant (including British) arms reductions on the European
Continent will "save" the Royal Navy's surface fleet from declining
below the stated force objective of "about 50" destroyers and frigates.
Still, child's questions if it may not be wiser to "balance" the fleet in
favor of submarines and maritime patrol aircraft as opposed to
surface combatants if the Royal Navy, in concert with its European
allies, intends to "hold the ring" preparatory to the arrival of
American reinforcements. Given the Royal Navy's weakness in air
defense capabilities, concludes Childs, doing so effectively "must be
considered fanciful."
Cole, Paul M. and Hart, Douglas M. (eds.), Northern Europe:
Security Issues for the 1990s . Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986. See
especially Col. Jonathan Alford, BA (Ret.), "The Soviet Naval
Challenge," pp 43-56, and Lt. Gen. Heinz von zur Gathen, FRGA
(Ret.), "The Federal Republic of German's Contribution to the
Defense of Northern Europe," pp 57-82. The former sees forward U.S.
operations in the Norwegian Sea as unlikely, and argues that the
Royal Navy should, therefore, concentrate on the Channel, the North
Sea, and the Norwegian Sea, rather than either "unspecific
flexibility" or "keeping open the sea lines of communication to the
United States," options that parallel those discussed in the
concurrent U.S. Maritime Strategy debates. The latter discusses the
increasing West German role in Baltic, North, and Norwegian Sea
defense. Both authors base their arguments for enhanced European
naval power on the premise that the U.S. Navy will not be available,
at least not in strength, in the Norwegian Sea early in a war.
Cremasco, Maurizio, "Italy: A New Definition of Security?" in
Kelleher, Catherine M. and Mattox, Gale A. (eds.), evolving
European Defense Policies . Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987,
pp 257-272. On the Italian military policy debate and Italian Navy
views on strategy.
Crickard, F.W., R.Adm., RCN (Ret.), "The U.S. Maritime Strategy-
Should Canada Be Concerned?" See entry under Yost, William J.
Crickard, R.Adm. F.W., CN, "Three Oceans—Three Challenges:
The Future of Canada's Maritime Forces," Naval Forces . V/1985, pp
13-27. On complementary Canadian strategy, especially area ASW in
the North Atlantic SLOC.
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** Crickard, R.Adm. Frederick, "The Canadian Navy—New
Directions," Naval Forces . 11/1987, pp 78-87. Sees the Maritime
Strategy as forcing hard choices on Canadian naval planners. Cf his
views of a year earlier, cited above.
De Savornin-Lohman, J.P., "De Nederlandse Politieke Benadering
van het 'Out-of-Area' Probleem ("The Dutch Political Approach to the
'Out-of-Area' Problem"), Marineblad (The Hague), May 1988, pp 192-
198. Synopsis of the Dutch Government's policy on NATO "out-of-
area" issues, which includes: (1) rejection of a NATO out-of-area
"strategy" per se in favor of preparations to deal with situations on an
ad hoc basis, (2) a preference for political solutions through
international forums such as the United Nations, (3) a rejection of -
out-of-area military operations under NATO auspices, and (4) an
emphasis on indirect contributions in support of the direct
contributions by the larger NATO members, e.g., the provision of
transit facilities or force compensations. The article includes a useful
discussion of the Dutch decision to send mine warfare forces to the
Persian Gulf. Note is also made of existing NATO plans to protect
shipping outside the treaty area in the event of a crisis with the Soviet
Union.
Defense Agency (Japan), Defense of Japan: 1986 . Includes latest
official Japanese defense policy and strategy views. See especially pp
99 and 154. Outlines agreed division of labor between the Maritime
Self-Defense Force and the U.S. Navy in the event of an attack on
Japan, as understood by the Japanese government. The Maritime
Strategy was developed in full accordance with these concepts.
Delaere, Martijn, "Dutch Seek Naval Specialization," Jane's Defense
Weekly . June 3, 1989, p 1059. Reports on the jointly British-Dutch-
West German produced "Sub-Concept for the Northern Maritime
Region 2000-2010" plan for the creation, in time of a Norwegian Sea
crisis, of an integrated northern European naval force-in-being.
According to Delaere, the Dutch Navy is seeking to translate this
plan into an argument for mission specialization. He is wrong.
Department of Defense (Australia), The Defense of Australia: 1987 .
Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, March 19,
1987. The first official Australian Defense "White Paper" since 1976
ensures continued RAN cooperation within the Maritime Strategy.
"In the remote contingency of global conflict.. .our responsibilities
would include those associated with the Radford-Collins Agreement
for the protection and control of shipping. Subject to priority
requirement in our own area the Australian Government would then
consider contributions further afield. ..for example, our FFGs...are
capable of effective participation in a U.S. carrier battle group well
distant from Australia's shores."
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Dibb, Paul, Review of Australia's Defense Capabilities . Canberra:
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986. Against
Australian involvement with United States and other allied
contingency planning for global war. Claims that Radford-Collins
Agreement "convoying and escort connotations which extend more
than 2000 nautical miles west of Australia to the mid-Indian Ocean
suggest a disproportionate commitment of scarce resources to
activities which may be only marginally related to our national
interest and capabilities." An input to the March 1987 government
White Paper on defense.
Diehl, David, "Norwegian Admiral Watns Maneuver Limits,"
European Stars and Stripes . September 17, 1988, p 3. V.Adm. Torolf
Rein, NATO's allied commander northern Europe, comments on
exercises "Teamwork '88," and proposes that, while he is pleased
with the Alliance's new forward strategy, Norway's resources "can't
go on to exercises of this type a year."
Dunn, Michael Collins, "Canada Rethinks Its Defense Posture,"
Defense and Foreign Affairs . November 1985, pp 12-19. Discusses
Canadian ground and air contributions to NATO's Northern Front
and naval contribution to Atlantic ASW and Arctic defense.
Ebata, Kensuke, "Ocean Air Defense Japanese Style," Proceedings .
March 1987, pp 98-101. On Japanese AAW concepts and programs,
essential elements of the Maritime Strategy in the Pacific.
Eberle, Adm. Sir James, RN, "Defending the Atlantic Connection,"
in Till, Geoffrey, (ed.), The Future of British Sea Power . Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1984, pp 146-150. See especially for frank
overview of four Royal Navy tasks in the Atlantic.
** Eberle, Adm. Sir James, RN, "Editorial," Naval Forces . IV/1986, p 7.
By a former top Royal Navy and NATO Commander-in-Chief. "The
New Maritime Strategy is to be welcomed as a brave effort to bring
some much needed clarity into the filed of* maritime strategic
thinking, but it is more likely to be welcomed in Europe by naval
officers than it is by political leaders."
Espersen, Morgens, The Baltic—Balance and Security . Copenhagen:
The Information and Welfare Service of the Danish Defense
Ministry, 1982, 71 pp. A very useful Danish portrayal of the historical
evolution and contemporary security and international legal status of
the Baltic Sea and Danish Straits. Includes a valuable summary of
Soviet Warsaw pact naval activities and exercises along the seaward
flank of NATO's Central Front.
Federal Minister of Defense (Federal Republic of Germany), White
Paper 1985: The Situation and the Development of the Federal Armed
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Forces . Includes latest official West German defense policy and
strategy views. See especially pp 27-29, 76-77, 111, and 211-216.
Declares unequivocal German support for "forward defense at sea in
accordance with the NATO commanders' maritime concept of
operations, which "calls for countering the threat far from friendly
sea routes and shores. Interdiction of enemy naval forces should be
effected immediately in front of their own bases." Differentiates
clearly, however, between such use of naval (and air) forces and
"aggressive forward defense by ground operations in the opponent's
territory," which "NATO strategy rules out."
Gann, L.H. (ed.), The Defense of Western Europe . London: Croom
Helm, 1987, surveys all the defense forces of all the Western
European nations. Particularly useful is Nigel de Lee's "The Danish
and Norwegian Armed Forces," pp 58-94, which examines in some
detail their wartime sea and air concepts of operations in the
Norwegian Sea, the Baltic approaches, the Baltic itself and inshore
waters. These concepts are well integrated into the Maritime
Strategy. As regards Denmark, de Lee notes: "Plans for naval action
are based on aggressive tactics in depth, and this entails a forward
defense." Particularly useless is the highly parochial chapter by Col.
Harry Summers USA (Ret.), allegedly on "United States Armed
Forces in Europe," which should have been styled "The U.S. Army in
Germany."
Garrod, Sir Martin, Lt. Gen., Royal Marines, "Amphibious Warfare:
Why?" The RUSI Journal . Winter 1988, pp 25-30. A useful reminder
by the Commandant General of the British Corps pf Marines of the
"Basics" of amphibious warfare. Garrod's specific "target audience"
are those within the British Ministry of Defense and Government
who question the contemporary relevance of the "sea soldiers." But
his quotation of Liddell-Hart's observation how "amphibious
flexibility is the greatest strategic asset that a sea-based power
possesses," has perhaps even greater relevance for the amphibious
component of the American maritime strategy.
Greenwood, David, "Towards Role Specialization in NATO," NATO's
Sixteen Nations . July 1986, pp 44-49. Argues against a significant
Eastern Atlantic naval role for Belgium, the Netherlands, West
Germany and Denmark. This translates out as largely an attack on
the existence of the Dutch Navy, one of the world's best.
Grimstvedt, R.Adm. Bjarne, RNN, "Norwegian Maritime
Operations," Proceedings . March 1986, pp 144-149. By the Norwegian
CNO. Stresses Norwegian Navy intent and capabilities to defend
North Norway, including same Vestfjorden area that focused
COMSECONDFLT/COMSTRIKEFLTLANT's attention in 1985 and
1986.
68
Grove, Eric J., "After the Falklands," Proceedings. March 1986, pp
121-129. Questions and wisdom of the Royal Navy functioning
primarily in conjunction with Striking Fleet Atlantic and USN SSNs
in the Norwegian Sea. Would prefer RN focus to return to Naval
Control and Protection of Shipping in the Eastern Atlantic and
Channel.
Grove, Eric J., "The Convoy Debate," Naval Forces . No. III/1985, pp
38-46. Update of classic post-war Royal Navy pro-convoy/anti-forward
ops arguments by a leading British civilian naval analyst.
** Grove, Eric, "The Maritime Strategy and Crisis Stability," Naval
Forces . No. 6, 1986, pp 34-44. Excellent discussion of how the Soviet
Union and the West might agree on a set of formal or informal
"rules" for routinizing the periodic forward deployment of NATO
naval forces in the Norwegian Sea without upsetting the "Nordic
balance." Were such "normal times" rules to be broken, says Grove,
this would serve as a "tripwire" for the West to initiate the maritime
strategy's "Phase I" crisis reinforcement.
Grove, Eric, "The Maritime Strategy," Bulletin of the Council for
Arms Control (UK), September 1986, pp 5-6. Regards the Strategy as
"self-consciously offensive" and "self-consciously coalition-minded,
yet, another example of the growing difference in mood between the
two sides of the Atlantic." Challenges fellow Europeans to inject
amendments reflecting their own "interests and fears." The
"difference in mood" he sees, however, may well be more between
military leaders and some political writers on both sides of the ocean
than between Americans and Europeans.
Hackett, Gen. Sir John, BA (Ret.), McGeoch, V.Adm. Sir Ian, RN,
(Ret.), et al, The Third World War: The Untold Story, New York:
MacMillan, 1982. Fiction. Sequel to The Third World War: August
1985 (1978). A British vision, stressing the war at sea and on the
northern front, and all but ignoring the Mediterranean and Pacific.
"Swing" and carrier strikes on the Kola understood (as in 1978) as
normal NATO modus operandi. (XClancy's 1986 Red Storm Rising ,
and Hayes et al American Lake . Chapter 19, cited in Section II above.
Haesken, Ole, et al, Confidence Building Measures at Sea . FFI
Rapport-88/5002, Kjeller, Norway: Norwegian Defense Research
Establishment, November 10, 1988. An exhaustive study of the
desirability/feasibility of 14 different types of possible confidence
building measures (CBMs) at sea for the Nordic region. The study
finds 5 possible measures "clearly promising" (e.g., notification of
exercises, incidents-at-sea agreements), 6 with "uncertain value"
(e.g., limitation of exercises, exchange of shipboard exercise
observers), and 3 "clearly unsuitable." Each of the latter would entail
the creation of "permanent zones" of naval exclusion, e.g., limited
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presence, weapons (SLCM) limitations, and limited base access. This
is requisite reading for anyone concerned with the possible impact of
maritime CBMs on operations efficiency, deterrence, and forward
naval planning generally.
Heginbotham, Stanley, J., "The Forward Maritime Strategy and
Nordic Europe," Naval War College Review . November/December
1985, pp 19-27. Notes that U.S. Navy's maritime strategy means
different things to different people, and that the European allies will
accept or reject the strategy, depending on their particular
interpretation (e.g., "deployment doctrine" vs. "horizontal escalation
doctrine"). The author concludes that, "it is important to bear
European sensitivities in minds and to shape a strategy in ways that
are most likely to draw European support rather than opposition."
Heginbotham, Stanley, "The Forward Maritime Strategy and Nordic
Europe, Naval War College Review . November-December 1985, pp 19-
27.
Hoist, Johan Jorgen, "Arms Control and Security on NATO's
Northern Flank," NATO Review . October 1988, pp 10-16. A
comprehensive statement of the Norwegian position on European
arms control objectives, including the need for limiting or
(preferably) prohibiting nuclear-armed SLCMs.
Hoist, Johan Jorgen, et al. (eds.), Deterrence and Defense in the
North . Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1985. See especially
authoritative chapters by high Norwegian government officials and
Hunt, Kenneth, "The Security of the Center and the North," pp 66-76:
"The Stronger the North, the Stronger the Center."
Hoist, Johan Jorgen, "The Security Pattern in Northern Europe: A
Norwegian View," Marineblad (The Hague), December 1986/
January 1987, pp 622-33. Excellent discussion by Norway's defense
minister of his country's "security calculus," including, in
particular, the country's relationship with the Soviet Union based on
the "trade-off between considerations of deterrence and
reassurance." Most treatments of the linkage between the Central
Front and the Northern flank focus on the first as the"dependent
variable." Hoist reminds the reader that this relationship is much
more synergistic: "The size and topography of North Norway would
require a Would-be attacker to commit fairly large forces which
would then not be available for allocation to the central front or the
Baltic region. ..and. ..NATO's ability to hold the central front is vital,
therefore, also from the point of view of constraining Soviet options
for diverting forces to the Nordic area." Hoist is less than sanguine
about some of the declaratory aspects of the U.S. Navy's maritime
strategy. He specifically cautions against putting the Soviet SSBNs at
risk, against using Norwegian territory for "horizontal escalation,"
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and against a U.S. Navy "permanent naval presence in the
Norwegian Sea." By contrast, he does support the idea of a
"reasonable frequency of presence. ..in order to emphasize the
American commitment to the defense of Norway."
Howlett, Gen. Geoffrey, BA., "Interview," Journal of Defense and
Diplomacy . September 1986, pp 13-16, NATO Commander-in-Chief
Allied Forces Northern Europe rejects a GIUK Gap maritime
defense line. Advocates forward defense on land and sea in North
Norway and the Baltic, and containment of the Soviet Northern and
Baltic fleets in their home waters.
** Huitfeldt, Lt. Gen. Tonne, RNA, "The Threat from the North-
Defense of Scandinavia," NATO's Sixteen Nations . October 1986, pp
26-32. The former NATO International Military Staff Director's
endorsement of the Maritime Strategy as "making a more effective
contribution to deterring the Soviet Northern Fleet from any
adventurism in the Norwegian Sea, and Soviet aggression in
general," with the caution that it "not go beyond what is essential for
deterrence and defense."
Huitfeldt, Lt. Gen. Tonne, RNA, NATO's Northern Security . London:
Institute for the Study of Conflict, September 1976, by the retired
Director of the NATO International Military Staff. "United States
maritime strategy is in harmony with the agreed NATO strategy."
Good coverage of the 1981 NATO concept of Maritime Operations, a
major building block of the Maritime Strategy.
Huldt, Bo, "The Strategic North," The Washington Quarterly .
Summer 1985, pp 99-109. Reviews the evolution of the Nordic area
from a regional "buffer zone" to a central area in global strategy. The
Swedish author suggests that, given the transition of the region from
being a flank area to "being perhaps directly in the line of fire," a
renewed Danish and Norwegian interest in NATO's nuclear
deterrent "should not be ruled out as totally inconceivable."
Hunter, Robert, (ed.), NATO—The Next Generation . Boulder, CO:
Westview, 1984. See especially, and unexpectedly, Japanese Maritime
Self Defense Force role in closing off Far Eastern straits and
protecting Western Pacific sea lines of communication in chapters by
Jun Tsunoda and Shunji Taoka.
Jane's NATO & Europe Today . May 3, 1989, "NATO Votes New Navy
War Rules," p 3. Reports the adoption by NATO of new roles of naval
engagement, defining when naval commanders may open fire
against potential adversaries. Does not spell out whether ROEs have
been tightened or liberalized.
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Jansson, C. Nils-Ove, Cdr., Royal Swedish Navy, "The Baltic: A Sea
of Contention," Naval War College Review , pp 47-61. Notes that the
Baltic Sea is a "backwater maritime theater" no longer due to three
key developments: (1) the forwardness of the U.S. Navy's maritime
strategy, (2) NATO's FOFA concept, and (3) the rejuvenation of the
Soviet TVD system. The article goes on to postulate a wide range of
possible Soviet offensive and defensive scenarios for the region.
"Japan, U.S. Map Out Sea Defenses," Washington Times . December
1, 1986, p 6. On the wartime division of labor between the U.S. Navy
and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force.
Kampe, V.Adm. Helmut, FGN, "Defending the Baltic Approaches,"
Proceedings . March 1986, pp 88-93, by the NATO Commander, Allied
Naval Forces, Baltic Approaches. Complementary German and
Danish naval strategies: "In the Baltic Sea, forward defense begins at
the Warsaw Pact ports."
Kawaguchi, Hiroshi, "Japan's Evolving Defense Policy," NATO's
Sixteen Nations. April 1989, pp 21-24. An explanantion of how
Japan's decision, in January 1987 to repeal the one percent of GNP
ceiling on defense expenditures will provide for a robust defense and
will not likely be reversed despite the prospect of regional detente. In
the area of Far East maritime security, Kawaguchi (a research
fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National
Defense University in Washington, DC) suggests that a START
agreement will likely result in the elimination or at least important
reduction of the Soviet SSBN fleet in the Sea of Okhotsk. The result
may be that the Soviet Pacific Fleet, relieved of its task ofSSBN
protection, "would have more room for other activities."
King-Harman, Col. Anthony, BA, "NATO Strategy—A New Look,"
RUSI . March 1984, pp 26-29. By a former long-time member of the
International NATO Staff. Alleges and decries a NATO "lack of
political direction in the maritime sphere. It has been largely left to
SACLANT himself to develop and implement a maritime strategy for
deterrence...There is also a Tri-MNC concept of operations again
carrying no political endorsement." Calls for a new NATO "strategic
review," one result of which, he anticipates would be a finding that
"reinforcements...would only need the minimum of maritime
protection."
Leenhardt, Adm. Yves, FN, "France—The Need for a Balanced
Navy," NATO's Sixteen Nations . February-March 1986, pp 41-46.
Rowing to the beat of a different drum. Authoritative statement by the
French CNO. Heavy emphasis on nuclear deterrence, crisis
prevention and control, and allied cooperation. Minimal discussion
relating to global or regional forward conventional operations against
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the Soviets, however, in contrast to U.S.Maritime Strategy and other
allied writers.
Longbottom Squadron Leader S.P., RAAF, "Maritime Strike Strategy
for the Royal Australian Air Force," Defense Force Journal .
March/April 1987, pp 5+. Argues for increased RAAF attention to
mine warfare.
Mabesoone, Capt. W.C., RNLN, and Buis, Cdr. N. W.G., RNLN,
"Maritime Strategic Aspects of the North Sea," RUSI . September
1984, pp 12-17. Dutch Navy view of North Sea operations.
Complements the Maritime Strategy. Stresses need for land-based
air forces in air defense and possibility of SSN TLAM-C support of
Central Front operations. Emphasis on barrier vice close-support
Naval Protection of Shipping operations.
** Mackay, Cdr. S.V., RN, "An Allied Reaction" Proceedings . April
1987, pp 82-89. Concludes that a peacetime USN Norwegian Sea
CVBG presence is required with concomitant "greater commitment
from Norway," and "a firm and agreed-upon line. ..on ROEs. There
are clear indications from recent exercises that this Maritime
Strategy is the way ahead for U.S. maritime forces and not solely to
support the cause for a 600-ship Navy...the supporting maritime
nations in NATO must follow the lead. (But) We in Europe must be
sure that the Maritime Strategy is a genuine U.S. policy for the
future and not just a product of the current administration." See also
"Comment and Discussion," July 1987, pp 19-20.
Margolis, Eric, "Will Canadian Waters Become the Next Maginot
Line?" Wall Street Journal . February 21, 1986, p 23. A Canadian call
for increased U.S./Canadian ASW capabilities in the Arctic.
Matsukane, Hisatomo, "Japan and Security of the Sea Lanes," Global
Affairs . Spring 1989, pp 49-64. The director of the Japanese Center for
Strategic Studies and a former lieutenant general in the Japanese
army warns that the Soviet Pacific Fleet threat is aimed mainly at the
Pacific sea lines of communications, to prevent the Soviet fleet from
breaking out into the open ocean, the author makes three main
recommendations: (1) a change from "passive to active defense" by
Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Forces, including teaming up with
U.S. forces for "coordinated strikes on regional Soviet facilities," (2)
tighter integration of U.S. and Japanese command and control
capabilities, and (3) the creation of a "well-articulated regional
defense, involving far-reaching cooperation and collaboration"
between the United States, Japan, and other regional Far East-
Pacific nations.
** Nakanishi, Terumasa, "U.S. Nuclear Policy and Japan,"
Washington Quarterly . Winter 1987, pp 81-97, especially pp 84-85 and
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p 90. The Maritime Strategy in the context of the overall military
situation in Northeast Asia. "The new 'Full-Forward' strategy of the
U.S. Pacific Fleet.. .is certainly in the interest of Japan's conventional
security." He is less sanguine regarding Japan's nuclear security,
however.
Nathan, James A., "How's the Strategy Playing With the Allies?"
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings . August 1988, pp 57-62. The author
asserts that American's overseas allies, especially in the Pacific
region, are skeptical about the intent, manageability, and
wherewithal of the U.S. Navy's "global" maritime strategy. Fearing
that Pacific Fleet carriers may need to be "swung" to the Atlantic,
countries such as Japan and Australia are allegedly reluctant to join
with the United States in early forward operations and perhaps be left
to "hold the bag."
** Naval Forces . No. 7, 1986, "Norway and the U.S. Maritime Strategy,"
pp 14-15. An anonymous, but presumably Norwegian, author
explains the "reluctant Norwegian embrace of the maritime
strategy." While acknowledging Norway's "uncomfortable" security
situation vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the article expresses worry
nevertheless that a heightened U.S. military profile in northern
waters could negate Norway's past efforts to strike a balance between
"deterrence and reassurance." Cited are these specific concerns: (1)
an American submarine campaign against Soviet SSBNs might
trigger nuclear escalation, as well as serve to denude the Norwegian
Sea-deployed carier battlegroups of their own SSN protection; (2) the
Soviet Union could counter U.S. forward deployment with its own
increase in force levels, the latter could become a permanent feature
of the Nordic "strategic landscape," whereas the U.S. presence may
turn out to be a passing phenomenon; and (3) there is no guarantee
that U.S. Navy forces will arrive in time and at places of Norwegian
choosing.
Netherlands Advisory Committee on Peace and Security, Burden
Sharing: A Political Task . The Hague, May 1989. Report prepared for
the Dutch ministries of defense and foreign affairs. Concludes that
the American perception (real and imagined) of an inequitable
Alliance defense burden should be re-dressed less through higher
European defense expenditures than by way of a broader "European"
responsibility for its own security. The revival of the Western
European Union (WEU), and the dispatch of European naval units to
the Persian Gulf are reported as "signals" to the United States that
"Europe" is indeed prepared to share burdens outside the Atlantic
treaty area. The Report acknowledges that a "united Western
Europe" may not always make itself heard to U.S. liking, and must
guard against living up to the fears of some Americans that "1992"
will inaugurate a "fortress Europe."
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Newman, Peter C, "Business Watch: About-Face in Defense
Strategy," Maclean's Magazine . January 1,2, 1987, p 28. Naval
aspects of the defense debate in Canada on the eve of publication of
the 1987 "White Paper."
Nishihara, Masashi, "Maritime Cooperation in the Pacific: The
United States and its Partners," Naval War College Review . Summer
1987, pp 37-41. "The U.S. strategy of horizontal escalation by which
the United States would open up armed tensions in different parts of
the world, in order to force the Soviets to disperse their forces, may
not meet Japanese interests."
Okazuki, Hisahiko, Japan's National Security Strategy . Maryland:
Abt Books, 1986. Ambassador Okazuki presents persuasive
arguments why Japan could not stay out of large or small conflicts
involving its interests.
** Olsen, Edward R., "The Maritime Strategy in the Western Pacific,"
Naval War College Review . Autumn 1987, pp 38-49. A reminder that
U.S. perceptions of what-needs-to-be-done in the "American lake,"
i.e. Western Pacific, are not always shared by the regional states.
Most nations in the area, says Olsen, fully appreciate the
maritimeness of their geo-strategical and economic circumstances;
however, they have so far failed to "co-sign" the American estimate of
the Soviet danger, and remain uncertain of how exactly an American
maritime strategy would cope with this danger.
Oseald, Sir Julian, Adm. Royal Navy. "Maritime Concepts of
Operations: New Thinking," The RUSI Journal . Summer 1988, pp.
10-14. NATO's Commander-in-Chief, Channel and Eastern Atlantic
considers how emerging maritime technologies will help keep the
allied "forward maritime concept" affordable.
Price, Alfred, Air Battle Central Europe . New York: The Free Press,
1986. See Chapter 14, "Guardians of the Baltic Shore," on Federal
German Naval Aviation forward air-to-surface warfare concepts in
the Baltic, and Chapter 15, "Protecting the Lifeline," on air defense of
the seas surrounding the United Kingdom.
Pruijs, A., Capt., RNLN, "De verdediging van de Noordflank is meer
dan de verdediging van Noord-Noorwegen" ("The Defense of the
Northern Flank is More Than the Defense of Northern Norway"),
Marineblad (The Hague), April 1987, pp 9Q-107. A review of the
importance of the Nordic region to the security and defense of Central
Europe. A maritime forward defense, says this serving officer in the
Dutch Navy, is codified in the 1982 NATO Defense Planning
Committee-approved Concept of Maritime Operations
(CONMAROPS). Western European navies and amphibious forces
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must be prepared to respond to a crisis quickly and in force, pending
the arrival of the U.S. carrier reinforcements.
Richey, George, Britain's Strategic Role in NATO . London:
MacMillan, 1986. Argues for Britain's return to a classic Maritime
Strategy, as Ambassador Robert Komer, Senator Gary Hart and
William Lind (but not the U.S. Navy) use the term.
Riste, Olav and Tamnes, Rolf, The Soviet Naval Threat and Norway .
Oslo: Research Center for Defense History (FHFS), National Defense
College Norway, 1986. See especially pp 18-22. Two Norwegian
defense specialists see recent U.S. naval and other efforts as
providing "from the Norwegian point of view. ..a considerably
improved probability that the supply lines to Norway will be kept
open." See also Tamnes' "Integration and Screening," (also FHFS
1986), on Norwegian attitudes in the 1970s and 1980s.
"Royal Navy Edges Closer to Kola," Defense Attache . 4/1985, pp 9-10.
On actual complementary contemporary Royal Navy North
Norwegian Sea strategy.
Schlim, V.Adm. A.J.P., BN, "Mine Warfare in European Waters,"
NATO's Sixteen Nations . February-March 1986, pp 20-28. By the
Belgian CNO. How NATO plans to use mines and mining against the
Soviets. Excellent complementarity with the Maritime Strategy.
Secretary of State for Defense (UK), Statement on the Defense
Estimates 1986:1 . London: HMSO, 1986. See especially pp 29, 34, and
60-61. "...enemy attack submarines are successfully to be held at
arm's length from the critical Atlantic routes. Defense against these
submarines would begin when they sailed; the availability of U.S.
ships in the Eastern Atlantic at the outbreak of hostilities cannot be
assumed; U.S. and European navies are continuing.. .to ensure the
preservation of an essential margin of allied maritime superiority in
key ocean areas."
Secretary of State for Defense (UK), Statement on the Defense
Estimates 1987:1 . London: HMSO, 1987. See especially p 25 for
reaffirmation of previous year's policy statements and commitment
to Royal Navy "forward deployment operations in the Norwegian
Sea."
Shadwick, Martin, "Canada's Commitments to NATO: The Need for
Rationalization," Canadian Defense Quarterly . Summer 1985, pp 22-
27. The range of options for future Canadian deployment strategies,
any of which would affect the Maritime Strategy.
Small, Adm. William N., "The Southern Region: The Key to Europe's
Defense," Armed Forces . January 1986, pp, 12-13. By the NATO
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Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe. NATO's plans for
defense of its Southern Region, including allied and U.S. Navy Sixth
Fleet/STRIKEFORSOUTH Mediterranean operations and Turkish
Black Sea operations.
Sokolsky, Joel J. "Canada's Maritime Forces: Strategic
Assumptions, Commitments, Priorities," Canadian Defense
Quarterly . Winter 85/86, pp 24-20. By a leading Canadian civilian
defense and naval specialist. See especially pp 28-29, regarding
similarities between the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s and NATO
naval strategy of the 1950s. Also see Francis, David R., "Canada
Ponders Major Shift in Defense Policy," Christian Science Monitor .
February 4, 1987, p 9, for update of Sokolsky' s views.
** Sokolsky, Joel, "The U.S. Navy and Canadian Security: Trends in
American Maritime Strategy," Peace and Security . Spring 1987, pp
10+. Sees the Maritime Strategy as creating problems for Canada.
Advocates a Canadian Naval build up.
Stavridis, Cdr. James, "The Global Maritime Coalition,"
Proceedings . April 1985, pp. 58-74. Also "Comment and Discussion,"
October 1985, p 177. On role of allies in Maritime Strategy by a former
OP-603 staffer.
Stryker, Russell F., "Civil Shipping Support for NATO," NATO
Review . February 1986, pp 29-33. By a U.S. Maritime Administration
official and member of the NATO Planning Board for Ocean
Shipping. On the shipping that i to use the North Atlantic SLOC.
Teitler, G., "The Maritime Strategy: Uitdaging ook aan de
bondgenoten" ("The Maritime Strategy: Challenge for the Allies"),
Marineblad (The Hague), June 1986, pp 332-38. One of the most astute
Dutch commentators on international maritime affairs advises the
Royal Netherlands Navy to answer the "challenge" of the American
maritime strategy, and make up its minds whether to "sign on," or
maintain its preoccupation with the "southerly defense" of the
Atlantic SLOCs. Without active participation in the maritime
strategic debate, warns Teitler, the Dutch Navy is likely to find itself
relegated to "specialized" tasks such as sweeping mines in the North
Sea and English Channel. See also the commentary by Veassen and
Van Waning in the September 1986 issue of Marineblad .
The North Atlantic Assembly, NATO Anti Submarine Warfare:
Strategy. Requirements and the Need for Cooperation . Brussels: 1982.
Good survey of the issues, with a call for resolution of the debate over
mission priorities.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures (10th and
subsequent editions), Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1981 and
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subsequently. The basic official public document of NATO policy and
strategy. See especially latest (1984) edition, pp 108-111, 143-144 and
380. "The primary task in wartime of the Allied Command Atlantic
would be to ensure security in the whole Atlantic area by guarding
the sea lands and denying their use to an enemy, to conduct
conventional and nuclear operations against enemy naval bases and
airfields and to support operations carried out by SACEUR. NATO's
forces (have) roles of neutralizing Soviet strategic nuclear
submarines, safeguarding transatlantic sea lines and in general
preventing the Warsaw Pact from gaining maritime supremacy in
the North Atlantic."
Thorthon, T.E., Lt. Cdr. RN, "Have We Really Got It Right?
Reflections on NATO's Naval Strategy," Armed Forces (London),
August 1987, pp 349-50. A British naval officer warns that NATO is
without enough grey hulls to afford the risk of an early forward
offensive and should, therefore, plan on "establishing the strongest
possible blockade in the vicinity of the GIUK gap."
** Till, Geoffrey, "Maritime Power: The European Dimension," Naval
Forces . 11/1987, pp 88-104. Excellent and comprehensive survey by a
European of how European naval power complements the Maritime
Strategy in supporting overall NATO Maritime Strategy. A partial
antidote to Bing West's concerns.
Tokinoya, Atsushi, The Japan-U.S. Alliance: A Japanese Perspective
(Adelphi Paper #212), London," IISS, Autumn 1986.
Tonge, David, "Exposure Troubles NATO's Northern Commanders,"
Financial Times . October 27, 1982, p 3. Reports NATO Northern
Region ground commanders' concerns that carrier battle groups
may not arrive in the Norwegian Sea early enough.
Toyka, Cdr. Viktor, FGN, "A Submerged Forward Defense,"
Proceedings . March 1984, pp 145-147. Complementary German
Maritime Strategy for the Baltic.
Train, Adm. Harry, "U.S. Maritime Power," in Coker, Christopher,
U.S.Military Power in the 1980s . London: MacMillan Press, 1983 pp
107-114. SACLANT provides details on the 1981 NATO Maritime
Concept of Operations (CONMAROPS), one of the building blocks of
the Maritime Strategy.
Ulman, Neil, "Defending NATO's Northern Flank," Wall Street
Journal . June 3, 1982, p 29. One reporters impression of Norway and
Sweden's perception of the Nordic threat.
*+ Urban, Mark, "New Navy Plan to Attack Soviet Subs Near Bases,"
The Independent (London). April 14, 1987. Commander-in-Chief of
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the British Fleet, Adm. Hunt, on forward Royal Navy and NATO
submarine, including anti-SSBN operations.
Vaessen, Jules J., "Defensie van de Noordflank is meer dan de
verdediging van Noord Noorwegen" ("Defense of the Northern Flank
Means More Than the Defense of Northern Norway"), Marineblad .
(The Hague) December 1986/January 1987, pp 609-21. Compares the
Soviet and Western stakes in Europe's northern region. Includes a
discussion of NATO's plans for a "defense-in-depth" of Denmark and
the Danish Straits.
Vaessen, Jules, J., Capt., RNLN, "The Maritime Strategy en de
bondgenoten" ("The Maritime Strategy and the Allies"),
Commentary on Teitler's "The Maritime Strategy: Uitdaging ook aan
de bondenoten," Marineblad (The Hague), September 1986, p 471.
Writes that the American maritime strategy's emphasis on
threatening the Soviet flanks is a move in the right direction, away
from NATO's myopia with defense on the ground in Europe's center.
If it does not want to find itself a minor partner to the British Navy,
warns Vaessen, his service had better take an active role in the
development of a new Atlantic maritime concept.
Van Eekelen, W.F., "De Noordflank van NAVO" ("The Northern
Flank of NATO") Marineblad (The Hague), December 1986/January
1987, pp 599-600. The Dutch defense minister takes note that the
'Nordic Balance" is a political concept in need of a military balance,
including an allied naval presence. Van Eekelen supports the
Norwegian position that the creation of a Nordic nuclear-free zone
(NFZ) cannot be isolated from a much broader agreement on
European de-nuclearization.
Van Reijn, J.A. and Teitler, G., "Maritieme stragegie in the 20e
eeuw: een conceptie in beweging." ("Maritime Strategy in the 20th
Century: An Evolving Concept"), Marineblad (The Hague), Vol. 99:3,
March 1989, pp 103-109. The authors find that naval forces are the
instrument par excellence for war prevention, conflict management,
and coercive diplomacy.
Van Reijn, J.A., Lt. Col., Royal Netherlands Marines, "De
Koninklijke Marine naar het jaar 2000" ("The Royal Navy Toward the
Year 2000"), Spiegel , Vol. 22, No. 87, 1987, pp 11-25. This article in the
quarterly journal of the Royal Netherlands Naval Institute offers a
prognosis of the domestic and international factors that the author
believes will shape the roles, missions, and capabilities of the Dutch
fleet during the final decade of the 20th century. Norway and the
Norwegian Sea are labeled "the key to Europe's security." Confirmed
is the Dutch Navy's northern "tilt." The author voices his belief that
Dutch naval plans will be influenced increasingly by an emerging
"European pillar" within NATO. Uncertainty about the continued
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pre-eminence of Europe in U.S. thinking, the questionable longevity
of the U.S. Navy fleet build-up, and certain geographic considerations
imply these European naval tasks in the Norwegian Sea: (1) a
permanent peacetime presence, (2) crisis control and deterrence
through increased presence, and (3) acting as the first-line-of-defense
pending the appearance of U.S. reinforcements. On the out-of-area
"problem," the writer emphasizes that, "it can hardly be maintained
in the future that NATO's security interests...are limited to the
Atlantic treaty area." The American plans for "horizontal
escalation," he says, signify that US/Soviet out-of-area confrontation
is not likely to leave Europe untouched, and that this alone is
sufficient reason for the Europeans to participate in out-of-area crisis
decision-making and deployments.
Van Rooyen, Jules J.J., Cdr. Royal Netherlands Navy, "A Dutch
View of Maritime Strategy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings .
September 1988, pp 46-48. Cdr. Van Rooyen is the deputy head of the
Royal Netherlands Navy strategic planning division, and a key
participant in the NATO Eurogroup's "European Maritime Concept
2010" series of regional maritime security studies. His article should,
therefore, be read as an authoritative portrayal of his Navy's view of
the strategic demands for crisis management and deterrence in the
North Atlantic Region. That view holds that a credible NATO
deterrent depends as much on "a relationship of greater
(US/European) understanding," as on military capabilities per se .
Allied solidarity and the adverse time-distance relationship between
NATO's northern arena and American reinforcements dictate that a
maritime strategical response to an evolving crisis rely initially on
the forward movement of the European navies.
Van Waning, J.J., Capt. RNLN, "The Maritime Strategy:
Afhankelijk van de bijdrage van bondschappelijke marines" (The
Maritime Strategy: Dependent on the Contribution of the Allied
Navies"). Commentary on Teitler's "The Maritime Strategy:
Uitdaging ook aan de bondgenoten," Marineblad (The Hague),
September 1986, pp 472-77. Disagrees with Teitler's contention that
the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy is a plan for going-it-alone. Cites
extensively from the U.S. Naval Institute's "White Paper" of January
1986 to "prove" the strategy's coalitional intent.
Veassen, Jules J., Capt., RNLN, "De maritieme expansie van de
Sovjet Unie: Schoolvoorbeeld van geintegreerd maritiem beleid: ("The
Maritime Expansion of the Soviet Union: Textbook Example of an
Integrated Maritime Policy"), Marineblad (The Hague), March 1987,
pp 56-65. Voices strong support for the U.S. Navy's plans to defend
NATO's northern flank through a forward offensive. National and
coalition interests mandate that the Dutch Navy team up with its
British and possibly West German sister services, and join the U.S.
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maritime strategy, and, in the event of a crisis, act as a European
"gap filler" force preparatory to the arrival of the U.S. battlegroups.
Wemyss, R.Adm. Martin Lat., RN, "Naval Exercises 1980-81," Jane's
Naval Annual . 1981, pp 151-158. Highlights problems in interallied
naval cooperation resulting from U.S. Navy communication and
intelligence systems advances.
Wemyss, R.Adm. Martin Lat., RN, "Submarines and Anti-
submarine Operations for the Uninitiated," RUSI Journal .
September 1981, pp 22-27. Restatement of classic Royal Navy
arguments for focusing allied ASW efforts around expected afloat
targets, instead of US Navy-spearheaded forward operations.
Wettern, Desmond, "Maritime Strategy: Change or Decay?" Navv
International . May 1986, pp 304-08. Speculating that Gorshkov's
successor, Admiral Chernavin, may shift Soviet Navy Strategy to
planning for a massive U-boat style Atlantic tonage campaign,
Wettern urges that the European NATO navies must choose between
a large increase of convoys escort forces or joining the American
preference for forward strategy. If the latter course is chosen, he
concludes, the Europeans must ipso facto prepare to join in "global
strategy," including active participation in -out-of-area hostilities.
Wettern, Desmond, "NATO and Maritime Strategy," Navv
International . December 1987, pp 472-75. Questions the apparently
discrepant NATO reinforcement and resupply shipping
requirements as variously reported by CINCHAN, SACLANT, and
the 1986 NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping (PBOS). Quotes
the outgoing CINCHAN, Admiral Sir Nicholas Hunt, to the effect
that Allied maritime forces share the U.S. Maritime Strategy's intent
to "operate forward defense...behind enemy lines in enemy waters."
Woodward, Sir John, V. Adm., RN, "Strategies, Concepts, and Their
Maritime Implications," The RUSI Journal . June 1986, pp 11-14. The
commander of the British task force during the Falklands war
reports that the existing mix and quality of the Royal Navy's
capabilities is just about the right one, that can and must be
maintained with proper management and in spite of a zero-growth
defense budget. Since Britain cannot cut back on its maritime
commitments in the NATO area and elsewhere, its naval planners
must emphasize a greater rationalization of effort, including longer
production runs, standardization of equipments, closer international
collaboration, etc.
Yost, William J., Ed., In Defense of Canada's Oceans . Ottawa,
Canada: Conference of Defense Associations Institute, 1988, 59 pp.
This is a collection office essays, first presented at a January 1988
seminar, sponsored by the Canadian Conference of Defense
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Associations in the wake of the country's recently-published White
Paper on Defense, which included the announcement of Canada's
controversial nuclear submarine buying plan. Individual
contributors include: General P.D. Manson, Chief of Defense Staff,
W. Harriet Critchley of the University of Calgary, Derek Blackburn,
MP and Defense Critic for the New Democratic Party, Rear Admiral
F.W. Crickard, former Deputy Commander of Maritime Command,
and Rear Admiral A.P. Gay, a retired French naval officer. Most
relevant to the American maritime strategy is Crickard's "The U.S.
Maritime Strategy—Should Canada Be Concerned?" Crickard's
answer is "yes," and he notes that, "At the navy-to-navy level, there
was neither prior consultation with the US on its maritime strategy
nor, to my knowledge, has there been any organized naval or defense
assessment of it in Canada."
Young, Thomas-Durell, "Australia Bites Off More Than the RAN
Can Chew," Pacific Defense Reporter . March 1986, pp 15-17. See also
his "Self-Reliance and Force Development in the RAN," Proceedings .
March 1986, pp 157-161, and "Don't Abandon Radford-Collins,"
Pacific Defense Reporter . September 1986, p 16. On Australian and
New Zealand ASW and Naval Control/Protection of Shipping roles in
the Indian and Southwest Pacific Ocean.
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VI. SOVIET STRATEGY AND VIEWS
U. S. and allied Maritime Strategy is not a game of solitaire. The
Soviet threat, along with U.S. national and allied interests and geo-political
realities, is one of the fundamental ingredients of that strategy. No attempt
can be made here, however, to recount the considerable literature that
exists on Soviet naval affairs. The focus in the relatively few works listed
below is how the Soviets view their own maritime strategy as well as ours,
and how correctly we have divined their views. A critical issue is which
missions they see as primary and which they see as secondary, for their
navy and for those of the west, and whether these priorities will change
soon. Much material on the Soviets also can be found in other entries in this
bibliography.
** Balev, B., "The Military-Political Strategy of Imperialism on the
World Ocean," World Economics and International Relations . April
1986, pp 24-31. A Soviet perspective on the Maritime Strategy
—
"novaya morskaya strategiya." The three national phases restyled as
"Keeping Oneself on the Verge of War, Seizing the Initiative," and
"Carrying Combat Operations into Enemy Territory."
** Breemer, Jan, "U.S. Maritime Strategy: A Re-appraisal," Naval
Forces . 11/1987, pp 64-76. discusses the background behind and the
issues surrounding current U.S. Navy thinking on Soviet naval
strategy.
Bystrov, R.Adm. Yu., "U.S. Games in the World Ocean,"
Literaturnava Gazeta . September 4, 1985, p 14. Soviet public reaction
to exercise Ocean Safari 85 and other forward exercises.
Christman, Timothy J., "Sen. Quayle Favors Exploiting Soviet
Weaknesses," Defense News . May 11, 1987, p 31. Reports the
inclusion in the 1988 authorization bill of the requirement ofSECDEF
to report on progress and implementation of the "competitive
strategies" concept.
Dalaere, Martijn, "De Verbetering van de Russische
Onderzeeboottechnologie en de Amerikaanse Maritieme Strategie"
("The Improvement of Soviet Submarine Technology and the
American Maritime Strategy"), Marineblad (The Hague), October
1988, pp. 419-27. This Dutch author argues that a U.S. strategic ASW
campaign against the Soviet SSBN bastions is no longer credible in
light of recent Soviet advances in submarine quieting, and urges that
the United States and its allies turn instead to protecting the Atlantic
SLOCs by means of barrier and escort strategies. Yet, having
concluded on the improbability of a successful anti-SSBN campaign,
the writer then turns around to warn how American success could
trigger a Soviet use-them-or-lose-them strike!
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** Daniel, Donald C.F., "The Soviet Navy and Tactical Nuclear War at
Sea," Survival . July/August 1987, pp 138+. The Director of the Naval
War College's Strategy and Campaign Department concludes, inter
alia , that Soviet decision makers will use nuclear weapons at sea
only if they have already been used ashore, or if NATO uses them at
sea first.
** Elliott, Frank, "Soviets Knew of Maritime Strategy Before Lehman,
Watkins Publicized It," Defense Week May 4, 1987, p 5. Reports on
important Seminar on Soviet views of the Maritime Strategy. See also
Seminar transcript, Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1987.
Falin, Valentine, "Back to the Stone Age," Izvestia (Moscow),
January 24, 1986. Condemns the U.S. Navy for planning to use
forward deployment as a means for "taking any dispute to a global
level," and using "non-nuclear means against the other side's
nuclear forces and thus improving its own nuclear position."
American naval planners, says Falin, do not expect the Soviet Union
to respond with nuclear means, but he asks, how would the United
States react if Soviet Navy forces were to apply "naval and air
pressure in the spirit of Watkins' concept against American ships,
bases and territory?" The author provides his own answer: "They
(American decision makers seize on nuclear weapons in response
not even to a threat to their arsenals, but to minor inconveniences for
U.S. Policy." Highlights opposing arguments by Barry Posen. See
also commentary by Manthorpe, Capt. William, USN (Ret.), "The
Soviet View: The Soviet Union Reacts," Proceedings . April 1986, p
111.
Fitzgerald, Capt. T.A., "Blitzkrieg at Sea," Proceedings . January
1986, pp 12-16. Argues Soviets may use their Navy as a risk fleet for a
"Blitzkrieg," and not for sea-denial. A view shared by many U.S.
Navy operators.
** Friedman, Norman, "Soviet Naval Aviation," Naval Forces. No.
1/1986, pp 92-97. Sees Soviet Naval Aviation as perhaps the greatest
threat to NATO navies.
** George, James L., (ed.), The Soviet and Other Communist Navies:
The View from the Mid-1980s . Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
1986. An outstanding collection of papers from a 1985 CNA-sponsored
conference of top experts in the field, including several references to
the Maritime Strategy. See especially Brad Dismukes' discussion of
the contending views on Soviet Navy missions; the authoritative
judgments of R.Adm. William Studeman, R. Adm. Thomas Brooks,
and Mr. Richard Haver, the nation's top naval intelligence
professionals; and the contrasting views of Adm. Sylvester Foley and
Adm. Harry Train, two former "operators." Wayne Wright's "Soviet
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Operations in the Mediterranean" is especially good on the interplay
of Soviet and U.S. Maritime Strategy. The excellent paper by Alvin
Bernstein of the Naval War College and the paper by Anthony Wells
have also been reprinted elsewhere: the former in National Interest .
Spring 1986, pp 17-29; the latter in National Defense . February 1986,
pp 38-44.
Gorshkov, R.Adm. Serge G., The Sea Power of the State . Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1979. See especially pp 290 and 329. "The
employment of naval forces against the sea-based strategic systems of
the enemy has become most important in order to disrupt or blunt to
the maximum degree their strikes against targets ashore...."
** Komenskiy, Captain First Rank V., "The NATO Strategic Command
in the Atlantic" and "Combat Exercises of the Combined NATO
Forces in 1985," Zarubezhnove Vovennove Obozrenive . April 1986, pp
47-53 and August 1986 pp 45-51. Includes discussion of roles and
missions of NATO naval forces in the context of the Maritime
Strategy. See also Rodin, Colonel V. "The Military Doctrines of
Japan," August 1986, pp 3-9.
Leighton, Marian, "Soviet Strategy Towards Northern Europe and
Japan," Survey . Autumn-Winter 1983, pp 112-151. Sees "striking and
disquieting similarities" between recent "patterns of Soviet coercion
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** Manthorpe, Capt. William, USN (Ret.), "The Soviet View: RimPac-
86," Proceedings . October 1986, p 191. The Soviets see linkages
between the Maritime Strategy and allied exercises.
Mayer, Charles W., Jr., Cdr., USN, "Looking Backwards into the
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have presumably learned from the U-boat wars of World Wars I and
II, the author warns that the wartime practice of Soviet Naval
Strategy may be much more offensive than the planners of the
maritime strategy seem to anticipate. Recommends that U.S. naval
planners be prepared with the Soviet Navy's capability to stage a
massive submarine onslaught against the Atlantic sea routes.
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together with deck-based tactical and strategic aviation." Perov is
evidently painfully aware of the SLCM "revolution" at sea.
Petersen, Charles C, "Strategic Lessons of the Recent Soviet Naval
Exercise," National Defense . February 1986, pp 32-36. A leading
strategy analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses sees Soviets'
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VII. PEACETIME. CRISES. AND THIRD WORLD CONTINGENCIES
Most of the above works deal principally with use of the Navy in
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higher up on the scale of violence.
Howe, Cdr. Jonathan, Multicrisis: Sea Power and Global Politics in
the Missile Age . Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1971. The 1967 Mideast
Crisis, the 1958 Quemoy crisis, and the effectiveness of conventional
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War College Review . March-April 1979, pp 82-94. Thoughtful piece
seeking to integrate naval peacetime and wartime missions into one
framework: the "Theory of Unengaged Force Warfare."
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Mandel, Robert, "The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy,"
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compared to the victim."
Martin, Laurence, "The Use of Naval Forces in Peacetime," Naval
War College Review . January -February 1985, pp 4-14. A lecture
summarizing many contemporary themes on the subject.
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Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions . New
York: Praeger, 1977. See especially chapters by MccGwire, Booth,
Dismukes and Kelly.
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and Military Intervention," in Stern, Ellen P., The Limits of Military
Intervention . Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977, pp 151-178, and reprinted in
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McNulty, Cdr. James, "Naval Presence—The Misunderstood
Mission," Naval War College Review . September-October 1974, pp 21-
31 . Another reflection of the initial Zumwalt-Turner focus on
presence. See also Turner, V.Adm. Stansfield, "Challenge," pp 1-2 in
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Mission," Naval War College Review . Fall 1977, pp 37-59. Sees
political and technological changes as necessitating revision to
contemporary thinking on naval presence, just when that thinking
had begun to solidify.
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Navy routine forward presence posture to enhance Navy flexibility
and reduce individual ship OPTEMPO.
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Trost, C.A.H., Navy's Strategic Victory in the Gulf," New York
Times
. October 8, 1988, p 26. Rebuts the Times editorial of September
12, 1988, claiming that the Gulf war "validated the Navy's choices at
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Also provides listing of incidents when USN was used.
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VIII FLEET BALANCE: ATLANTIC VS. PACIFIC VS.
MEDITERRANEAN
Geographic flexibility is one of the great strengths of naval power.
Yet, the U.S. Navy's global posture since World War II has often looked like
a series of hard-and-fast theater commitments, more appropriate to less
flexible land-based types of forces. The articles and letters below illustrate
current problems of implementing a balanced global Maritime Strategy
with limited naval forces in the face of competing regional demands. They
were selected because of their focus on the need for hard choices by the Navy
regarding fleet balance; articles merely trumpeting the importance of an
area or discussing regional priorities solely at the geopolitical level are
omitted.
Babbage, Ross, "The Future of the United States Maritime Strategy
and the Pacific Military Balance." Paper presented at the Conference
on Maritime Security and Arms Control in the Pacific Region,
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada, May 19,
1988, 33 pp. This paper considers a number of "wild cards" that,
according to the Australian author, might' upset some of the key
assumptions that underlie the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy for the
Pacific theater. Those assumptions concern the likelihood of nuclear
escalation, Soviet avoidance of a two-front (Atlantic and Pacific) war,
the collaboration of America's Pacific allies, and the future of
American superiority in ASW. Based on his conversations with
Chinese officials, Babbage reports that China might choose the"kick-
in-the-door" option, and launch an assault against the Soviet Far
East if the Soviet Union were to lose a conflict badly and its
disintegration appeared likely. In any case, concludes Babbage,
Soviet fear of such an eventuality could exert "substantial war-
termination leverage."
* Baggett, Lee, Jr., Adm. USN, "NATO at Sea: Future Maritime
Power," The RUSI Journal . Autumn 1988, pp 5-8. SACLANT
describes the Soviet maritime threat to the North Atlantic Alliances
as a "double envelopment" of self-serving naval arms control
proposals on the one hand, and continued qualitative improvements
of seagoing capabilities on the other. Both, says Baggett, are aimed at
surrounding "our strategy, closing off all avenues of maneuver and
leaving us with nothing but unacceptable options." As far as
SACLANT's capabilities for war are concerned, reports Baggett, a
shortage of forces to simultaneously support the Northern flank and
directly defend Atlantic shipping, compels an early forward
offensive. NATO presently possesses a large enough pool of shipping
to support Re/Re and economic shipping needs, but the trend
continues downward.
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Booth, Ken, "U.S. Naval Strategy: Problems of Survivability,
Usability, and Credibility," Naval War College Review . Summer 1978,
pp 11-28. Argues for withdrawal of Sixth Fleet.
Borg, James C, "New Significant of the North Pacific," Jane's
Defense Weekly . December 10, 1988, pp 1483-89. Report on the
increased tempo and scope of U.S. Navy exercises in the northern
Pacific.
Breemer, Jan S., "De-Committing the Sixth Fleet," Naval War
College Review . November-December 1982, pp 27-32.
Cole, Cdr. Bernard, "Atlantic First" Proceedings . August 1982, pp
103-106. Also "Comment and Discussion:" December 1982, pp 86-87.
Desh, Michael C, "Turning the Caribbean Flank: Sea-Lane
Vulnerability During a European War," Survival (London),
November/December 1987, pp 528-51. The author warns that a
judiciously timed Cuban entry into a NATO-Warsaw Pact war could
impose an intolerable strain on allied resupply and reinforcement
capabilities, and even "tip the balance decisively in favour of the
Warsaw Pact." The article posits a "menu" of alternative Cuban
Caribbean SLOC interdiction scenarios, and potential U.S. counter
options. The author concludes that the most credible and least
resource-diverting U.S. response would be a combination of
"defensive" SLOC protection, backed up by the withheld threat of
retaliatory nuclear TLAM strikes.
Deutermann, Capt. Peter, "Requiem for the Sixth Fleet,"
Proceedings . September 1982, pp 46-49. Also "Comment and
Discussion:" November 1982, p 14; January 1983, pp 17-20; February
1983, pp 80-81; March 1983, pp 12-17; July 1983, p 89.
Dismukes, Bradford, and Weiss, Kenneth G., "Mare Mosso: The
Mediterranean Theater," in James L. George (ed.), The U.S. Navv:
The View From the Mid-1980s . Boulder, CO.: Westview. On timing
reductions in U.S. Navy Mediterranean forces.
Etzold, Thomas, "From Far East to Middle East: Overextension in
American Strategy Since World War II," Proceedings/Naval Review
1981, May 1981, pp 66-77. On the need to make hard strategic choices,
especially between the Pacific and Indian Ocean.
Foley, Sylvester, R., Adm., USN, "Strategic Factors in the Pacific,"
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. August 1985, pp 34-38. The
CINCPACFLT reviews the main international political "strategic
factors" he believes will dominate the efficiency of his forces and war
plans in the Pacific-Indian Ocean region. They are" (1) the ability of
the National command Authorities (NCA) to respond promptly to
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ambiguous crisis indicators, (2) the stability of the U.S. relationship
with Japan, China, and the Philippines, (3) the necessity for an
Indian Ocean presence, and (4) the security of the Aleutian "rear
area." Foley wonders whether the Soviet Pacific Fleet will restrict its
operations to a defensive naval campaign on behalf of SSBN bastion
waters.
** Gray, Colin S., "Maritime Strategy and the Pacific: Implications for
NATO," Naval War College Review , Winter 1987, pp 8-19. A geo-
political analysis and forecast of the US/Soviet/China-Japan
triangular relationship in the Pacific and the implications thereof for
US/NATO strategic planning in the European theater. Argues that
the U.S. commitment to NATO ought to shift from reliance on
nuclear threats to preparations to confront the Soviet Union with a
protracted (maritime) two-front war. Suggests that the United States
must hold-the-line in the Pacific pending the emergence of a
China/Japan strategic condominium.
Hayward, Tomas, B., Adm., USN (Ret.), and Hays, Ronald J., Adm.,
USN (Ret.), "It is in the Interest of the West to Make Percestroika
Work Throughout the Pacific," Navy League of the United States, The
Almanac of Seapower 1989 . Arlington, VA, January 1989, pp 44-58. A
former CNO and VCNO team up to urge that future roles of U.S.
Naval power in the Pacific and Indian Oceans be dominated by the
twin goals of (a) seeking strategic stability among the maritime
aspirations of the regional nations (mainly India and Japan), and (b)
"easing tensions" with the Soviet Union. The authors specifically call
for a U.S./Soviet dialogue on the possible adoption of naval
confidence-building measures, including perhaps a re-consideration
of the U.S. Navy's practice of fleet exercises close to Soviet shores.
Heppenheimer, T.A., "Victory at Sea?" Science Digest . September
1985. A journalistic account of how the United States intends to
safeguard the Atlantic SLOCs in the event that, "for the third time in
a century, the world is at war."
Jampoler, Capt. Andrew, "Reviewing the Conventional Wisdom,"
Proceedings . July 1983, pp 22-28. Also "Comment and Discussion,"
December 1983, p 26. On refocusing the Atlantic Fleet from the
Mediterranean to the North Atlantic.
* Jane's Defense Weekly . "NATO's Southern Strategy Outlines,"
December 17, 1988, p 1547. CINCUSNAVEUR, Adm. James Busey,
USN is quoted to the effect that NATO's maritime strategy on the
Mediterranean flank will seek "strategic leverage" by taking the
initiative at an "early stage" and "using NATO strength against
Warsaw Pact vulnerability."
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Jordan, Robert, "The Maritime Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance,"
The RUSI Journal . September 1987, pp 45-54. A somewhat rambling
account of the linkage between SACEUR's "regional" responsibilities
on the ground, and the "global" thrust of the U.S. Navy's maritime
strategy.
Kennedy, William V., "Moving West: The New Theater of Decision,"
Naval War College Review . Winter 1989, pp 19-32. Expands upon
former NAVSEC Webb's theme that U.S. interests and military
commitments ought to be re-focused from Western Europe to the Far
East. Kennedy believes that the United States can best deter the Soviet
Union from aggression, and, come war, achieve a favorable outcome,
by exploiting its comparative military superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet
military position in the Far East. He calls for a "North Pacific
Strategy" that, with the help of 15 (1) carriers, and possibly in
conjunction with China, would aim at no less than the occupation of
the Siberian periphery, the defeat of Soviet power east of the Urals,
and the post-war reconstitution of a Soviet "progressive government
that could abide the opening of the entire Soviet Union to the free
interchange of ideas, labor and investment."
Kolodziej, Edward A., "The Southern Flank: NATO's Neglected
Front," AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review . Vol 6 No 2, 1986, pp
45-56, especially pp 48-50. A leading political scientist endorses Capt.
Deutermann's views on re-orienting U.S. naval concentrations from
the Mediterranean to the Atlantic.
Komer, Robert W., "A Credible Conventional Option: Can NATO
Afford It?" Strategic Review . Spring 1988, pp 33-38. A
"continentalist's" solution for strengthening NATO's conventional
war-fighting posture that calls for a build-up of up to 30 days of war
reserves, the creation of additional reserve formations, and greater
reliance on "deep strike capabilities."
Kurth, James R., "The United States and the North Pacific," paper
presented at the Conference on Security and Arms Control in the
North Pacific, The Australian National University, August 1987.
Evaluates the"dilemma of deterrence vs. provocation" that the author
claims is part and parcel of a maritime strategy based on the forward
deployment of naval forces during a US/Soviet crisis. Kurth
recommends that the United States can limit the risk of premature
crisis escalation and Soviet pre-emption by forward converging its
naval and marine forces at locations within closing range of their
intended targets, yet still at the limit of the Soviet Union's pre-
emptive strike potential. Concludes that the "Reagan version" of the
maritime strategy will probably change in form and in shape, but
that naval forces will become an increasingly important element in
Western defense planning.
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** Lee, Ngoc and Hinge, L.Cdr. Alan, RAN, "The Naval Balance in the
Indian-Pacific Ocean Region," Naval Forces . 11/1987, pp 150-175.
Views the U.S. Navy as under strength for warfighting in the
Atlantic-Mediterranean threats, and over strength in the Pacific and
Indian Oceans. Essentially an update of Hinge's August 1986 article,
cited in Section II above.
* Lehman, John, "Successful Naval Strategy in the Pacific: How We
Are Achieving It, How We Can Afford It," Naval War College
Review . Winter 1987, pp 20-27. Asserts that the Regan
Administration's "common sense" approach to Pentagon and
Department of the Navy management and procurement has resulted
in more band-for-the-buck, thus permitting the Navy to meet national
commitments in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters with sufficient
assets simultaneously.
Linn, Thomas C, Maj., USMC, "Amphibious Shipping Shortfall
Undermines Maritime Strategy," Armed Forces Journal
International. April 1989, pp 54-58. Makes a convincing case that
current trends point to a widening gap between the U.S. Navy's
strategic requirements for amphibious lifts, and the maritime
strategy's programmatic goals. The author reports a strategic war-
fighting need for two Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs)—one each
for the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, but fears that actual capabilities
will soon fall short of even the 1983 program goals of one MEF-plus-
MEB (Marine Expeditionary Brigade). The article also urges various
technological steps to make future amphibious lift forces less
vulnerable.
* Lucas, Hugh, "Webb Calls for U.S. Defense Review," Jane's Defense
Weekly . January 23, 1988. p 101. Reports on SECNAV Webb's
advocacy, at the National Press Club in Washington, DC, of a "total
review of U.S. defense security commitments," including a reduced
"continental" involvement in Europe and a heightened military
profile in the Pacific. American conventional forces should be re-
structured away from a "static" theater orientation, and emphasis
instead globally deployable (read Navy) "maneuver forces."
Maiorano, Lt. Alan, "A Fresh Look the Sixth Fleet," Proceedings .
February 1984, pp 52-58. Also "Comment and Discussion," July 1984,
pp 28-33. Qn reducing the USN Mediterranean commitment, with
USAF and allied forces filling any gaps.
McGruther, L.Cdr. Kenneth R., "Two Anghors in the Pacific: A
Strategy Proposal for the U.S. Pacific Fleet," Naval Review
1979/Proceedings May 1979, pp 126-141. On re-orienting the Pacific
Fleet primarily northward for wartime operations, and secondarily
westward, for peacetime presence, by a former OP-603 staffer.
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Ortlieb, Cdr. E.V., "Forward Deployments: Deterrent or
Temptation." Proceedings . December 1983, pp 36-40. Also "Comment
and Discussion," February 1984, p 22. On reducing the Sixth and
Seventh Fleets while increasing the Second and Third.
Pay, David J., "The U.S. Navy and the Defense of Europe," Naval
Forces. No. 1, 1988, pp 28-35. Good critique of maritime strategic
critics whose arguments and reservations, says the author, "seem to
be based on a mistaken choice between maritime and continental
forces and a rather strange assessment of nuclear risk." Disagrees
that the U.S. maritime strategy and 600-ship fleet build-up have come
at the expense of the American NATO commitment. The maritime
strategy, concludes Pay, may be a "symptom" of a U.S. re-assessment
of global priorities away from Western Europe, but it is hardly the
cause.
Sestak, L.Cdr. Joseph, "Righting the Atlantic Tilt," Proceedings .
January 1986, pp 64-71.
Snyder, Jed C, "Strategic Bias and the Southern Flank," The
Washington Quarterly . Summer 1985, pp 123-42. A critique of
NATO's Central Region-oriented "prism" addressing the
Mediterranean basin, the author concludes that a multiplicity of
crisis points, the growth of local Soviet naval power, and the lack of
political and military cohesion, have brought about an area where
"NATO is weak where the Soviet incentive to strike may be
strongest."
Till, Geoffrey, and King, Richard, "A Standing Naval Force for
Northern Waters?" Naval Forces . No. 5, 1987, pp 16-18. NATO must
prevent Soviet naval power in the Norwegian Sea from becoming a
"kind of perceived maritime dominance" by default. In order to
counter such a development, Till and King believe that the idea of a
Standing Naval Force for Northern Waters (STANAVFORNOR),
patterned after STANAVFORLANT, is worth thinking about.
Train, Harry, Adm., USN (Ret.), "Maritime Strategy in the
Mediterranean, " Adelphi Paper (London), No. 229: "Prospects for
Security in the Mediterranean," Part 1, Spring 1988, pp 49-60.
Excellent account of the strategical interconnectedness between the
Mediterranean and Atlantic theaters, and, as a consequence, the
inter-theater wartime flexibility of U.S. naval forces on forward
deployment in the Mediterranean. Train believes that, with the
possible exception of the Mediterranean's easternmost portion,
NATO command of the Mediterranean is virtually guaranteed even if
COMSTRIKFORSOUTH's battlegroups may need to be swung into
the Atlantic. Also a good overview of NATO's naval command
hierarchy in the Mediterranean area.
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Van der Meulen, J.W., "Zuid-Afrika's Strategische Betekenis voor
het Westen" ("South Africa's Strategic Significance for the West"),
Marineblad (The Hague), May 1988, pp 214-22. Excellent overview of
the Western interest, past and present, in South Africa as a potential
military-strategic partner. The author concludes that neither South
Africa's military potential, nor the country's importance as a source
of strategic minerals (or for that matter, the nature of the Soviet
threat) warrant a closer association with the Pretoria Government.
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IX. WAR GAMING
As is well discussed in previous sections, U.S. and allied navies,
other services, and joint and allied commands have a variety of means at
their disposal in peacetime to test the wartime validity of aspects of the
Maritime Strategy, besides debate and discussion. They actually participate
in fleet exercises, advanced tactical training, and "real world" peacetime
and crisis operations, and they conduct extensive operations analyses and
war games. Most of these avenues are generally inaccessible to the public,
however, save one: gaming. There are over a half-dozen commercial board
and computer games now available that can provide players with insights
into modern maritime strategic, operational, and tactical problems and
potential solutions, and thereby further enhance players' understanding of
the Maritime Strategy. Like all simulations, however, they each have their
limitations, and even built-in inaccuracies (as the various reviews point
out). Thus, they cannot by themselves legitimately be used to "prove"
validities or demonstrate "outcomes." Nevertheless, playing them is the
nearest many students and theorists of Maritime Strategy can even come to
actually "being there," and, therefore, is an activity that can only be
encouraged.
** Balkoski, Joseph, Second Fleet . New York: Victory Games, 1986
(Board Game). Reviewed by U.S. Naval History Center historian
Michael A. Plamer, Proceedings . March 1987, pp 160-162. "Those of
us without access to the War College's computers can test the waters
north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap and
gain insight into the problems and opportunities inherent in the
application of the Maritime Strategy." Can be played simultaneously
with Sixth Fleet , with forces shifted from one set of maps to the the
other, in a simulation of war in both Northern and Southern
European waters and adjacent areas.
Balkoski, Joseph, Sixth Fleet . New York: Victory Games, 1986 (Board
Game). Reviewed by U.S. Naval History Center historian Michael A.
Plamer, Strategy and Tactics . January-February 1986, pp 51-52. "The
inclusion of random elements into the system, the addition of logistic
rules, and the key role of Soviet naval aviation made the Sixth Fleet
game an excellent operational level naval wargame."
Connors, L.Cdr. Tracy D., USNR, "Gaming for the World,"
Proceedings. January 1984, pp 106-108. On the Naval War College's
Global War Game series, a principal research tool for identifying
critical Navy, joint, and allied Maritime Strategy issues. See also
Murray, Robert J., "A War-Fighting Perspective," Proceedings.
October 1983, pp 66-81; and Eulis, Cdr. James, "War Gaming at the
U.S. Naval War College," Naval Forces . 1985/V, pp 96-103.
Grigsby, Gary, North Atlantic '86 . Mountain View, CA: Strategic
Simulations Inc., 1983 (Apple Computer Game. Reviewed by John
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Gresham and Michael Markowitz, Proceedings . July 1984, pp 116-
117. Entering premise in the initial failure of NATO, U. S., and the
Maritime Strategy: "The great war in Europe is over. As expected,
Russia won' it now controls all of Germany and Norway. Its next
plan: complete domination of the North Atlantic through the
isolation of Great Britain."
Herman, Mark, Aegean Strike . New York: Victory Games, 1986
(Board Game). Reviewed by U.S. Naval History Center historian
Michael A. Plamer, Strategy and Tactics , (forthcoming in 1987). The
eastern Mediterranean. "Few, if any, games...better integrate the
strengths and weaknesses of land, air, and naval assets."
Nichols, W. J., Fifth Escadra . Bridgewater, Nova Scotia: Simulations
Canada, 1984 (Apple Computer Game). Soviets vs. NATO in the
Mediterranean. Five levels of conflict ranging from rising tensions to
global nuclear war.
Nichols, W.J., Grev Seas. Grev Skies . Bridgewater, Nova Scotia:
Simulations Canada, 1983 (second edition forthcoming in 1987)
(Apple Computer Game). Reviewed by Hohn Gresham and Michael
Markowitz, Proceedings . July 1984, pp 116-117. Seven "pre-built"
scenarios, including Japanese destroyers versus Soviet submarines
in the Kuril Islands, a Soviet amphibious group versus West German
forces in the Baltic, U.S. versus Soviet carrier battle groups off the
North Cape, and similar clashes in the Western Pacific and the
Mediterranean. Focus is more tactical than the other games listed
here.
Nichols, W.J., Seventh Fleet . Bridgewater, Nova Scotia: Simulations
Canada, 1985 (Apple Computer Game. Soviets vs. U.S. and Japan.
Includes Sea of Okhotsk, Sea of Japan and South China Sea
operations.
** Perla, Peter C, "Wargaming and the U. S. Navy," National Defense .
February 1987, pp 49-53. By a leading Center for Naval Analyses war
gamer. "The Navy is continuing a process of using wargaming,
exercises, and analysis to address the aspects of major issues fo
which they are best suited...a classic example of this process can be
seen at work in the 2nd Fleet. Taking the promulgated maritime
strategy as his starting point, the commander, 2nd Fleet, proposed a
concept for operating the NATO Striking Fleet in the Norwegian Sea.
A wargame was held at the Naval War College to explore this
concept, and analysis was undertaken to quantify some of the issues
raised by the game. Then an exercise was -held in the area of interest,
which confirmed some assumptions and raised new questions. A
new series of games and analysis was capped by a second major
exercise, as the process continues." See also his "What Wargaming
is and is Not," co-authored by L.Cdr. Raymond T. Barrett, Naval War
106
College Review . September-October 1985, pp 70-78 and "In My
View..." commentary, Naval War College Review . Autumn 1986, pp
105-108; and "War Games, Analyses, and Exercises," Naval War
College Review . Spring 1987, pp 44-52; and endorsement by former




The general and historical literature on naval strategy is admittedly
vast. What is presented here are only books that describe earlier strategies,
conceptualized, planned and/or implemented, which are analogous to key
aspects of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy today. The materials are
generally listed chronologically, by historical period covered.
** Breemer, Jan S., "The American Origins of the Maritime Strategy,"
Marineblad (The Hague), November 1987, pp 410-15. Reviews the
recent (mid-1970s to early 1980s) historical antecedents to the U.S.
Navy's maritime strategy, and concludes that it is up to the European
navies to clarify which parts of the maritime strategy meet with their
approval and which not.
Callwell, Major C.E., BA, The Effect of Maritime Command on Land
Campaigns Since Waterloo . Edinburgh: William Blackwood and
Sons, 1897, especially pp 178-182 and 196-197); Barker, A., J., The War
Against Russia, 1854-1856, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1970; Curtiss, John Shelton, Russia's Crimean War . Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 1979; and Rich, Norman, Why the Crimean
War? A Cautionary Tale . Hanover, NH: University Press of New
England, 1985, especially pp 124-126, 136-137, 158-159, 178, 201-202,
206-209. Successful maritime global forward coalition strategy
against Russia 130 years ago, with operations in Barents, Baltic, and
Black Seas, and off Kuriles and Kamchatka. Component of a larger
military strategy, which blocked subsequent Russian expansion for
over 20 years.
Cave Brown, Anthony (Ed.), Dropshot. The American Plan for World
War III Against Russia in 1957 . New York: Dial Press, 1978. 1949
JCS study: good example of early post-war strategic thinking. See
especially pp. 161-165, 206-211, 225-235. Not to be read without
examination of review by David Rosenberg and Thomas E. Kelly III,
Naval War College Review . Fall 1978, pp 103-106.
Comptroller General of the United States, Implications of the
National Security Council Study "U.S. Maritime Strategy and Naval
Force Requirements" On the Future Naval Ship Force (PSAD-78-6A) .
Washington: U.S. General Accounting Office, March 7, 1978.
Discusses in detail, and in highly unsympathetic terms, the
classified 1976 NSC study often cited by Secretary of the Navy John
Lehman as triggering his thinking on U.S. naval strategy and force
levels. See also Rumsfeld, Donald, "Which Five-Year Shipbuilding
Program?", Proceedings . February 1977, pp 18-25.
Defense/Space Daily . "Findings of Sea Plan 2000," April 4 through 7,
1982 issues. Four part summary of the "Sea Plan 2000" Carter
Administration progenitor to the Maritime Strategy, including the
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idea of a "second-front" Pacific strategy aimed at relieving Soviet
pressure in Central Europe, and safeguard the allied SLOCs.
Erickson, John, The Road to Stalingrad (Vol. I) and The Road to
Berlin (Vol. II), Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983. See especially
Vol. I, pp 14, 55-57, 218, 237-240, 271-272, 295; Vol. II, pp 43, 132, 156.
Effect of Far East operations, or lack thereof, on Central/East Europe
Front in World War II.
** Friedman, Norman, The Postwar Naval Revolution . London:
Conway Maritime Press, 1986. See especially Chapter 10 "Epilogue,"
pp 212-218. On allied naval developments in the first post-World War
II decade, including relationships to the Maritime Strategy developed
three decades later.
Gordon, Michael R., "John Lehman: The Hard Liner Behind
Reagan's Navy Buildup," National Journal . October 3, 1981, pp 1763-
66. Profiles the then newly-appointed SECNAV's previous careers
with the National Security Council staff and the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and predicts that Lehman's views on
the Navy's needs have "the makings of a harmonious relationship
with the Navy.
Gough, Barry M., "Maritime Strategy," The Legacies of Mahan and
Corbett as Philosophers of Sea Power," The RUSI Journal . Winter
1988, pp 55-62. A comparison of the two premier Anglo-American
theorists of seapower with reference to their respective contributions
to the understanding of (a) the relationship between naval power and
global power, and (b) the significance of historical "lessons" for
contemporary maritime strategy. The author finds that neither
Mahan or Corbett, nor their modern-day successors, can always
provide the correct answers to naval strategic problems, but that
history can provide a framework for asking the "right" questions
about the objectives of naval force in both peace and in war.
Gray, Colin S., The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland.
Rimland. and the Technological Revolution . New York: Crane
Russak, 1977. Analyzes and updates geopolitical grand theory.
Stresses maritime aspects of the Western alliance and global nature
of Western security problems.
Huntington, Samuel P., "National Policy and the Transoceanic
Navy," Proceedings . May 1954, pp 483-93. Clearly foreshadows the
basic outline of the Maritime Strategy. An analysis generally as
relevant today as then.
Keegan, John, The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval
Warfare . New York, NY: Viking Penguin, Inc., 1988. Patterned after
his highly acclaimed The Face of War . Kegan's The Price of
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Admiralty is a brilliant evocation of how the maritime strategies of
the past have been fought at the strategical, tactica, material and,
most important, human levels. The author narrates four critical
naval battles of the past—Trafalgar, Jutland, Midway and the
Atlantic U-boat campaign, each representing contemporary "capital"
naval technology—the ship-of-the-line, the dreadnought, aircraft
carrier, and submarine. The description of how the crews that fought
at Trafalgar alone is worth the book's reading. No doubt, many
readers will find Keegan's most controversial observation in the final
chapter, "The Empty Seas," which predicts that the future of
seapower rests with the submarine.
Lehman, John, Aircraft Carriers: The Real Choices . Beverly Hills:
Sage, 1978. Codification of Lehman's thought on naval strategy before
become SECNAV. Much more than carriers, especially Chapter II.
See also his March 1989 testimony in U.S. Senate, Committee on the
Budget, Ninety-Sixth Congress, Second Session, Hearings on
National Defense: Alternative Approaches to the U.S. Defense
Program . Washington: USGPO, 1980, pp 208-253.
Love, Robert B., Jr. (Ed.), The Chiefs of Naval Operations . Annapolis:
U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1980. See sections on post=World War II
CNOs' views on strategy, especially Rosenberg piece on Arleigh
Burke.
** Mahan, Capt. Alfred Thayer, "The Problem of Asis," in his The
Problem of Asis and Its Effect Upon International Politics .
Cambridge, MA: University Press, 1900, pp 1-146. Mahan on
"Restraining Russia," the central problem of the Maritime Strategy:
"The Russian centre cannot be broken. It is upon and from the
flanks. ..that restraint, if needed, must come," p 26; "Hence ensues
solidarity of interest between Germany, Great Britain, Japan and the
United States," p 63. See also Trofimenko in Section VI above, and
Crowl, Philip A., "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," in
Paret, Peter (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to
the Nuclear Age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp
444-477, especially p 477. A Naval War College professor emeritus
asserts the Maritime Strategy is antithetical to Mahan's teaching,
especially as regards the role of other services, in a book which
otherwise, and to its detriment, pays scant attention to makers of
modern maritime strategy. Trfimenko gets the linkage between
Mahan and the Maritime Strategy right. Crowl gets it wrong.
Marolda, Edward J., "The Influence of Burke's Boys on Limited
War," Proceedings . August 1981, pp 36-41. By a prominent Navy
Department historian on the influence of the Navy officer corps on
national strategy a generation ago. "Between 1956 and 1960, the Navy
added its considerable influence to the intellectual campaign within
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the national defense community for a reorientation in strategic
policy."
** Miller, Edward S., War Plan Orange. 1897-1945: the Naval Campaign
Through the Central Pacific . Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
forthcoming in 1988. History's most successful pre-war plan, with
lessons for the complex problems of naval strategic planning of the
1980s. See also Dyer, V.Adm. George C, On the Treadmill to Pearl
Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson. USN
(Retired) . Washington: Naval History Division, Department of the
Navy, 1973, Chapter XIV: "War Plans'" and Shelton, Cdr. Michael
W., CEC, "Plan Orange Revisited," Proceedings. December 1984, pp
50-56; and "Comment and Discussion," March 1985, pp 73 and 79.
Draws false parallels between the Western Pacific in 1941 and the
Norwegian Sea today, i.e. between a purely naval, unilateral, theater
problem and one portion of a joint, allied, global problem. Advocates
ceding the Norwegian Sea, Norway, and Iceland to the Soviets. Bad
history and worse strategy.
Nimitz, F.Adm. Chester, "Future Employment of Naval Forces,"
Vital Speeches . January 15, 1948, pp 214-217. Also, in Brassev's
Naval Annual: 1948 . and Shipmate . February 1948, pp 5-6+, as "Our
Navy. It's Future." Argues for a projection strategy and a Navy
capable of land attack early in a war.
Palmer, Alan, The Gardeners of Salonika . New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1965. See especially pp 226-247. Southern Flank Maritime
Strategy in action. WWI allies advance to the Danube from
beachhead in Greece in 1918 knocking Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria,
Turkey out of the war. Gallipoli concept vindicated.
** Palmer, Michael A., Origins of the Maritime Strategy: American
Naval Strategy in the First Postwar Decade . Washington: Naval
Historical Center (fothcoming in 1988). An important discussion of
the similarities and differences in U.S. naval strategic thought
between the first and fifth postwar deceased, the two postwar eras
most characterized by U.S. Navy concern with problems of naval
warfighting vis-a-vis the Soviet Union itself.
** Reynolds, Clark G., "The Maritime Strategy of World War II: Some
Implications?" Naval War College Review . May/June 1986, pp 43-50.
Prescribes certain "principles" of maritime strategy learned from
World War II, but cautions that, "in strategy making, the greater
danger than a complete ignorance of history is its misapplication."
Rosenberg, David, "American Postwar Air Doctrine and
Organization: The Navy Experience," in A.F. Hurley and R.C.
Ehrhart, et al. Air Power and Warfare . Washington: USGPO, 1970.
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Antecedent naval postwar air strike strategies by a leading historian
of U.S. Navy postwar strategy.
Rosenberg, David, Arleigh Burke and the United States Navv. Vol I:
War and Cold War . Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, (forthcoming
in 1988). By a Naval War College faculty member. "Maybe it would
help us sell the Navy's case if we could make a presentation on how
the Navy could function in the first 90 days of a war, and keep that
presentation up-to-date," R.Adm. Burke in 1952 after relieving as OP-
30, now Op-60.
** Rosenberg, David, U.S. Navy Long-Range Planning: A Historical
Perspective . Washington: USGPO (forthcoming in 1988.
Ro skill, Stephen W., Naval Policy Between the Wars. Volume I: The
Period of Anglo-American Antagonism. 1919-1929 . New York:
Walker, 1968. Chapter III: "The War of Intervention in Russia, 1918-
1920"; and Dobson, Christopher, and Miller, John, The Day Thev
Almost Bombed Moscow: the Allied War in Russia. 1928-1920 . New
York: Atheneum, 1986, pp 42-47, 72-73, 247-266, and 274-276. Poorly
devised global, allied, forward maritime operations against the
Soviets 70 years ago. which, however, did achieve independence for
the Baltic states.
Ryan, Capt. Paul USN (Ret.), First Line of Defense . Stanford: Hoover
Institution Press, 1981. Mainstream USN perspectives on post-war
defense policies through the Carter Administration.
Schilling, Warner R., "Admirals and Foreign Policy, 1913-1919,"
Phd. dissertation, Yale University, 1954. "Maritime Strategy" of the
1980s was not first time this century U.S.Navy developed a coherent
preferred strategy.
Spykman, Nicholas John, The Geography of the Peace . New York:
Harcouurt, Brace, 1944. Basic geopolitical reference. See especially
maps, pp 50-54.
Starr, Chester G., The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History .
New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1989, 105 pp. This is a
fascinating small volume that throws much light on the interaction
between a land and seapower in the Mediterranean world of
antiquity. It is so in particular because the findings and conclusions
sharply contradict the author's starting premise. The latter takes
issue with Mahan's claim that the power and wealth of the classical
thalassocracies (Greece, Rome, Carthage) were historical "proof of
the decisive influence of seapower on history. Not so, says Starr. The
rise and fall of the classical empires originated on land. Ironically,
however, the author finds that the Greek and Carthaginian
maritime empires fell because at the same time that both permitted
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their fleets to decline, their continental opponents (Sparta and Rome,
respectively) made the conscious choice to build up naval power.
Similarly, as long as Rome possessed the world's first "standing
fleet" the empirial sealines of communications and coastlines were
secure. The later empire's vulnerability to barbarian raids and
invasions can be blamed perhaps as much by the decline of that fleet
as by the overextension of the legions on land. One is tempted to draw
this lesson: a maritime power may not be able to overcome a strong
landpower, but the reverse is certainly true if the continental
opponent takes to the sea as well.
Teitler, G., "De slagvloot en de SLOCs" ("The Battlefleet and the
SLOCs"), Marineblad (The Hague), October 1986, pp 521-25. Relates
the offensive thrust of the U.S.Navy's maritime strategy to the Navy's
Pacific war experience, the Mahanian philosophy of the "big battle,"
and, indirectly, the British Navy's tradition of securing the SLOCs by
"indirect" means, i.e., seeking out and defeating the opponent's
battlefleet. The British tradition on "indirect" defense is contrasted
with the Dutch tradition of "direct" defense, i.e. the protection of
shipping by way of escort strategies. The author concludes that even
a 600-ship U.S. fleet will make an early forward offensive against the
center of Soviet military strength in the North a high-risk substitute
for reliance on a mix of direct and indirect SLOC defense strategies.
Teitler, G., "Van de Krim naar Kola: Algemene en Bijzondere
Beschouwing over Maritime Strategie" ("From the Crimea to Kola: A
General and Special Consideration of Maritime Strategy,"
Marineblad (The Hague), June 1988, pp 261-67. The 19th century
Crimean War is used to illustrate the essence of grand and maritime
strategy as the exploitation of assymetries, including assymetries in
timing (surprise), space (maneuver), and escalation (e.g., the
"second front option"). The key to NATO's strategic success, says
Teitler, will be to offset the Soviet Union's assymetrical advantage on
the Central Front with the West's (maritime) ability to (a) deny the
Soviets a "short war," (b) threaten Moscow's vulnerabilities outside
the European area, and (c) threaten to regain nuclear dominance by
placing the Soviet SSBNs at risk. Teitler reminds his readers,
however, that few assymetrical advantages come at no cost. Excellent
article.
Till, Geoffrey, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age . (Second
Edition), New York: St. Martin's, 1984. Basic one-volume historical
and topical survey.
** Turner, Adm. Stansfield, USN (Ret.), "Victory at Sea: Bull Halsey at
Leyte Gulf." Washington Post Book World . December 15, 1986, pp 1
and 13. Review of E.B. Potter's Bull Halsey. Draws analogies to
today's military problems, especially regarding "the offense and the
defense." Of a piece with Turner's other writings.
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U.S. Navy, Sea Plan 2000: Naval Force Planning Study (Unclassified
Executive Summary) . Washington, DC: March 18, 1978. A progenitor
of the Maritime Strategy. Whereas the latter stresses the role of the
Navy in a global conventional war with the Soviets, however, the
former tended more toward emphasizing the extent of the range of
potential uses of naval power.
** Vlahos, Michael, "Wargaming, an Enforcer of Strategic Realism:
1919-1942," naval War College Review, March-April 1986, pp 7-22. By
a former Naval War College faculty member. How wargaming
prepared the U.S. Navy for war in 1941, and how it is doing so again
today, including linkage between gaming and planning.
Wylie, Capt. J.C., "Why a Sailor Thinks Like a Sailor," Proceedings .
August 1957, pp 811-817. By the Navy's leading public strategist of the
1950s and 60s. Remarkably similar to the views expressed in the
Maritime Strategy a generation later.
Wylie, R.Adm. J. C, Military Strategy . New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press, 1967. Codification of views of USN's most
prominent post-war strategic theorist.
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XI. MAKING MODERN NAVAL STRATEGY: INFLUENCES
Barlett, Henry C, "Approaches to Force Planning," Naval War
College Review . May-June 1985, pp 37-48. By a Naval War College
faculty member. Provides eight approaches to Force Planning, but
each such "approach" can, and does apply to the drafting of Strategy
as well. They are presented by the author as pure types, stark
alternatives, but in actual practice (for example, in the development
of the Maritime Strategy) their influence on the strategist is often
simultaneous to a greater or lesser degree. His list of approaches:
"top-down, bottom-up, scenario, threat, mission, hedging, technology
and fiscal." The first four were probably the most important
influences on the Maritime Strategy of the late 1940s/early 1950s and
the 1980s; "Mission" and "hedging" were relatively more important
from the late 1950s through the mid-1970s. "Threat" influences
tended to be driven more by preceived capabilities in the 1940s
through the 1970s and more by perceived intentions in the 1980s.
Critics tend to focus on "technology" and budget" influences. There is
actually also a ninth approach, "historical/academic" approach,
which tends to focus the strategist on "lessons of history" and/or the
great classics of military thought. All these approaches coexist with
the organizational and psychological influences on war planning
identified by Jack Snyder. The remaining citations in this section
give examples, drawn primarily from the Maritime Strategy debates.
** Froggett, Cdr. S.J., "The Maritime Strategy: Tomahawk's Role,"
Proceedings. February 1987, pp 51-54; Williams, R.Adm. J.W., Jr.,
"In My View...Corss Training," Naval War College Review . March-
April 1985, pp 96-97; and Chipman, Dr. Donald D., and Lay, Maj.
David, USAF, "Sea Power and the B-52 Stratofortress," Air
University Review . January-February 1986, pp 45-50. Good examples
of the "technology" approach to strategy. Focus is on one system, in
these cses the cruise missile, the nuclear submarine, and the land-
based heavy bomber; and arguments on strategy are built around it.
But cf Tavlor. Philip A., "Technologies and Strategies: Trends in
Naval Strategies and Tactics," Naval Forces . VI/1986, pp 44-55. "The
consensus among senior military officers is that ...technology.. .has
not, nor is it likely to determine military strategy."
Holloway, Adm. James L., Ill, USN (Ret.), "The U.S. Navy—
A
Functional Appraisal," Oceanus . Summer 1985, pp 3-11. Focus on
"Mission" by the 1974-78 CNO: "The organization of fleet battle
strategy reflects the mission, functions, roles, and deployment of the
U.S. Navy." See also Williams, Cdr. John A. "Jay," USNR, "U.S.
Navy Missions and Force Structure: A Critical Reappraisal," Armed
Forces and Society . Summer 1981, pp 499-528; and Bryron, Cdr. John,
"Sea Power: The Global Navy," Proceedings January 1984, pp 39-33.
Alternative views of the Navy's "Missions" by two officers who later
contributed to the Maritime Strategy's development. Also see
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"Commentary," Armed Forces and Society . Summer 1982, pp 682-684
for official Navy response to Williams on the eve of Maritime Strategy
development, and Williams' rejoinder. Williams' updated views are
in th'The U.S. and Soviet Navies: Missions and Forces," Armed
Forces and Society . Summer 1984, pp 507-528.
Hughes, Capt. Wayne P., USN (Ret.), "Naval Tactics and Their
Influence on Strategy," Naval War College Review . January-
February 1986, pp 2-17. The strategy-tactics interface. The bottom-up"
view of strategy-building. See also his Fleet Tactics; Theory and
Practice , cited in Section II above; and Hill, R.Adm. C.A. "Mark,"
Jr., USN (Ret.), "Congress and the Carriers," Wings of Gold. Spring
1987, pp 6-8. But cf "In My View...: Tactical Skills," Naval War
College Review . May-June 1986, p 91, "The best plans are not those
developed through top-down or bottom-up approaches. Strategists
and tacticians need to keep in mind that the road to sound planning
is a two-way, not one-way thoroughfare."
Jampoler, Capt. Andrew, "A Central Role for Naval Forces? ...to
Support The Battle," Naval War College Review. November-December
1984. By a member of the 1983-84 Strategic Studies Group at Newport.
Argument is distilled from a "scenario" approach. See also fictional
treatments by Clancy, Hackett and McGeoch et al . and Hayes et al .
cited in Sections I and II above.
Johnson, Capt. W. Spencer, "Comment and Discussion Strategy:
Ours vs. Theirs," Proceedings . September 1984, p 107. One of the
initial drafters of the Maritime Strategy elaborates on the necessity,
utility and existence of a national military strategy from which the
Maritime Strategy is derived. The "top-down" view of strategy-
building written in response to McGruther's "threat-based"
approach, cited below. See also "Comment and Discussion,"
Proceedings . April 1984, p 31.
Jordan, Frank E. Ill, "Maritime-Continental Debate: A Strategic
Approach," National Defense University, Essavs on Strategy V .
Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988, pp 205-
234. An excellent Clausiwitzian critique of what the author contends
is the artificiality of the "Mahan vs. Mackinder" framework of the
contemporary maritime-continental debate over American national
security goals and means. The appropriate U.S. strategy, concludes
Jordan, is one that "is neither purely continental nor purely
maritime, but rather one of global (yet strategically limited)
integrated naval and land campaigns directed toward preserving the
critical US center of gravity." The latter includes the Eurasian
rimlands and narrow seas, and the capabilities, naval and
otherwise, needed to protect their security. Conversely, the Soviet
center of gravity encompasses the Soviet regime and its war-making
mechanism, mainly the Red Army and strategic nuclear forces; the
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necessity for escalation control demands that U.S. strategy exclude a
direct attack against this Soviet center of gravity.
McGruther, Cdr. Kenneth R., "Strategy: Ours vs. Theirs."
Proceedings . February 1984, pp 344-39. By a former member of the
Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603). Calls for a strategy based on
defeating Soviet strategy, a "threat-based" approach. Unlike Barlett,
however, McGruther's approach is rooted in intentions as well as
capabilities. CfVlahos chapter, cited in Section I above.
Moodie, Michael, and Cottrell, Alvin J., Geopolitics and Maritime
Power . Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981. A good example of "hedging" focus.
Regards Lehman's "Major change" as not enough. Also wants
greater naval activity in the Carribean, periodic visits to the South
Atlantic, an enhanced fleet in the Western Pacific and continuing
large-scale activity in the Indian Ocean. See also Sea Plan 2000 . cited
in Section X above.
Nailer, Peter, "The Utility of Maritime Power: Today and
Tomorrow," The RUSI Journal . September 1986, pp 15-21. Discusses
the changes in the elements that have characteristically made up
"maritime power" (fighting fleet, a trading fleet, bases). Changes
such as increasing warship cost and complexity, and the
internationalization of merchant shipping, says Nailer, are making
it progressively more difficult to convincingly state-the-naval-case.
Neustadt, Richard E. and May, Ernest R., Thinking in Time: The
Uses of History for Decision-Makers . New York: The Free Press,
1986. Seeks to focus decision-makers/users of the "historical"
approach. Has direct relevance for strategists, a sub-category of
"decision-makers." For example, the "cases" highlighted in Section
VIII of this addendum and in its predecessor, The Crimea, Salonika,
the Russian Intervention, World War II, etc., can all be profitably
examined using the Neustadt-May methodology.
Peter Swartz, Capt., USN, "Floating Bases Moving Out to Sea?"
NATO's Sixteen Nations . April 1989, pp 65-69. A "founding father" of
the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy proposes a variety of alternative
basing schemes for solving the prospective gap between U.S. global
commitments and the dwindling number of readily accessible
foreign host-country gases. Concludes that no single technological or
political option is likely to answer the case, so that the future
American overseas basing infrastructure will probably be a mix of
facilities on foreign soil, complemented by novel floating base
concepts, fast sea and airlift, and space-based systems.
Sagan, Scott D., "1914 Revisted: Allies, Offense, and Instability,"
International Security . Fall 1986, pp 151-175. An excellent piece.
Takes issue with literature on the alleged "Military Bias for the
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Offensive. Offensive military doctrines are needed not only by states
with expansionist war aim, but also by states that have a strong
interest in protecting an exposed alley." See also Synder, Jack and
Sagan, Soctt D., "Correspondence: The Origins of Offense and the
Consequences of Counterforce," Winter 1986-87, pp 187-198.
Snyder, Jack, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision-
Making and the Disasters of 1914 . Ithaca,, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1984. Chapter I. On how military strategy gets made and why.
Geopolitical, bureaucratic, and personal factors. View military as
predictably and unfortunately biased toward offensive strategies. See
also his "Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914," in Robert
Jervis, et al . (eds.), Psychology and Deterrence . Baltimore: John
Hopkins University Press, 1985, pp 162-164. Summarizes the
literature on the alleged "Military Bias for the Offensive."
** Ullman, Cdr. Harlan K., USN (Ret.), "Gramm-Rudman: A Fiscal
Pearl Harbour," Naval Forces . II/1986, pp 10-11. Congressional
budget actions seen as potentially disastrous for both 600-ship Navy
and the Maritime Strategy. Exhibits all pitfalls of a solely "fiscal"
approach. See also Ullmn, Harlan, U.S. Conventional Force
Structure at a Crossroads . Washington: Georgetown University
CSIS, 1985; and the annual volumes issued by the Brookings
Institution and the Committee for National Security, cited in Sections
I-III above.
* Webb, James H., Jr., "For a Defense That Makes Sense," New York
Times . May 21, 1989, p 38. Calling the post World War II retention of
large U.S. military forces in Europe and South Korea a "historical
anomaly," the former SECNAV appeals for an end to "our strategic
rigidity" and a return instead to the country's "historical role as a
maritime nation." Webb insists that, even while all the parties
involved, including the Europeans and the United States, agree that a
European war is extremely unlikely, institutional conservatism and
"rice bowls" paralyze U.S. decisionmakers from undoing the heavy
financial and security burden on the Continent. He concludes that
the key element to the future deterrence of a Soviet attack against
Western Europe ought to be the American retaliatory threat of
second-front operations in the Pacific.
* Webb, James H., Jr., Untitled remarks at the National Press Club,
Washington, DC, January 13, 1988. Calls for the United States "to
take a fresh look at the world and our place in it, and to seriously
debate the posture of the U.S.military in that context." Maintains that
post-World War II shifts in the global economic and military balance
dictate a re-allocation of U.S. military forces away from "static"
positions in NATO-Europe, and in favor of globally mobile naval and
amphibious "maneuver" forces.
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XII. MAKERS OF MODERN NAVAL STRATEGY: PEOPLE AND
INSTITUTIONS
The Maritime Strategy was originally drafted primarily, although
certainly not exclusively, by U.S. naval officers for U.S. naval officers. Not
only were agreed national, joint, and allied intelligence estimates and
concepts of operations utilized as fundamental "building blocks," but great
importance was also attached to long-held views of the U.S. Navy and
Marine Corps leadership, to the concepts of operations of the fleet
commanders-in-chief, and to the views of thinkers in uniform (active duty
and reserve) at the Naval War College and the Center for Naval Analyses.
Much of what is in the Maritime Strategy is hardly new, and would
be especially recognizable to naval officers who developed U.S. and allied
naval warfighting concepts in the late 1940s and 1950s. Likewise, elements
from key strategy products of naval officers and civilian thinkers of the late
1970s, e.g. the 1976 National Security Council Maritime Strategy study,
naval reservist John Lehman's 1978 Aircraft Carriers , and the Navy's 1978
Sea Plan 2000 and Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navv (NWP 1 , Rev.A), are
also evident in the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s.
Much of what is new in the Maritime Strategy is the linked, coherent
discussion of (a) global warfare, rather than separate service and theater
operation; (b) warfare tasks, e.g. anti-submarine, anti-air, anti-surface,
strike, amphibious, mine and special warfare, rather than traditional
"platforms" or "unions"; (c) the specific geopolitical problems facing the
U.S. Navy, and other maritime elements of the 1980s; and (d) the current
conventional wisdom regarding Soviet Navv capabilities and intentions.
This approach was largely driven by the primacy of the need for the
Strategy to satisfy current global operational requirements of fleet and other
force commanders, over the future requirements of competing
bureaucracies in Washington. Its effect in fostering common reference
points for all portions of the contemporary officer corps, especially junior
officers, is already being felt.
While much of the robustness of the Maritime Strategy derives from
its roots thoughout the U.S. Navy and Marine Crops and elsewhere, both
over space and over time, it owes a high degree of its current utility to its
initial approval and promulgation by successive Chiefs of Naval Operations
in Washington and to its codification by their staffs (OPNAV). These
include especially the successive Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations for
Plans, Policy and Operations (OP-06), heads of the Strategic Concepts
Branch (OP-603), and staff officers in that branch. OPNAV is the one
organization tasked to focus on maritime strategy, and to view it not only in
a balanced global manner but also within the bounds of actual current
national military planning parameters.
OPNAV's capabilities in this endavor are due in part to the existence
of the Navy Politico-Military/Strategic Planning subspecialty, education,
screening, and utilization system. This personnel system, while somewhat
imperfect, has been identifying, training, and using naval officers in a
network of strategists, in Washington, Newport, the Fleet, and elsewhere,
for over a decade and a half.
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Nevertheless, despite the clear postwar historical roots of the
Maritime Strategy and its codification in and dissemination from
Washington by some of the best minds in the national security affairs
community today, a number of publications appeared in the last decade
decrying a lack of strategic training and thinking in the Navy, past and
present, and ignoring or misunderstanding the critical role in strategy
development of naval officers in staff positions. This literature, as well as
some counters to it, is briefly outlined below.
A. The Public Debate: Criticisms and Kudos
"413 Named as Proven Subspecialists," Navy Times . September 9,
1985, p 58. The Navy system for identifying the "pool" of naval
strategists. Results of the seventh biennial U.S. Navy selection board
that identifies "proven" subspecialists for further mid-and high-level
assignments in the eight fields of naval Political-Military/Strategic
Planning. Earlier lists appeared in Navy Times back into the 1970s.
Includes many of the builders of the Maritime Strategy. Note that
these names constitute not only the "Corps of Naval Strategists," but
also the Navy's Politico-Military and Regional Affairs experts.
Brooks, Captain Linton F., "An Examination of Professional
Concerns of Naval Officers as Reflected in Their Professional
Journal," Naval War College Review . January/February 1980, pp 46-
56. A future primary contributor to the development and articulation
of the Maritime Strategy decries the paucity of articles on strategy in
the Navy professional literature of the late 1960s. This era was
admittedly dominated by Vietnam and an internal professional view
of the Navy as primarily an infinitely flexible limited war fire
brigade, but it did, however, also see the publication of R.Adm. J.C.
Wylie's Military Strategy . R.Adm. Henry Eccles' Military Concepts
and Philosophy and Adm. Joseph J. Clark's coauthored Sea Power
and Its Meaning .
Bruins, Berend D., "Should Naval Officers Be Strategists?"
Proceedings . January 1982, pp 52-56. Also "Comment and
Discussion," March 1982, p 27; April 1982, p 20; May 1982, p 17. The
Proceedings throws three more retirees and an active-duty non-
strategist into the public fray. Meanwhile, fleet plan staffs, the
Strategic Studies Group at Newport, and the one intelligence officer
and nine line officers (six with PhDs) assigned to OP-603 were at the
time actively laying the groundwork for the Maritime Strategy.
Illustrative of the limited public visibility of actual naval strategic
thinkers before 1982-83.
Buell, Cdr. Thomas B., USN (Ret.), "The Education of a Warrior,"
Proceedings . January 1981, pp 40-45. Also "Comment and
Discussion," February 1981, p 21; March 1981, p 15; April 1981, pp 21-
23; June 1981, pp 77-79; July 1981, pp 78-80; August 1981, pp 71-75;
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November 1981, pp 84-87; January 1982, p 76; March 1982, p 27; April
1982, p 20. Posed the questions, "Where will we get our future
strategists?" Implied that the Navy had no real answer to the
question, a view shared by most of the eight commenters and
discussants chosen for publication by Proceedings , only one of whom
was familiar with actual Navy practice in this area. Illustrative of
the limited public visibility of true U.S. Navy strategic thought before
1981-82.
** Burdick, Capt. Howard, "Sons of the Prophet: A View of the Naval
War College Faculty," Naval War College Review . May-June 1986, pp
81-89. On the Naval War College, its faculty, and the Maritime
Strategy, by the Dean of Academics at the Naval War College.
** Bush, Ted, "Libyan Exercise Exemplifies New Navy Strategy," Navy
Times . February 10, 1986, pp 45-46. OPNAV strategists illuminate a
variety of aspects of the Maritime Strategy and its origins. Note that,
unlike open-literature authors, actual practicing strategists usually
remain nameless to the general public. This hardly means, however,
that they are somehow less important.
** Clark, Charles S., "In Person: Fred H. Rainbow: Charting a Course
for the Navy's Debates," National Journal . February 21, 1987, p 435.
On the role of the Proceedings in orchestrating "some heated
forensics over the Navy's trumpeted Maritime Strategy (while)
similar Air Force and Army journals often reflect the blandness of
official restraints." The Institute has come a long way in just a few
short years. Like the Naval War College and the Naval War College
Review , the Naval Institute and the Proceedings are clearly at the
cutting edge of maritime strategy debate today.
** CNA Annual Report: 1985 . Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval
Analyses, 1986, especially pp 7-12 and 29-30. On CNA's contribution
to the development of the Maritime Strategy and on its use of that
strategy in planning its research programs. Also, CNA analysts'
views on Soviet maritime strategy.
Crackel, Lt. Col. Theodore J., USA (Ret.), "On the Making of
Lieutenants and Colonels," Public Interest . Summer 1984, pp 18-30.
"The services have produced no strategic thinkers at all." He is
especially hard on War College faculties, including the Naval War
College: "None of the war college faculties is in the forefront of
development in any of the military disciplines they teach." Actually,
no group has been more in the "forefront of development in the
"discipline" of Maritime Strategy (SECNAV, the CNO, the OP-06
organization, and the Strategic Studies Group aside) than the Naval
War College faculty, as is evidenced by their prominence in this
biolography. Crackel is a military historian by training with little
apparent experience in actual strategy or policy-making, and with an
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almost exclusively U.S. Army-oriented academic and operational
record. Unlike most practicing U.S. naval strategies, he has
apparently self-fulfilled his prophecy and "discovered that the think-
tanks in and around Washington are a more congenial
environment."
Davis, Capt. Vincent, USNR (Ret.), "Decision Making, Decision
Makers, and Some of the Results," in Cimbala, Stephen, (ed.), The
Reagan Defense Program: An Interim Assessment . Wilmington,
DE, Scholarly Resources, 1986, pp 23-62. A somewhat anachronistic
characterization of the contemporary Navy as one with "too few
thinkers," driven by acrimonious debates among factions of naval
officers. "Rancorous disputes simmer among its 'big three unions
—
the carrier, submarine and surface-warfare admirals." Thus, the
seminal thinker and writer on naval strategy and bureaucratic
politics of the 40s, 50s and 60s sees no essential change in the Navy of
the mid-80s, despite conscious Navy efforts to take his earlier counsel
to heart in its development of a transcendent Maritime Strategy. Qf
articles by V.Adms Demars, Schoultz, and Dunn, leaders of the
submarine and air warfare communities, and by Lts. Winnefeld,
Peppe and Keller, the rising generation, cited in Sections II and III
above.
Gallotta, Capt. Richard USN (Ret.), et al . Assessment of Maritime
Strategy Education and Training in the Department of the Navv .
McLean, VA: The BDM Corporation, December 31, 1986. A
comprehensive balanced survey, with recommendations.
Hanks, R.Adm. Robert J., USN (Ret.), "Whither U.S. Naval
Strategy?" Strategic Review . Summer 1982, pp 16-22. An outstanding
OP-60 of the 1970s challenges the U.S. Navy to develop a coherent
strategy, an activity being vigorously pursued even as the article was
published.
Hattendorf, John, Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of
the U.S. Naval War College. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press,
1984. Chronicles the important supporting role of the Naval War
College in the development and dissemination of U.S. Navy strategic
thought. See especially pp 201-202, 237, 312-219.
Hearding, L.Cdr. David, "A Requiem for the Silent Service,"
Submarine Review . July 1987, pp 73-78. An important article
stressing the need for broader integration of U.S. Navy submarine
officers into the Navy as a whole, in part as a result of the advent of
the Maritime Strategy.
Kennedy, Floyd D., Jr., "Naval Strategy for the Next Century:
Resurgence of the Naval War College as the Center of Strategic Naval
Thought," National Defense . April 1983, pp 27-30. Covers the
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resurgence of the Naval War College, although without describing
the linkages between that institution and the strategic planners in
Washington, through which Naval War College thinking is actually
translated into Maritime Strategy elements. Also see 1983 Murray
article cited in Section I above.
Lehman, John F., Jr., "Thinking About Strategy," Shipmate . April
1982, pp 18-20. SECNAV's charge to the officer corps.
** Leibstone, Marvin, "US Report," Naval Forces . 11/1986, p 94. Alleges
"an unusually large number of naval officers do not recognize fully
the switch from 'defense' to 'offense' that the Navy's high command
believes is necessary." But cf "The United States Navy: On the Crest
of the Wave," The Economist . April 19, 1986, p 49 cited above: "What
is certain is that an entire generation of junior and middle-grade
naval officers now believes that the first wartime job of the Navy
would be to sail north and fight the Russians close to their bases."
* Marryott, R.Adm. Ronald F., "President's Notes," Naval War College
Review . November/December 1985, pp 2-4. By the 1985-86 President of
the Naval War College and 1983-84 Director of Strategy, Plans, and
Policy (OP-60), the Navy's principal global strategist. On development
of the Maritime Strategy, and the Naval War College's vital
supporting contribution.
** Metcalf, V.Adm. Joseph, "Metcalf Speaks Out: On the Navy's New
Offense, Ship Design and Archimedes," Navv News and Undersea
Technology . July 18, 1986, p 2. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Surface Warfare views Maritime Strategy as of little concern to
Navy junior officers. Not a common view.
Milsted, L.Cdr. Charles E., Jr., "A Corps of Naval Strategist,"
Masters Degree Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 1983. Based
on the somewhat skewed open literature available during this period.
As with Bruins, above, "strategy" and "long-range planning" not
well differentiated. Proposed establishment of a network of
specifically educated and trained naval strategists responsible for
long-range planning. Following his own model, Milsted was
subsequently assigned to OP-603 from 1983 to 1985, where he became
a key contributor to the codification of the Maritime Strategy. Qf U. S.
Navy, First Annual Long Range Planners' Conference cited in
Section I above.
Murray, Williamson, "Grading the War Colleges," National
Interest . Winter 1986/7, pp 12-19. Antidote to Crackel. "The best of the
war colleges, the Naval War College at Newport, sets the standard by
which the other war colleges should be measured. The strategy and
policy curriculum has justifiably acquired a reputation as the
premier course in the United States, if not the Western world, for the
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examination of strategy. So high is the Naval War College's
reputation, that over the course of the past few years it has attracted a
number of the best young military historians and political scientists
in national security affairs to Newport." <
Stavridis, L.Cdr. Jim, "An Ocean Away: Outreach from the Naval
War College," Shipmate . November 1985, p 8, on the role of the Naval
War College in contributing to OP-603's codification of the Maritime
Strategy and in "getting the word out" to mid-grade naval officers. By
a former OP-603 member.
** Tritten, Cdr. James, "New Directions," Naval War College Review .
Spring 1987, p 94. By the Chairman of the Naval Postgraduate School
National Security Affairs Department and a former OP-60 staffer. On
the revitalization of Naval history and strategy studies at the "PG
School."
** Wirt, Robert T., "Strategic ASW," Submarine Review . July 1986, pp
50-56. Calls for a comprehensive ASW plan, driven by submarines to
support the Maritime Strategy. Unionism is not quite dead yet.
Woolsey, R. James, "Mapping U.S. Defense Policy in the 1980s,"
International Security . Fall 1981, pp 202-207. By the 1977-1980 Under
Secretary of the Navy. "The other side of the coin." A call to bring the
"American academic intellectual establishment" and the military
establishment more in touch with each other by focusing the efforts of
the former on the actual "defense policy" problems of the latter, vice
exclusively on "(a) the politico-military situation in the four corners
of the globe and (b) nuclear and arms control theology." For similar
disconnects that have occurred even within the field of "nuclear
theology" itself, see Rosenberg, David, "U.S. Nuclear Strategy:
Theory vs. Practice," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists . March 1987,
pp 20+. "Theorists and consultants have had little impact on the
development of nuclear weapons policies. Rather, strategic planning
should be seen as a governmental process, carried out largely by
military officers and civilian bureaucrats."
B. The Public Record: OP-603
From 1982 to the present, the primary U.S. Navy organization
charged with codifying, refining, and articulating the consensus in the
Navy regarding the Maritime Strategy has been the OPNAV Strategic
Concepts Group (OP-603). Organized by V.Adm. William J. Crowe (then
OP-06) and R.Adm. Robert Hilton (then OP-60) in 1978, OP-603 evolved into
an office of about a dozen post-graduate educated, trained, professional
operator-strategists, including U.S. Army, Air Force, Marine Corps and
Central Intelligence Agency officers.
" Almost invisible to the general and national security affairs
academic publics, especially when contrasted to the Secretary of the Navy,
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the Chief of Naval Operations, OP-06 and OP-60, the operational
commanders, the Strategic Studies Group and the Naval War College,
these officers have nevertheless been those principally responsible for the
development of the Maritime Strategy as a unified, coherent, global
framework and common U.S. and allied naval vision.
As with war planners, but unlike war college faculties, their output
is largely classified. Nevertheless, they, and their superiors, OP-60 and OP-
60B, have also achieved respectable open publication records. Typically,
their writings prior to assignment to OP-60/603 reflect their diverse
operational and academic interests and achievements; their publications
during and after their assignment as strategists usually reflect their work
on the Maritime Strategy. For the latter, see the entries cited earlier in this
bibliography by R.Adms. Hanks, Maryott, and Pendley; Capts. Barnett,
Brooks, Johnson, McGruther and Swartz; Cdrs. Hickman, Kalb and
Milsted, and L.Cdrs. Pocalyko and Stavridis. For the former, see the entries
below. They represent, admittedly, only a portion of the record, limited only
to the products of those officers who were specifically and principally
assigned to codify the Maritime Strategy, generally the Op-603 "Branch
Heads" and "Maritime Strategy Action Officers" serving from 1982 through
1986. They are provided only to illustrate the breath of experience and depth
of thought members of the U.S. Navy's current, functioning "Corps of
Naval Strategists" bring with them when they report for duty.
Barnett, Capt. Roger W., "Soviet Strategic Reserves and the Soviet
Navy," in Currie, Maj. Kenneth M. and Varhall, Maj. Gregory, "The
Soviet Union: What Lies Ahead? Military Political Affairs in the
1980s . Washington: USGPO, 1985, pp 581-605. The operator and
Sovietologist as future strategist. A 1980 paper by the 1983-84 OP-603
Branch Head. See also his "Their Professional Journal" (with Dr.
Edward J. Lacey), Proceedings . October 1982, pp 95-101.
Daly, Capt. Thomas M. and Myers, Cdr. Albert C, "The Art of
ASW," Proceedings. October 1985, pp 164-165. Operators and warfare
specialists as strategists. The 1985-86 OP-603 Branch Head and his
primary Maritime Strategy Action Officer discuss their primary
warfare specialty. See also Daly Proceedings articles on the Iran-Iraq
ar, July 1984 and May and July 1985, and on the Bikini A-Bomb tests,
July 1986.
** Hattendorf, John B., "The Evolution of the Maritime Strategy: 1977 to
1987," Naval War College Review . Summer 1988, pp 7-26. Excellent
and insightful discussion of the institutional origins of the U.S.
Navy's strategical thinking that resulted in the development, "for the
first time in many decades," in a "concept of national maritime
strategy," and that the Navy's leadership agreed could be a
"reasonable basis upon which to plan and prepare for a possible
future war with the Soviet Union..." A "must" reading.
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Parker, L.Cdr. T. Wood, "Thinking Offensively," Proceedings. April
1981, pp 26-31; "Theater Nuclear Warfare and the U.S. Navy," Naval
War College Review . January/February 1982, pp 3-16; and
"Paradigms, Conventional Wisdom, and Naval Warfare,"
Proceedings . April 1983, pp 29-35. The operator and War College
student as future strategist. Three prize-winning essays by the 1984-
85 principal OP-603 Maritime Strategy Action Officer.
Seaquist, Cdr. Larry, "Memorandum for the Commander. Subject:
Tactical Proficiency," and "Tactics to Improve Tactical Proficiency,"
Proceedings . July 1981, pp 58-61 and February 1983, pp 37-42. The
operator and tactician as future strategist. By a member of the 1983-
84 Strategic Studies Group and 1984-85 OP-603 Branch Head.
Weeks, L.Cdr. Stanley B., "United States Defense Policy Toward
Spain, 1950-1976, unpublished PhD dissertation, American
University, 1977; and Johnson, L.Cdr. William S., "Naval Diplomacy
and the Failure of Balanced Security in the Far East—1921-1935, and
"Defense Budget Constraints and the Fate of the Carrier in the Royal
Navy," Navv War College Review . February 1972, pp 67-88 and May-
June 1973, pp 12-30. Operators and international relations specialists
as future strategists. By the OP-60 co-drafters of the initial 1982-1983
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